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Zusammenfassung
Gegenwa¨rtig werden kryptographische Anwendungen in fast allen Bereichen des Lebens
genutzt, einschließlich Wirtschaft, Gesundheitswesen, Milita¨r und Unterhaltung. Ohne sie
wu¨rde sich unser Leben in unvorhersehbarer Weise vera¨ndern. Seit der Vero¨ffentlichung
von Shor’s Algorithmus in 1994 ist allerdings bekannt, dass kryptographische Anwendun-
gen, die auf den Problemen des Faktorisierens oder diskreten Logarithmus basieren, von
Quantencomputer-Angriffen bedroht sind. Dazu geho¨ren fast alle heutigen Anwendung.
Es wird davon ausgegangen, dass code-basierte Kryptographie sicher ist gegen Angriffe von
Quantencomputern. Daru¨ber hinaus hat sie einige weitere Vorteile. Erstens weist sie gute
Sicherheits-Eigenschaften auf: Beispielsweise werden bina¨re Goppacodes als eine sichere
Wahl fu¨r code-basierte Anwendungen angesehen, und das McEliece-Verschlu¨sselungsver-
fahren wurde seit seiner Vero¨ffentlichung vor u¨ber 30 Jahren nicht gebrochen (es war
lediglich eine Anpassungen der Parameter erforderlich).
Zweitens ko¨nnen code-basierte Anwendungen vergleichsweise einfach auf Gera¨ten mit
geringer Rechenkapazita¨t und ohne kryptographischem Coprozessor laufen, da sie nur
lineare Algebra nutzen, anstelle von z.B. Fließkommaberechnungen.
Schließlich kann die Komplexita¨t von Angriffen gegen code-basierte Anwendungen meist
pra¨zise in der erwarteten Anzahl von Operationen berechnet werden, ohne die asympto-
tische O-Notation nutzen zu mu¨ssen. Dies erlaubt eine genaue Berechnung des Sicher-
heitslevels dieser Anwendungen. Der hauptsa¨chliche Nachteil der meisten code-basierten
Anwendungen ist die betra¨chtliche Schlu¨sselgro¨ße von mehreren Kilobyte bis Megabyte.
Diese Arbeit leistet einen Beitrag zu zwei wichtigen Aspekten der Entwicklung kryp-
tographischer Anwendungen. Der erste betrifft die Verwendung sicherer Primitive. Wa¨h-
rend Verfahren wie McEliece und Niederreiter seit langer Zeit analysiert werden und heute
als sicher gelten, werden kontinuierlich Varianten und neue Verfahren entwickelt. Die
Zielsetzung ist typischerweise eine Verringerung der Schlu¨sselgro¨ße oder die Pra¨sentation
neuer Eigenschaften und anderer Verbesserungen (wie z.B. ho¨here Effizienz). Zur Bestim-
mung der Sicherheit dieser neuen Verfahren, mu¨ssen diese gegen alle relevanten Angriffe
getestet werden. Unser Beitrag besteht in der Entwicklung eines neuen Angriffs, des
Broadcast-Angriffs, sowie der Weiterentwicklung und Generalisierung existierender An-
griffe.
Der zweite Aspekt betrifft die Wahl sicherer Parameter, welche fu¨r eine praktische An-
wendung der Primitive erforderlich ist. Die hierfu¨r zu beru¨cksichtigen Einschra¨nkungen
sind in erster Linie die Gewa¨hrleistung eines ausreichenden Sicherheitslevels; weitere betr-
effen verschiedene Aspekte von Effizienz, z.B. Ver- und Entschlu¨sselungszeit, erforderliche
Bandbreite oder Speichergro¨ße usw. Unser Beitrag ist die Bestimmung optimaler Parame-
ter fu¨r das McEliece-Verschlu¨sselungsverfahren sowie das QD-CFS Signaturschema durch
Anwendung des Systems von Lenstra und Verheul.
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Abstract
Today, cryptographic applications are used in nearly all areas of our lives, including the
economy, health, military, and entertainment. Without them, society would change in
ways we can hardly imagine. Since the publication of Shor’s algorithm in 1994, however,
we know that those cryptographic applications based on the problems of factoring and
discrete logarithm are threatened by quantum computer attacks. Most current applica-
tions belong to this category.
Code-based cryptography is conjectured to be secure against quantum computer attacks,
and it has several other advantages. Firstly, it exhibits advanced security properties: for
example, binary Goppa codes are considered a secure choice for many schemes, and the
McEliece encryption scheme has not been broken in over 30 years since its publication
(merely an adjustment of the parameters was necessary).
Secondly, since code-based cryptosystems are based on linear algebra instead of, for exam-
ple, arithmetic using floating-point numbers, they are usually very fast and can be imple-
mented on devices with a low computing power and without cryptographic co-processor.
Finally, the complexity of attacks against code-based schemes can usually be estimated ac-
curately in the expected number of binary operations instead of relying on the asymptotic
O-notation. This allows a precise computation of the security level a scheme provides.
The major drawback of most code-based schemes is their large key size.
This thesis contributes to two important aspects in the development of cryptographic
applications. The first concerns the use of secure cryptographic primitives. While schemes
like the McEliece and Niederreiter encryption schemes have been studied for a long time
and are considered secure, new schemes or variants of existing ones are constantly being
developed. The objectives are to decrease the key size, create schemes with new properties,
or to introduce other improvements. In order to assess the security of these schemes, they
have to be subjected to all relevant attacks. We contribute to this aspect by introducing
a new type of attack, a broadcast attack, and by improving and generalizing existing
attacks.
Secondly, once a secure primitive has been found, appropriate code parameters have to be
selected. This choice needs to reflect several constraints. Most importantly, the parameters
have to provide a sufficient security level. Other constraints concern different aspects of
efficiency, e.g. encryption or decryption time, required bandwidth, memory size etc. Our
contribution is the selection of optimal parameters for the McEliece cryptosystem and the
QD-CFS signature scheme by applying Lenstra and Verheul’s framework.
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1. Introduction
Throughout history, cryptography has played an important role for society. For instance,
Julius Caesar sent encrypted messages to his troops, and breaking the famous Enigma
ciphers in World War 2 was a critical success in the Allied war effort. While historically
most applications were military, today cryptography is used in many other areas as well:
Encryption schemes allow private and secure communication; they protect digital rights,
e.g. the content of DVDs or pay-TV streams; and they secure sensitive data on all levels,
be it national secrets or personal medical records. Digital signatures certify the source of
documents and ensure that they are unaltered; this does not only include the common
example of signed emails, but in fact, digital signatures are the basis of public-key infras-
tructure, creating a hierarchy of trust and thereby enabling applications such as electronic
banking or credit card transactions via the internet. Identification and authentication
schemes ensure that the communicating parties really are who they claim. Therefore,
they are an important component of many of the applications mentioned above. These
tools are thus essential for our modern economy, since global trade and the increasing
number of electronic financial transactions would hardly be possible, if at all.
In order to allow communication between two parties without the need to meet or ex-
change keys via some other channel, public-key cryptography is required. In contrast to
secret-key cryptography, public-key schemes do not require the initial secret exchange of
some key. Every user has a public and a private/secret key. The public key is used, for
example, to encrypt messages addressed to this user and to verify his signatures, while
the decryption of messages as well as the generation of signatures require the secret key.
All public-key schemes are based on a (usually mathematical) hard problem. This means
that the scheme can be attacked by solving an instance of this problem, and in some cases
the (stronger) other direction holds as well. Most cryptographic schemes used today are
based on the problem of factoring large integers or on the problem of computing discrete
logarithms, e.g. the RSA and ElGamal encryption schemes. However, in 1994 P. Shor
published a quantum algorithm allowing to solve these two problems in polynomial time,
showing that large enough quantum computers can break these “classical” cryptosystems.
While existing quantum computers use only a small number of quantum bits, or qubits,
and while the technical difficulties to employ more qubits are very high, many researchers
expect that large quantum computers will be built in the next few decades.
It is, therefore, crucial to develop cryptosystems that are resistant to quantum computer
attacks. Error-correcting codes, originally developed for communication over noisy chan-
nels, have been applied in cryptography for at least three decades, ever since R. J. McEliece
published his encryption scheme in 1978. Together with cryptography based on lattices,
multivariate equations, and hash functions, code-based cryptography is conjectured to be
secure against quantum computer attacks. Consequently, it is a promising candidate for
post-quantum cryptography, which refers to those cryptographic schemes that remain se-
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cure after the development of large quantum computers.
The advancement of code-based cryptography takes place in four areas: Firstly, the devel-
opment of secure cryptosystems. Progress in this area requires constant improvement of
attacks to assess the security of a scheme as precisely as possible. Secondly, the choice of
secure and efficient parameters for these schemes. This selection has to take into account
the specific cryptosystem, the time for which protection is required, and assumptions
about future hardware and software developments. The third area is the reduction of the
key size which is usually very large for code-based cryptosystems. Research towards this
goal is linked with the first two areas since many proposals for key size reduction have
implications on the security of the respective scheme. Finally, the development of schemes
with additional features, for instance blind or ring signatures.
1.1. Summary of results
The goal of this thesis is to improve the understanding of the theoretical security and to
advance the applicability of code-based cryptography. We focus on the first two of the
four areas mentioned above: the development and improvement of attacks against code-
based cryptosystems (Chapters 3 and 4) and the choice of secure and efficient parameters
(Chapter 5). More specifically, this work contributes the following results.
Chapter 3: Critical attacks Our first contribution consists of the results of a comprehen-
sive analysis of broadcast attacks against the Niederreiter and the HyMES cryptosystems.
A broadcast scenario is given if a sender broadcasts a message m to several users, en-
crypted with the respective user’s public key. A typical example for this scenario is the
distribution of standardized emails to many recipients. We show that both schemes are
vulnerable to this kind of attack if they are not protected by a layer of semantic conversion.
Our attack is related to the one by Plantard and Susilo who studied broadcast attacks
against lattice-based schemes. Here, we extend their approach by the following aspects:
we prove an explicit bound for the expected number of recipients that is required to run
our attack; we cover the case where too few messages are intercepted by an attacker and
analyze the situation where the broadcasted messages are not identical but similar to each
other; finally, we discuss in detail the use of semantic conversions to protect against broad-
cast attacks. An implementation of our attack can be found in the appendix of this work
(see page 135).
Chapter 4: Non-critical attacks The second group of contributions consists of improve-
ments of non-critical attacks. The first is a generalization of attacks based on information
set decoding from binary to larger fields Fq. We propose and prove lower bounds for
the complexity of these algorithms, and we show that the field structure can be used to
improve the efficiency compared with a straightforward generalization. Secondly, we an-
alyze the effect of partial knowledge on the efficiency of attacks. We define two types of
partial knowledge an attacker might be able to obtain, describe techniques that exploit
this knowledge, and prove lower bounds for the complexity of attacks employing these
18
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techniques. Our third result is the improvement of attacks based on the generalized birth-
day algorithm for the case where the target matrix is of a certain structure. We conclude
this section with an analysis of three “cross-area” attacks: two lattice-based attacks used
against code-based systems and one code-based attack employed against lattice-based sys-
tems.
Chapter 5: Parameter selection Our final group of results focus on the major practical
aspect of code-based cryptography, the selection of secure parameters. In contrast to some
other areas of cryptography where the complexity of attacks is known only asymptotically
(and expressed in O-notation), the complexity of many attacks against code-based cryp-
tosystems can be expressed in the expected number of binary operations. This facilitates
a detailed analysis of secure and efficient parameters.
We begin with an application of Lenstra and Verheul’s framework to the McEliece cryp-
tosystem. Using this framework and a set of assumptions about future hardware and
software developments, we derive parameters that are expected to be secure at least until
a given year and minimize the corresponding public key size. Next, we focus on the selec-
tion of optimal parameters for the QD-CFS signature scheme. Our analysis is also based
on Lenstra and Verheul’s framework, and it takes into account the various constraints
which are due to structural attacks and the use of quasi-dyadic codes. Finally, we show
that the selection of parameters allows to trade off signature generation time versus public
key size.
1.2. Related Work
This section provides a context for this thesis. We reference the major publications from
the four research areas listed above.
The first notable code-based encryption scheme was published by R. J. McEliece [55]
in 1978. The Niederreiter cryptosystem [70], which can be seen as a dual to McEliece, was
presented in 1986. Both schemes remain secure up to date (when used with Goppa codes
and appropriate parameters). Other important code-based schemes are the CFS signature
scheme [70], the FSB hash function [5] and the SYND stream cipher [39].
Many attacks have been developed against these and other cryptosystems. Two impor-
tant types of generic attacks are information-set decoding and the generalized birthday
algorithm. Initially proposed by Prange [79], the former was improved and refined many
times (see Sections 2.5.2 and 4). The latter was developed by Wagner [97] and was gener-
alized by Minder and Sinclair [60] (see Sections 2.5.2 and 4.3). In addition to that, there
have been several structural attacks against specific cryptosystems. Examples include the
Sidelnokiv-Shestakov attack [87] in 1992 and the algebraic cryptanalysis of McEliece vari-
ants with compact keys by Fauge`re et al. [33].
While many publications of new schemes included sample parameters, we are not aware
of a detailed, comprehensive analysis of the parameter selection that compares to ours.
Key size reduction was not a major research focus until it received increasing attention in
recent years. This development is in great measure due to the emergence and growing use
of small devices, e.g. mobile phones and sensors, which often contain very limited memory.
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Many proposals are based on the idea to use codes with additional structure which allows a
more compact representation, for instance low-density-parity-check (LDPC), quasi-cyclic,
and quasi-dyadic codes [40, 10, 61].
The development of cryptosystems with additional properties is another recent trend.
Code-based ring signatures [98], identity-based identification and signature schemes [25],
and threshold ring signatures [56, 30] are prominent examples.
In summary, code-based cryptography has received increasing attention in recent years,
but there is much room for further improvements towards secure and efficient cryptogra-
phic applications.
20
2. Preliminaries, Definitions, and Notation
In this section, we review notions and definitions from coding theory, code-based crypto-
graphy, and cryptanalysis. We aim to make this thesis as self-contained as possible, but we
will confine ourselves to the most important parts and provide references for more details.
A collection of symbols and abbreviations used in this thesis can be found on page 125.
2.1. Introduction
Coding theory is the study of error-correcting codes and their properties. The study of
these codes was inspired by Shannon’s article “A mathematical theory of communica-
tion” [85]. They were initially developed to correct errors due to data transmission over
noisy channels, and there is a wide range of applications including CDs and DVDs, hard
disks, mobile phones, and satellite communication. Codes are also used for data compres-
sion, and they are the foundation of code-based cryptography.
The underlying idea is to add redundancy to the data which allows the correction of a
certain number and type of errors. Specifically, the data or message is mapped injectively
into a certain set which is called a code, and its elements are codewords. Encoding a
message is the application of this map; depending on the context, decoding refers either
to the process of removing the errors from a codeword, or to the map from codewords
potentially containing errors to the set of messages. We will use the former definition in
this thesis.
In code-based cryptography, the sender of a message intentionally adds errors to the code-
word in order to make decoding — and thus decryption — difficult. The receiver of the
message is able to decode it by using some secret knowledge (usually about the code
structure), but this is infeasible for an attacker who does not have the secret knowledge.
2.2. Mathematical notation
In this thesis, we denote row vectors and numbers by lower case, and matrices and sets by
upper case roman letters, unless the notation commonly used in the literature is different.
We denote by Ik the set {1, 2, . . . , k}. The elements that vectors and matrices consist of
are also called entries or bits, and they are denoted by subscripts, e.g. x = (x1, . . . , xn)
and H = (Hij)i,j∈In . For any non-zero vector v ∈ Fnq \{0}, le(v) ∈ Fq denotes the leading
element of v, i.e. its first non-zero element. As usual, addition of vectors and matrices is
defined on the entries. In general, we denote multiplication by ·, but we will omit it where
this improves the readability. Whenever the summands or factors are elements of a finite
field Fq and unless stated otherwise, the operation is performed over Fq. For matrices A,
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B, and C, we write A = (B|C) and A′ = 〈B,C〉 to denote the horizontal and vertical
concatenation of B and C, respectively, and similarly for vectors. For a matrix A and
J ⊆ In, A·J denotes the submatrix of A consisting of those columns indexed by the set J .
2.3. Coding theory
In the following, we recall selected notions from coding theory. We refer to the book by
MacWilliams and Sloane [53] for more details.
2.3.1. General concepts
Definition 2.3.1 (Error-correcting code). A (linear) error-correcting code C of length n
and dimension k, defined over a finite field Fq, is a k-dimensional vector subspace of the
n-dimensional vector space Fnq . A code with these properties is called an [n, k] code. For
q = 2, C is called a binary code, otherwise it is called a q-ary code. The co-dimension r
of a code is defined as r = n− k, and the code rate R is the ratio of dimension to length,
R = k/n.
Definition 2.3.2 (Permutation-equivalent codes). Two linear codes C and C′ are called
permutation-equivalent if there exists a permutation σ on In such that
C′ = σ(C) := {(xσ−1(i))i∈In : (xi)i∈In ∈ C}.
Definition 2.3.3 (Hamming weight, Hamming distance). The (Hamming) weight wt(v)
of any vector v is defined as the number of non-zero entries of v. The (Hamming) distance
of two vectors d(x, y) is defined as wt(x− y).
In order to decode words in a set D ⊆ Fnq with respect to an [n, k] code C, every word
c ∈ D needs to be associated with a codeword which can then be mapped uniquely to the
corresponding message. There are different ways to do this, but the most common one is
to associate a given word with that codeword which has minimum distance.
Definition 2.3.4 (Decoding algorithm). Let C be an [n, k] code over Fq and D ⊆ Fnq .
An algorithm DC that takes a word c ∈ D and a natural number t as input is called a
t-error-correcting algorithm for C iff
∀c ∈ D : DC(c) = {x ∈ C : d(x, c) ≤ t}.
If D = Fnq , DC allows complete decoding.
Two important properties of a code are its minimum distance and its error-correcting
capability.
Definition 2.3.5 (Minimum distance, error-correcting capability). The minimum dis-
tance d of a code C is the minimum distance of any two different codewords, or equivalently,
the minimum weight of all non-zero codewords:
d = min
x,y∈C
x 6=y
d(x, y) = min
x∈C
x 6=0
wt(x).
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A code of length n, dimension k and minimum distance d is denoted an [n, k, d] code.
For c ∈ Fnq and any t ≤ b(d− 1)/2c, there can be at most one codeword x with d(x, c) ≤ t.
Therefore, c can be decoded uniquely to x, and t = b(d−1)/2c is called the error-correcting
capability of C. A code with these properties is denoted an (n, k, t) code.
Since a code is a vector subspace, it can be defined by a basis and by its dual space.
Definition 2.3.6 (Generator and parity check matrices, syndrome). Let C be an [n, k]
linear code over Fq. A k × n matrix G of full rank and defined over Fq is a generator
matrix of C if the rows of G form a basis of C. We say that G generates C, and we have
C = {mG : m ∈ Fkq}.
A parity check matrix of C is an r × n matrix of full rank and defined over Fq, where
C = {x ∈ Fnq : HxT = 0}.
H is a generator matrix for the dual space C⊥. For a given parity check matrix H and
any vector e, we call s the syndrome of e if sT = HeT .
Two generator matrices generate permutation-equivalent codes if one is obtained from
the other by a linear transformation and a permutation. Therefore, up to permutation
we can write any generator matrix G in systematic form G = [Ik|R], where Ik is the
identity matrix of size k, which allows a more compact representation. If C is generated
by G = [Ik|R], then a parity check matrix for C is H = [−RT|In−k]. Up to permutation,
it is also possible to have the identity submatrix on the left hand side of H.
In 1952 and 1957, Gilbert [42] and Varshamov [96] independently developed bounds on
the maximum size of a code. While the methods to prove these bounds were different, the
bounds are asymptotically equal. Based on these bounds, Barg [7, Section 1.2] proposed
the related Gilbert-Varshamov distance.
Definition 2.3.7 (Gilbert-Varshamov (GV) bound, GV distance). Let Aq(n, d) denote
the maximum size of an [n, k, d] code over Fq, i.e. the maximum number of codewords.
The GV bound states that
Aq(n, d) ≥ q
n∑d−1
j=0
(
n
j
)
(q − 1)j .
For C an [n, k] code over Fq, the GV distance is defined as the maximum integer d such
that
d−1∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
(q − 1)j ≤ qn−k.
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2.3.2. Goppa codes
This section covers special types of codes that will be used in different parts of this thesis.
We start with the definition of Goppa codes. These codes have been used in cryptogra-
phy for more than three decades, ever since McEliece presented his encryption scheme in
1978 [55].
A useful method for constructing codes is the subfield subcode construction (see [90] for
details on the construction and on properties of subfield subcodes).
Definition 2.3.8 (Subfield subcodes). Let C be a code defined over an extention field Fqm
of Fq. A subfield subcode C′ of C over Fq is the restriction of C to Fq:
C′ = C|Fq = C ∩ Fnq .
Definition 2.3.9 (Vandermonde matrix). Given a set L = (L1, . . . , Ln) ∈ Fnq and an
integer t > 0, the Vandermonde matrix vdm(t, L) is the t × n matrix V with elements
Vij = L
i−1
j .
Definition 2.3.10 (Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) and alternant codes). Let L =
(L1, . . . , Ln) ∈ Fnq be a sequence of distinct elements and D = (D1, . . . , Dn) ∈ Fnq be a
sequence of non-zero elements. The GRS code GRSt(L,D) is the (n, k, t) code defined by
the parity-check matrix
H = vdm(t− 1, L) · diag(D).
An alternant code is a subfield subcode of a GRS code.
Definition 2.3.11 (Goppa codes). Let q be a prime power, Fqm an extention field of
Fq of degree m ≥ 1, a sequence L = (L1, . . . , Ln) ∈ Fnqm of distinct elements, and a
polynomial g(x) ∈ Fqm [x] of degree t such that g(Li) 6= 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The Goppa
code Γ(L, g) over Fq is the alternant code over Fq corresponding to GRSt(L,D), where
D = (g(L0)
−1, . . . , g(Ln)−1).
2.3.3. QC alternant codes, QD Goppa codes
Due to the main drawback of many code-based cryptosystems, the large public key size,
there have been many proposals on how to reduce those key sizes. One way to do this is to
use codes with additional structure. These allow highly structured generator and parity
check matrices which can be stored more efficiently. Two examples that play a role in this
thesis are quasi-cyclic (QC) alternant [10] and quasi-dyadic (QD) Goppa [61] codes. We
give a brief description here and refer to the original papers for more details.
Definition 2.3.12 (Circular/cyclic matrices). A circulant or cyclic matrix M is a square
matrix where each row is a cyclic shift of the previous
M =

m1 m2 · · · mn
mn m1 · · · mn−1
...
. . .
. . .
...
m2 · · · mn m1
 .
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Definition 2.3.13 (Dyadic matrices). Let h = (h0, h1, . . . , hn−1) ∈ Fnq and n = 2a for
some integer a. A dyadic matrix D is an n × n matrix over Fq with entries Dij = hi⊕j ,
where ⊕ refers to bitwise XOR on the binary representations of the indices. The vector h
is called the signature of D.
Definition 2.3.14 (QC and QD matrices and codes). A QC (QD) matrix is a k0l × n0l
block matrix where each block of size l× l is cyclic (dyadic). A QC (QD) code is one that
admits a QC (QD) generator matrix.
Cyclic and dyadic matrices are completely determined by their first row, and QC and
QD matrices by the first rows of the k0n0 blocks. This allows a much more efficient rep-
resentation.
In [10], Berger et al. proposed to use QC alternant codes for the McEliece cryptosystem
(see Section 2.4.2) and presented an algorithm to construct these codes. Misoczki and
Barreto [61] focused on a different class of codes and proposed QD Goppa codes. In order
to do that, they first had to show that there are a sufficient number of Goppa codes that
admit a QD generator matrix, and they also gave an algorithm to construct these codes.
2.4. Code-based Cryptography
Code-based cryptography exists since more than three decades but it has never gained
much public acceptance since the schemes usually have a large public key size. However,
it is a candidate for “post-quantum cryptography” as it is considered immune to quantum
computer attacks. In contrast, once large enough quantum computers exist, Shor’s algo-
rithm [86], published in 1997, allows to break all cryptographic schemes which are based
on the integer factoring or the discrete logarithm problem.
In this section, we recall some hard problems from code-based cryptography and describe
several cryptographic schemes which will be used in this thesis.
2.4.1. Hard Problems
Most code-based cryptographic schemes are based on the difficulty of one or more of
the following hard problems (or a variant of these): The general decoding problem, the
syndrome decoding problem, and the code distinguishing problem.
Problem 2.4.1 (General decoding problem). Given an [n, k] code C over Fq, an integer
t0 and a vector c ∈ Fnq , find a codeword x ∈ C with d(x, c) ≤ t0 or return {} iff no such
codeword exists.
Problem 2.4.2 (Syndrome Decoding (SD) problem). Given a matrix H and a vector s,
both over Fq, and a non-negative integer t0; find a vector x ∈ Fnq of (Hamming) weight t0
such that HxT = sT or return {} iff no such vector exists.
Depending on the parameters n, k, and t0, the expected number of solutions of these
decoding problems can be different. For example, in the context of an encryption scheme
there is only one solution expected (otherwise decryption would not be unique), while the
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problem of finding a collision in a hash function usually has a large number of possible
solutions.
Proposition 2.4.3. Both, the general decoding and the SD problem are equivalent to the
problem of finding codewords of low weight in the same or a slightly longer code.
Proof. For both problems, let C be the given [n, k] code, generated by a parity check
matrix H.
In case of the general decoding problem, let C′ be the code obtained by adding the vector
c to C, i.e. the vector space spanned by C and c. Since x ∈ C, the new code contains the
difference e = c− x ∈ C′, and wt(e) = t0. Therefore, the general decoding problem can be
solved by finding a vector e of weight not exceeding t0 in the code C′.
To convert the SD problem, let C′′ be the code of length n+ 1 generated by H ′ = (H|sT).
Since HxT = sT, we have H ′ · (x|1)T = 0T. Therefore, the SD problem can be solved by
finding a vector e ∈ C′′ with wt(e) ≤ t0 + 1.
The other direction is obvious since the solution of the general decoding and the SD
problem are low-weight vectors in the respective codes.
For these two problems, the corresponding decision problems were proved to be NP-
complete in 1978 [11], but only for binary codes. In 1994, A. Barg proved that this result
holds for codes over all finite fields ([6, in Russian] and [7, Theorem 4.1]).
In [34], Finiasz proved the NP-completeness of the following variant of this problem:
Problem 2.4.4 (Goppa Parameterized Syndrome Decoding (GPSD)). Given a binary
matrix H of size 2m× r and a syndrome s, decide whether there exists a word x of weight
r/m such that HxT = sT.
This variant is interesting in the context of this thesis since it proves that the SD prob-
lem remains NP-complete for those parameters that are used for Goppa codes: a binary
Goppa code of length n = 2m and co-dimension r with an error-correcting capability
of t = r/m.
Note that this result only regards the parameters and does not prove that the problem
remains hard when H corresponds to a Goppa code (instead of a random code).
The following problem can be used to link the security of Goppa codes to that of random
codes.
Problem 2.4.5 (Goppa code Distinguishing (GD)). Given an r × n matrix H, decide
whether H is the parity check matrix of a Goppa code.
In 2010, Fauge`re et al. [32] showed that Goppa codes of very high rate R = k/n can
be distinguished from random codes, rendering Dallot’s security proof [29] of the CFS
signature scheme invalid. However, the distinguisher does not pose a direct threat to
existing cryptosystems since it does not constitute a technique to decode or reveal the
secret key.
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2.4.2. Encryption schemes
Since McEliece’s first proposal [55] in 1978, several encryption schemes have been published
in code-based cryptography. In this section, we will briefly describe the three encryption
schemes relevant for this thesis: McEliece [55], Niederreiter [70], and HyMES [84] by
Sendrier and Biswas.
In the following, let G be a k × n generator matrix for an (n, k, t) Goppa code C, H be a
corresponding r × n parity check matrix, and s a vector of length r. Let the message m
be a vector of length k, and ϕ a bijective function mapping an integer to a word of length
n and weight t. All matrices and vectors are defined over a finite field Fq, where q is a
prime power.
McEliece
The McEliece public-key encryption scheme was presented by R. McEliece in 1978 [55].
The original scheme uses binary Goppa codes, for which it remains unbroken (with suitable
parameters), but the scheme can be used with any class of codes for which an efficient
decoding algorithm is known.
Algorithm 1 The McEliece cryptosystem
Notation for Algorithm 1:
P : An n× n random permutation matrix
S : A k × k invertible matrix
DG : A decoding algorithm for the underlying (n, k, t) code C
Encryption EncMcEliece
INPUT: Message m ∈ Fkq and random seed r ∈ {0, 1}∗
OUTPUT: Ciphertext c ∈ Fnq
Ĝ← SGP
e← PRG(r), such that wt(e) = t
c← mĜ+ e
Return c
Decryption DecMcEliece
INPUT: Ciphertext c
OUTPUT: Message m
ĉ← cP−1 = mSG+ eP−1
mSG← DG(ĉ)
. Let J ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be a set such that G·J is invertible
m← mSG ·G−1·J · S−1
Return m
Niederreiter
In 1986, H. Niederreiter proposed a cryptosystem [70] which can be seen as dual to the
McEliece scheme. Originally, the scheme uses GRS codes, but this has been shown to be
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insecure by Sidelnikov and Shestakov [87]. The scheme uses a parity check matrix of a
(usually binary Goppa) code to compute the syndrome of the message, which serves as the
ciphertext. Even though the Niederreiter cryptosystem has been proven equally secure as
the McEliece system [52], it is threatened by broadcast attacks (see Section 3).
In contrast to the McEliece scheme, where the codeword contains the message and the
error vector is used to hide it, the Niederreiter scheme encodes the message into the error
vector. Since the underlying Goppa code can only correct a certain number t < n of errors,
a function ϕ is used which maps the message to a word of length n and weight t, which is
then encrypted.
Algorithm 2 The Niederreiter cryptosystem
Notation for Algorithm 2:
DH : A decoding algorithm for the underlying (n, k = n− r, t) code C
Encryption EncN
INPUT: Message m ∈ Flq
OUTPUT: Ciphertext c ∈ Frq
c← H · ϕ(m)T
Return c
Decryption DecN
INPUT: Ciphertext c
OUTPUT: Message m
m← ϕ−1(DH(c))
Return m
HyMES
The HyMES (Hybrid McEliece Encryption Scheme) cryptosystem [84] developed by Biswas
and Sendrier is a hybrid between the McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems. It increases
the efficiency of the McEliece scheme by encoding part of the message into the error vector.
While in the usual scenario this scheme is as secure as the original McEliece scheme, we
will show in Section 3 that it is vulnerable to a broadcast attack.
The HyMES scheme works as follows: The message m is split into two parts m = (m1|m2).
The first part m1 corresponds to the message in the original McEliece scheme, while the
second part is encoded into a word of weight t and serves as the error vector e = ϕ(m2).
There are many possible encoding functions ϕ, e.g. enumerative encoding or encoding
into regular words, but the choice of ϕ is not relevant in our context.
2.4.3. Signature and Identification schemes
In this section, we recall the CFS (Courtois-Finiasz-Sendrier) signature scheme [28] which
is the basis for our QD-CFS signature in Section 5.2. In addition to that, we will briefly
describe the Stern identification (ID) scheme. This scheme and its variant, the CVE
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Algorithm 3 The HyMES cryptosystem
Notation for Algorithm 3:
P : An n× n random permutation matrix
S : A k × k invertible matrix
DG : A decoding algorithm for the underlying (n, k, t) code C
Encryption EncHyMES
INPUT: Message m ∈ Fk+lq
OUTPUT: Ciphertext c ∈ Fnq
Ĝ← SGP
m1 ← MSBk(m)
m2 ← LSBl(m)
c← m1Ĝ+ ϕ(m2)
Return c
Decryption DecHyMES
INPUT: Ciphertext c
OUTPUT: Message m
ĉ← cP−1 = m1SG+ ϕ(m2)P−1
mSG← DG(ĉ)
. Let J ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be a set such that G·J is invertible
m1 ← mSG ·G−1·J · S−1
m2 ← ϕ−1(c−m1Ĝ)
Return (m1|m2)
(Cayrel-Ve´ron-El Yousfi Alaoui), serve as illustrations in Section 4.2 in the context of
partial knowledge.
CFS signatures
The CFS signature scheme is one of the first code-based signature schemes. Advantages
of the scheme are the small signature size (for parameters (m, t) = (15, 12) approx. 180
bit) and its very fast verification procedure. The main drawbacks are the large public key
size (which will be addressed in Section 5.2) and a slow signature generation.
A generic technique to build signatures from (public-key) encryption schemes is to es-
sentially reverse the process. A signature is created as follows:
• Compute the hash value h = h(m) of the document m which is to be signed.
• Treat h as a ciphertext and decode it into e.
• The signature for m is e.
This signature can easily be verified by using the public key to encode e and checking
whether the result is h(m).
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Unfortunately, this technique can not be directly applied in code-based cryptography
since for most codes the vast majority of hash values are not decodable. In CFS, this
problem is addressed by appending an integer i as a counter to the hashed message and
hashing again, h = h(h(m)|i). In the original paper, this counter is a sequentially increas-
ing number, while Dallot [29] proposed a random counter instead. The algorithm repeats
this computation until the resulting hash value is decodable. The signature consists of
(e, i), where e is the result of decoding h(h(m)|i). More formally, the CFS signature
scheme consists of the following algorithms:
• Keygen: Choose an appropriate (n, k, t) code over Fq defined by a public parity-check
matrix H with a private decoding algorithm DH . Let h() be a public hash function.
• Sign: Let m ∈ {0, 1}∗ be the message to sign. Find i ∈ N (either sequentially or
by random sampling) such that s = h(h(m)|i) is a decodable syndrome. Using the
decoding algorithm DH , find e ∈ Fnq of weight wt(e) ≤ t such that HeT = sT. The
signature is the pair (e, i).
• Verify: Let (e, i) be a purported signature for message m. Compute s = h(h(m)|i),
and accept iff wt(e) ≤ t and HeT = sT.
The expected number of iterations which are required to find a decodable codeword
is the inverse of the code density (i.e. the fraction of decodable words). For binary
Goppa codes, the code density is approximately 1/t!. Therefore, it is necessary to choose
parameters with a small value of t. Typical CFS parameters are n = 215 and t = 12.
Stern identification scheme
Stern presented a code-based identification scheme [89] in 1993. This zero-knowledge
scheme is the basis for many subsequent improvements and variants, amongst them the
CVE which we use in Section 4.2. We will briefly describe the scheme in order to illustrate
the working principle.
The idea of the scheme is that the owner of a secret key e proves his identity by showing
that he knows the secret, without giving away any information about it (hence zero-
knowledge). The secret key holder protects the secret e by using two techniques: the
transformation by means of a permutation, and the addition of a random vector. Since a
cheater has a 1/3 chance of successfully completing the protocol without the knowledge
of the secret, the protocol has to be run several times to detect cheating provers. The
security of the construction relies on the hardness of the general decoding problem, that
is, on the difficulty of determining the preimage (with respect to left hand multiplication
by H) e of sT = HeT . In Figure 2.1, h() denotes a hash function, H the parity check
matrix on a random binary (n, k, t) code and Sn the symmetric group of degree n.
2.4.4. Hash functions
Hash functions play an integral role in cryptography. While code-based cryptosystems
can usually be combined with any hash function, code-based hash functions are especially
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Figure 2.1.: Identification protocol
Prover P Verifier V
(sk,pk) = (e, (s = HeT, H, t))
y
$←− Fn2 , σ $←− Sn
c1 ← h(σ|HyT)
c2 ← h(σ(y))
c3 ← h(σ(y + e)) c1, c2, c3−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
b←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− b $←− {0, 1, 2}
If b = 0:
y, σ−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check commitments c1 and c2
If b = 1:
(y + e), σ−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check commitments c1 and c3
Else:
σ(y), σ(e)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check commitments c2 and c3,
interesting in our context since they can often be attacked with similar techniques as
code-based cryptosystems. In this section, we will present the FSB hash function which
is referred to in Section 4 of this thesis.
Fast Syndrome-Based (FSB) hash function
The FSB hash function [5] was proposed in 2003 and became a second-round SHA-3 can-
didate. It is based on the NP-complete regular syndrome decoding problem which is a
modification of the usual SD problem for regular words. FSB is based on a compres-
sion function and uses the Merkle-Damg˚ard domain extender [58, 31] to construct the
hash function. Hence, attacks are usually done on the underlying compression function.
Table 2.1 shows different parameters sets proposed in [5].
Table 2.1.: Parameters for the five versions of FSB.
n w r p s
FSB160 5 · 218 80 640 653 1120
FSB224 7 · 218 112 896 907 1568
FSB256 2
21 128 1024 1061 1792
FSB384 23 · 216 184 1472 1483 2392
FSB512 31 · 216 248 1984 1987 3224
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The working principle of FSB is as follows:
• In every iteration, the compression function outputs an r bit vector.
• The input are s−r bits from the document, concatenated with either the initialization
value (in the first iteration) or the output from the previous iteration.
• If necessary, a padding is applied to the input of the last round, and the Whirlpool
compression function is applied to compute the final hash value of the document.
Regular words
Before the s input bits are handed to the compression function, they are transformed into
a regular word. This is done in order to increase the efficiency of the hash function (see
Section 2.4.5). Regular words are defined as follows.
Definition 2.4.6 (Regular words). A regular word of length n and weight t over a finite
field Fq is a vector e ∈ Fnq consisting of blocks of size n/t, where each block contains
exactly one non-zero entry.
Remark 2.4.7. Bernstein et al. showed how to use the regular words structure to improve
the efficiency of ISD [17].
2.4.5. Constant weight encoding functions
Constant weight encoding (CWE) functions are maps from arbitrary vectors to vectors of
constant weight. The length of input and output can be variable or fixed. CWE functions
are used in the Niederreiter and HyMES cryptosystems in order to encode the message
(or part of the message) into a vector of length n and weight t. This allows the message to
be decoded uniquely. In the FSB hash function (see Section 2.4.4), a CWE is applied to
the input of the compression function in order to ensure that collision and other attacks
are difficult. Also, CWE functions (or rather, their inverse) can be used for compression
if the data contains vectors of constant weight.
In this section, we will present two CWE functions: Enumerative encoding and encoding
into regular words.
Enumerative encoding
For fixed input and output length, enumerative encoding is the most efficient encoding
function in terms of the length of the vectors. For given integers n and t and a finite field
Fq, it maps
ϕ : Flqq →Wn,t,q,
where lq = blogq(
(
n
t
)
(q − 1)t)c and Wn,t is the set of all vectors of length n and weight
t over Fq. Binary enumerative encoding has been described in different sources, e.g. [13,
Section 5.1]. In order to use this encoding technique with cryptosystems which are defined
of non-binary fields Fq, the encoding algorithm should be generalized to Fq as well. We
propose the following modification (even though we are not aware of other publications
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proposing this method, we do not claim that we are the first to suggest it). First note
that we can use the error positions to encode
(
n
t
)
different numbers, and for each of these
combinations of positions, (q−1)t different values. Let Enc2() denote binary enumerative
encoding Fl22 →Wn,t,2, our algorithm thus works as follows:
Algorithm 4 Enumerative encoding over Fq
INPUT: Integers n, t, q and a vector v ∈ Flqq
OUTPUT: Vector e ∈ Wn,t,q
i←∑lqj=1 vjqj−1
d← bi(q − 1)−tc
e← Enc2(d)
r ← i− d(q − 1)t
p← t− 1
for j from 1 to n do
if ej 6= 0 then
ej ← br(q − 1)−pc+ 1
r ← r − (ej − 1)(q − 1)p
p← p− 1
end if
end for
return e
Regular words encoding
While enumerative encoding is most efficient in terms of the output length, it is not very
fast since the evaluation of Enc2() requires the computation of t binomial coefficients.
Even though there are techniques to compute these faster than the na¨ıve approach, the
complexity remains high.
A different encoding method is encoding into regular words. As noted above, regular
words of length n and weight t consist of blocks of size n/t and weight 1. Depending on
the context, there are different encoding techniques. A simple binary algorithm works as
follows:
• For each block of size n/t, get the next blog2(n/t)c bits from the input.
• Convert the input bits to an integer i ∈ In/t.
• Set the i-th bit of the current block to 1 and all others to 0.
This algorithm can be generalized to Fq by using blogq(qn/t)c input bits and setting the
bit to the respective value in Fq.
2.5. Cryptanalysis
This section covers those cryptanalytic techniques which are relevant for this work. At-
tacks against cryptosystems are often classified into either critical or non-critical attacks.
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The former exploit structural weaknesses in the construction and cannot be countered
efficiently by simply increasing the key length. Therefore, special attention is required in
the construction process to prevent these attacks. The latter attacks are exponential in
the security parameter and can therefore be prevented by choosing suitable parameters.
We conclude this topic with a section on attacker models.
2.5.1. Critical attacks
In the following, we briefly present critical attacks against code-based cryptosystems which
are relevant in the context of this thesis. We conclude with an overview on the vulnerability
of the McEliece, Niederreiter, and HyMES cryptosystems (when used without semantic
conversions) against each of these attacks. More details can be found in [64].
Known partial plaintext
This type of attack applies when an attacker knows part of the plaintext he attempts to
reveal. This scenario arises in many applications, e.g. standardized emails or electronic
forms.
The complexity of decoding the ciphertext decreases exponentially with every known bit.
For example, attacking a ciphertext encrypted with McEliece using parameters (n, k)
and knowing kl bits is equivalent to attacking a McEliece ciphertext encrypted using
parameters (n, k − kl). See [63, 23, 48] for more details.
Message-resend and related-message
A message-resend condition is given if the same message is encrypted and sent twice (or
several times) to the same recipient. If the subsequent messages are related to the first by
a known relation, it is called a related-message condition.
In the case of McEliece and HyMES, these conditions can be detected by observing the
Hamming weight of the sum of two ciphertexts. By comparing the two ciphertexts, an
attacker can identify those bits where
• with high probability, neither ciphertexts contains an error, or
• with certainty, exactly one contains an error.
This allows to recover the ciphertexts in negligible time [63].
Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack
In 1992, Sidelnikov and Shestakov proposed an attack [87] on Niederreiter’s cryptosystem
using GRS codes which aims to recover an alternative private key from the public key.
They take advantage of the fact that the (secret) parity check matrix H of a GRS code
consists of entries Hij = zia
j
i . Sidelnikov and Shestakov concluded that each entry of
the public-key parity check matrix H ′ can be expressed by a polynomial in ai. From this
observation they were able to derive a system of polynomial equations whose solution yields
the private key. Using this method, it is possible to decipher the message in polynomial
time.
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Figure 2.2.: Overview on the vulnerability of the McEliece, Niederreiter, and HyMES cryp-
tosystems (without semantic conversions) using Goppa codes against different
critical attacks.
McEliece Niederreiter HyMES
Plaintext
Broadcast (Section 3.1 and [65]) no * *
Known partial [63] * * *
Message-resend [63] * no *
Related-message [63] * no *
Ciphertext
Chosen * * *
Lunchtime * * *
Adapt. chosen [92] * * *
Reaction [48] * * *
Malleability [48] * no *
Reaction attack
This attack can be considered a stronger version of a chosen ciphertext attack. Instead of
receiving the decrypted ciphertexts from the oracle, the attacker only observes the reaction
of the oracle. Usually, this means whether the oracle was able to decrypt the ciphertext. In
the context of side-channel-attacks, this can also mean observing decryption time, power
consumption etc.
In one of the easiest variants, the attacker flips individual bits of the ciphertext he attempts
to decode, and observes whether the oracle is able to decrypt it. If that is the case, the
bit corresponds to an error bit (McEliece / HyMES). In the Niederreiter case, the same
can be achieved by adding columns of the parity check matrix to the syndrome.
Malleability
A cryptosystem is vulnerable to the malleability of it’s ciphertexts if it is possible for
an attacker to create new valid ciphertexts from a given one and if the new ciphertexts
decrypts to a cleartext related to the original message. This property is relevant in many
scenarios, e.g. bank transactions, where an attacker could change the amount of money
transferred.
2.5.2. Non-critical attacks
This section covers three important non-critical attacks: Information-Set Decoding (ISD),
the Generalized Birthday Algorithm (GBA), and the Support Splitting Algorithm (SSA).
ISD and GBA are decoding attacks, i.e. they attempt to solve the general decoding or
the SD problem. Due to the way the algorithms work, ISD is usually more efficient if the
decoding problem has only one or a small number of solutions, while GBA is often better
to find one out of many possible solutions. The SSA attempts to recover the secret key by
searching for codes with known structure which are permutation equivalent to the given
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code.
A principle that is used in most ISD-like attacks and on which GBA attacks are based
is the birthday paradox.
The Birthday Paradox
The name is due to the fact that a surprisingly small number of people are required such
that the probability of at least two of them having the same birthday is greater than 50%
(this number is 23). In the context of ISD, this principle is used in the following way:
In order to find p columns of a matrix H that sum up to a given vector s, we build two
lists. L1 contains sums of p/2 columns of H, and L2 = {s − x : x ∈ L1}. Finding a
common entry between these lists corresponds to the birthday situation, hence we can
expect to quickly find a large number of these (so called) collisions. GBA attacks use a
generalization of this principle by allowing more than two lists.
Information Set Decoding
ISD algorithms are among the most efficient generic attacks against code-based cryptosys-
tems like the McEliece encryption scheme, the CFS signature scheme [28], the FSB hash
function [5], and others. ISD algorithms solve the general decoding problem, i.e. decoding
codewords with errors. More specifically, if m is a plaintext and c = mG+e is a ciphertext,
where e is a vector of weight t and G a generator matrix, then ISD algorithms take c as
input and recover m (or, equivalently, e). Since sT := HcT = H(mG + e)T = HeT , the
problem is often formulated using a parity check matrix as in Problem 2.4.2.
A basic version of an ISD algorithm works as follows: a random permutation P is ap-
plied to H in the hope that all columns corresponding to error positions in e are moved to
the left hand side of the matrix (in the first n − k columns). Then Gaussian elimination
is used to transform H into the form H ′ = [In−k|R], where In−k is the (n − k) × (n − k)
identity matrix, and the row operations are performed on s as well to get s′. If s′ has a
weight not exceeding t, the algorithm succeeds; we can read off the error positions from
s′ and get e = P−1[s′|0k], where 0k is the zero vector of size k. Otherwise, the algorithm
restarts.
Most advanced ISD versions make use of the birthday paradox: they allow a certain
(usually small) number p of errors in the last k − l columns of H. Then lists of column
sums of H are used to find these error positions. If we split the right hand part of H
into [H1|H2]T , and write e = [e1|e2], then we search for a vector e2 of weight p such that
sT −H2eT2 has weight t− p, and the non-zero positions of sT −H2eT2 show the remaining
t− p error positions.
Over the years, there have been many improvements and generalizations of ISD-like
attacks. The most important of these are listed in Table 2.2, together with their respective
binary work factor to decode a (1024, 524, 50) Goppa code (these are the original McEliece
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parameters).
Table 2.2.: Complexity of ISD algorithms against (1024, 524, 50) McEliece cryptosystem.
This table is from [69].
Log of binary
Year Algorithm work factor
1986 Adams-Mejier [3] 80.7
1988 Lee-Brickell [49] 70.89
1989 Stern [88] 66.21
1994 Canteaut-Chabanne [21] 65.5
1998 Canteaut-Chabaud [22] 64.1
2008 Bernstein-Lange-Peters [15] 60.4
2009 Finiasz-Sendrier [36] 59.9
Ball-collision decoding [16], published in 2011, has a complexity of 61.6 bit against these
code parameters (using (p1, p2, q1, q2, l1, l2) = (4, 4, 1, 1, 21, 22)). While this attack is more
efficient than Finiasz and Sendrier’s lower bound for large codes — the authors use the
examples n = 6624 and n = 30, 332 — it shows to be less efficient for smaller codes.
Generalized Birthday algorithm
Generalized Birthday algorithms are used for some of the most efficient attacks against
code-based cryptosystems. They have been proposed by Wagner in 2002 [97], and they are
named after the famous birthday paradox which allows to quickly find common entries in
lists. In 2009, Minder and Sinclair proposed a further generalization of this algorithm [60]
which allows to trade-off time and space efficiency. In this section we will review the basic
principles of Generalized Birthday Attacks (GBA).
GBA attempts to solve the SD problem stated above (Problem 2.4.2 on page 25), i.e.
for given parity check matrix H, syndrome s and integer t, to find a vector e of weight
t such that HeT = sT. In other words, find a set of columns of H whose weighted sum
equals the given syndrome. For easier demonstration of the algorithm, let t = 2a for some
integer a. If this is not the case, the algorithm still works with a slight loss of efficiency.
Let H be the parity check matrix of a [n, k] code, i.e. H has size r × n.
First, the algorithms sets up t lists L11, . . . , L
1
t , each of which consists of every column of
H (in the q-ary case, also all non-zero multiples of these columns). Each list therefore
consists of (q − 1)n vectors in Frq.
In the next step, pairs of lists are merged into new ones: For i ∈ [1, t/2], the lists L12i−1
and L12i are merged to form a new list L
2
i , with L
2
i = L
1
2i−1 ⊕ L12i. This means that the
new list is created by considering all pairs of one element from L12i−1 and one from L
1
2i,
and adding their sum to L2i . If an entry occurs more than once in a new list, it is removed
to minimize the size of the lists. The maximum size of L2i is hence ((q − 1)n)2.
Following this, the lists L2i are merged to form L
3
i , and this merging step is repeated
until exactly one list remains. If this list contains the vector s, then the algorithm was
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successful, and from the columns of H which were added to form s we can read of the
solution e. Often, a slight modification is introduced: The vector s is subtracted from
each entry in the last list L1t , and the algorithm attempts to find a combination of entries
that sum up to zero.
Figure 2.3.: Illustration of the GBA for a = 2.
L11 L
1
2 L
1
3 L
1
4
- ﬀ
?
- ﬀ
?
⊕ ⊕
L21 L
2
2
- ﬀ
?
⊕
L31
In fact, the final list contains all possible solutions. The number of solutions can be
quite large for certain applications, e.g. for collision attacks on signature schemes. This
fact can be used to further improve the attack, as shown by Wagner (and in a more general
way, by Minder and Sinclair):
After each merge step, the lists are being reduced in size. This is done by forcing a certain,
increasing number of bits to zero — i.e. to delete all list elements which are non-zero on
at least one of the positions forced to zero. Each forced bit reduces the expected list
size by a factor of q, and the number of bits that are forced to zero in each step can be
optimized with respect to the parameters [n, r] and t. The reduction of the list size is an
improvement in space — less data needs to be stored — as well as in time, since there are
less elements that need to be manipulated.
The time complexity of the GBA is in O(2a+u), where 2u is the maximum expected list
length and t = 2a. See [60] for a detailed proof.
This fact is the reason why GBA attacks are usually most efficient when there are a large
number of solutions. For example, an unpublished attack by D. Bleichenbacher against
the CFS signature scheme [28] was very efficient and required an increase in the CFS
parameters to remain secure (the attack is described in [36]).
Remark 2.5.1. There are (at least) two possible optimization techniques:
1. Depending on the setup of the initial lists L1i , some of the lists L
j
i can be identical
and do not need to be computed or stored twice (e.g. if L11 = L
1
3 and L
1
2 = L
1
4, then
L21 = L
2
2)
2. Instead of computing all lists on one level of the tree before continuing to the next
level, we can compute the lists in a “depth-first” way:
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• Set up L11 and L12
• Compute L21 and delete L11 and L12
• Set up L13 and L14
• Compute L22 and delete L13 and L14
• Compute L31 and delete L21 and L22
• ...
This allows to reduce the required memory since only approximately one list per level
of the tree needs to be stored. See [14], for example, where this technique was used
in an attack on the FSB hash function.
Decoding one out-of-many
In cryptography, different scenarios exist which are used to assess the security of a given
cryptographic scheme (see Section 2.5.3). Typically, the attacker is given exactly one in-
stance of the problem and attempts to break it, e.g. decode a given ciphertext. However,
there are some situations where several or even an unlimited number of instances are
available and the attacker is satisfied with breaking only one of them. For example, in
the CFS signature scheme the attacker can generate a large number of hashed documents
using different counters and needs to decode only one.
For GBA, Bleichenbacher developed an (unpublished) attack that takes this scenario
into account and saves a factor of approximately
√
N , where N is the number of instances.
However, the improvement factor is upper bounded since there is an overhead cost involved
(e.g., every instance needs to be read at least once), so the maximum improvement factor
is T 1/3, where T is the original cost of the attack; in other words, the running cost expo-
nent can be decreased to 2/3 at most.
In a recent paper, Sendrier [83] showed how to make use of the “Decoding One Out-of-
Many” scenario (dubbed DOOM) to improve the efficiency of an ISD attack. The idea is
similar to Bleichenbacher’s in that it improves the collision search step of ISD, in which
a common element (collision) of two lists is searched. In this step, the set of available
syndromes S is used to increase the size of one of the lists by a factor of approximately
|S|, thereby increasing the success probability. This improvement decreases the running
cost exponent to 2/3 + c (with small positive c), which is close to the theoretical optimum
of 2/3.
Support splitting algorithm
The SSA was presented by Sendrier [81] in 2000. This algorithm decides the question
whether two given codes are permutation equivalent, i.e. one can be obtained from the
other by permuting the coordinates. While this problem is not NP-complete, is has been
proved to be at least as hard as the graph isomorphism problem [76].
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To solve this problem, the SSA makes use of invariants and signatures (not to be con-
fused with the digital signatures or the signature of a dyadic matrix). An invariant is a
property of a code that is invariant under permutation, while a signature is a local prop-
erty of a code and one of its coordinates. The difficulty of using invariants and signatures
to decide whether two codes are permutation equivalent is that most invariants are either
too coarse (i.e. they take the same value for too many codes which are not permutation
equivalent) or the complexity to compute them is very high.
The SSA solves this issue by starting with a coarse signature and adaptively refining it in
every iteration. The total complexity of the SSA applied to a code is polynomial in the
length of the code and exponential in the dimension of its hull H(C) = C ∩ C⊥, i.e. the
intersection of the code with its dual.
The SSA is not a direct attack against a code or a cryptosystem, but it can be used to
recover the secret. See Section 5.1.4 (page 108) for this.
2.5.3. Attack models
There are several attack models proposed in the literature. These models describe what
capabilities an assumed attacker has. Some of the more common models are:
• Ciphertext-only
• Known-plaintext
• Chosen-plaintext
• Chosen-ciphertext
There exist many variants of these models. For example, adaptive chosen-ciphertext
attacks and lunchtime attacks are variants of chosen-ciphertext attacks.
In general, this thesis focusses on ciphertext-only attacks. This means that an attacker
has access only to one or several ciphertexts (in addition to any public information, which
we consider to be available). An encryption scheme is considered to be broken if the
attacker finds the corresponding plaintexts or the private keys. The model is defined cor-
respondingly for signature schemes, where the attacker needs to find signatures for one or
more given messages.
There are two exceptions to this: Firstly, Section 3 considers a broadcast scenario. This
is a variant of the ciphertext-only model in which the given ciphertexts correspond to the
same or to very similar messages. Secondly, in Section 4.2 we assume that the attacker
has some well-defined additional information that can be exploited in an attack.
Security level
Let C be an [n, k, d] code over Fq. When this code is used in a cryptographic scheme, the
properties of the scheme – e.g. key size, message length, security – are influenced by these
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four parameters. In order to measure the security of a cryptographic scheme, we introduce
the security level :
Definition 2.5.2 (Security level). Choose a code-based encryption scheme (e.g. McEliece),
let C be an [n, k, d] code over Fq, and C be the set of valid ciphertexts corresponding to
this scheme with the above parameters. We define the security level s of C against a
certain attack as s = log2(o), where o is the expected number of arithmetic operations of
a successful application of this attack against a ciphertext chosen uniformly at random
from C. When the attack is not specified, the definition refers to the best known attack
(i.e. the minimum over all known attacks).
We can extend this definition to the other types of cryptographic applications used in
Section 4.2.3 (the CVE identification scheme, page 77) and Section 5.2.3 (the QD-CFS
signature scheme, page 113). In the former example, C is the set of valid secrets e from
which Alice has chosen her private key; in the latter example, C refers to the set of valid
hash values of documents in which a collision or first/second preimage is to be found.
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While there is strong evidence that cryptosystems like McEliece and Niederreiter are secure
if appropriate parameters are selected, they have certain weaknesses when used without
semantic conversions. Examples include message-resend, related-message, reaction, and
known-ciphertext attacks (see Section 2). These have been analyzed in the context of
code-based cryptography (see [48] or [63] for an overview on these attacks).
A scenario that has not been considered yet in code-based cryptography is a broadcast sce-
nario, where the same message is (or similar messages are) sent to different users, encrypted
with the respective public keys. It is especially relevant for practical implementations since
it appears often in real-world applications, for example:
• Standardized emails
• Electronic banking
• Purchase orders and other business transactions
It is therefore necessary to understand the implications of broadcast attacks and how
to prevent them.
Our contributions
We have developed a broadcast attack that attempts to recover the secret message. In the
following, we show how and under what conditions this attack can be mounted against
two code-based encryption schemes: the Niederreiter and the HyMES cryptosystem. We
show that if the public keys corresponding to the intercepted messages are independent
from each other, we expect to require no more than Nr recipients to run the attack:
Nr :=
⌈
n+ 2
r
⌉
,
where n and r = n− k denote the code parameters of the users’ secret keys. That means
that with near certainty, N ≥ Nr recipients suffice to run the attack. Table 3.1 shows the
required number of recipients for selected parameter sets taken from Bernstein et al. [13]
and Biswas [18]. In most cases, a very small number of messages — usually in the order
of 10 — is sufficient to completely break the schemes. We achieve this by combining the
intercepted information into a large set of linear equations until the system has full rank
and can be solved.
In addition to that, we treat the cases when the attacker receives fewer messages than
required for this attack, and when the cleartexts are related, instead of identical. In the
former case, the attack complexity is higher compared with the broadcast attack before,
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Table 3.1.: Number of required recipients for Niederreiter and HyMES parameter sets. The
first column shows the cryptosystem for which the parameters were developed.
Number of
Cryptosystem n k q recipients Nr
Niederreiter([13])
2048 1696 2 6
2048 1608 2 5
4096 3832 2 16
4096 3556 2 8
HyMES([18])
1024 524 2 3
2048 1608 2 5
2048 1696 2 6
4096 3604 2 9
8192 7815 2 22
but lower than a generic attack: after setting up the linear equation system, the attacker
runs an ISD attack, the complexity of which is smaller the more messages are intercepted.
In the latter case, more messages are required to perform the broadcast attack:
N ′r :=
⌈
n+ 2
r − u
⌉
,
where u denotes the number of bits where not all messages are identical to each other.
While many code-based cryptosystems use certain classes of codes, e.g. binary Goppa
codes, our attack is completely independent of this choice and solves the underlying prob-
lem directly. That means, no matter what class of codes is used, the attack complexity
cannot be greater than our results; it might be possible, though, to achieve even better
results against certain code classes by exploiting the structure of the code. To illustrate
our results, we apply our broadcast attack implementation against the Niederreiter cryp-
tosystem in the FlexiProvider package1, recovering the message in only a few seconds to
minutes (see Table 3.2 on page 54). We conclude this section with a discussion on possi-
ble countermeasures and provide a CCA2-secure version of the Niederreiter cryptosystem
using the Kobara-Imai conversion.
Related work
In 1988, J. H˚astad [43] presented an attack against public key cryptosystems. This attack
was originally aimed at the RSA cryptosystem, when a single message is sent to different
recipients using their respective public keys. H˚astad showed how to recover the message
in this broadcast scenario. While this result has been known for a long time, this type of
attack has not been considered for cryptosystems based on error-correcting codes.
In [77], Plantard and Susilo describe a broadcast attack against lattice-based cryptosys-
tems. While the scenario is similar to H˚astad’s and ours, the attack works differently since
the lattice-based cryptosystem is not based on the same underlying problem as ours.
1http://www.flexiprovider.de/
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A recent paper [73] by Pan and Deng presents a broadcast attack against the NTRU cryp-
tosystem. The authors use an algorithm by Ding to solve the Learning with Errors (LWE)
problem for their attack.
Outlook and further work
As further work we propose to analyze whether additional structure in the cryptosystem
makes it more vulnerable to this attack, resulting in a smaller number of required messages.
Examples include the use of QC or QD codes, or the conversion of the message to regular
words.
3.1. Broadcast attacks against Niederreiter/HyMES
In this section, we will show how to mount a broadcast attack against the Niederreiter
and HyMES schemes. The problem solved by a broadcast attack is the following:
Problem 3.1.1 (Broadcast decoding problem). Given N ciphertexts ci of the same mes-
sage m, encrypted using N corresponding public keys Gi (HyMES) or Hi (Niederreiter),
find m.
Note that the broadcast scenario is very similar to the Low-Exponent-Attack on RSA.
In that case, a message m is sent to N users after being encrypted using a (small) exponent
e and the recipients’ individual moduli n1, . . . , nN , where N ≥ e.
Both the McEliece and the Niederreiter cryptosystem rely on the hardness of the SD
problem; this is equivalent to finding a codeword in a certain distance to a given word.
The main difference is that in McEliece, the cleartext determines the codeword and the
error vector is random, while Niederreiter works essentially vice versa. This difference
results in a weakness of the McEliece cryptosystem, the malleability of its ciphertexts:
Adding rows of the public key to a ciphertext results in a new valid ciphertext. This is
not possible for the Niederreiter cryptosystem.
Another implication is McEliece’s weakness to message-resend and related-message at-
tacks. Two ciphertexts of messages m1 and m2, where the messages have a known relation
(or are identical), allow an attacker to easily find at least k error-free positions, which al-
lows efficient guessing of error bits. See [13, Section 5.3] for more details. The Niederreiter
cryptosystem, however, is not vulnerable to these attacks. It is interesting to note that,
facing a broadcast attack, the situation is reversed.
3.1.1. Attacking Niederreiter
Recall that ϕ denotes a function mapping onto vectors of constant weight. In the Nieder-
reiter cryptosystem, we use ϕ : Flqq 7→ Wn,t,q, where lq = blogq
(
n
t
)
(q − 1)Tc and Wn,t,q
is the set of all vectors of length n and weight t over Fq. A Niederreiter ciphertext c is
generated by computing
cT = Hϕ(m)T.
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Attempting to solve this equation for m can be done by solving the corresponding linear
equation system with n variables and r equations: c1...
cr
 =
 h11 · · · h1n... . . . ...
hr1 · · · hrn

 m
′
1
...
m′n
 ,
where c = (c1, . . . , cr), ϕ(m) = (m
′
1, . . . ,m
′
n), and hij are the entries of H.
In a broadcast scenario, we have N ciphertexts ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , generated by computing
cTi = Hiϕ(m)
T using N public keys Hi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Since ϕ(m) is identical in all
computations, we can append the matrices H = 〈H1, . . . ,HN 〉 and the syndromes c =
(c1| . . . |cN ). The number of variables remains constant, whereas the number of equations
increases. Some of the new equations might be combinations of existing ones, so the new
number of equations can be smaller than Nr. In Section 3.1.3, we will show that the
number of redundant equations is actually very small. Since n/r is usually small, we need
very few ciphertexts ci to increase the rank of H to n, at which point we can solve the
system. We will compute the expected number of messages required to break the system
in Section 3.1.3.
Algorithm 5 summarizes the steps to run this attack.
Algorithm 5 Broadcast attack against the Niederreiter cryptosystem
INPUT: Code parameters (n, k, t), N parity check matrices Hi ∈ Fr×nq and corresponding ciphertexts
ci ∈ Frq for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , a finite field Fq, and a function ϕ
OUTPUT: Message m ∈ Flq
H ← 〈H1, . . . , HN 〉
c← (c1| . . . |cN )
Solve the linear equation system Hm′T = cT over Fq for m′ ∈ Wn,t,q
Return m = ϕ−1(m′)
There is a different way to describe our attack, seen from another perspective: by adding
ci as the (n+ 1)-th column of Hi for all i, we add (ϕ(m)|(q − 1)) as a codeword to every
code, since
(Hi|ci) · (ϕ(m)|(q − 1))T = Hi · ϕ(m)T + (q − 1)ci = qci = 0.
This codeword — and thus the message — can be found by intersecting these new codes.
There are several implementations to compute the intersection of codes, e.g. in Magma.
However, the approach above is better suited for our purpose since it allows easier under-
standing of the required number of recipients and of the application of ISD algorithms, as
we will show in Sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4, respectively.
3.1.2. Attacking HyMES
While the HyMES implementation [84] does provide methods for padding, a technique
used to prevent attacks that exploit relations between cleartexts and/or ciphertexts, this
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method seems to be a placeholder since it does not add any security. Similar to our
description of the scheme above, in the broadcast scenario we compute the ciphertexts ci
as
ci = m1Gi + ϕ(m2),
where m = (m1|m2) and 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Attacking this scheme can be done by finding ϕ(m2) since this allows to find m1 by
simple linear algebra: As the generator matrices Gi are by definition of full rank, the
functions m1 7→ m1Gi are injective. Therefore, m1 is the unique solution of the system
xGi = ci−ϕ(m2). It can be found by Gaussian elimination, for example. The problem of
finding ϕ(m2) can be reduced to the Niederreiter case:
First, the attacker uses the matrices Gi to compute the respective parity check matrices
Hi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . One way to do this is to compute the standard form of Gi:
G′i = UGiQ = (Ik|R),
where Ik is the identity matrix of size k, U an invertible matrix and Q a permutation ma-
trix. A parity check matrix of the permuted code corresponding to G′i is H
′
i = (−RT|In−k),
and a parity check matrix for Gi is Hi = H
′
iQ
−1.
Next, the attacker computes the syndromes si = Hi · cTi . Since
si = Hi(m1Gi + ϕ(m2))
T = Hi · ϕ(m2)T,
we have reduced the problem to the Niederreiter case above. Algorithm 6 outlines these
steps.
Algorithm 6 Broadcast attack against the HyMES cryptosystem
INPUT: Code parameters (n, k, t), N generator matrices Gi and corresponding ciphertexts ci, for 1 ≤
i ≤ N , a finite field Fq and a function ϕ
OUTPUT: Message m ∈ Fn+lqq , where lq = blogq
(
n
t
)c
∀1 ≤ i ≤ N perform the following computations
Find Ui and Qi such that G
′
i = UiGiQi = (Ik|Ri)
H ′i ← (−RT|In−k)
Hi ← H ′iQ−1i
si ← Hi · cTi
H ← 〈H1, . . . , HN 〉
s← (s1| . . . |sN )
Solve the linear equation system Hm2
′T = sT over Fq for m′2 ∈ Wn,t,q
Solve m1G1 = c1 −m′2 over Fq for m1 ∈ Fnq
Return m = (m1|ϕ−1(m′2))
As we noted above, the McEliece cryptosystem does not show a vulnerability to broad-
cast attacks as Niederreiter/HyMES do: We can sum the information contained in the
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ciphertexts and public keys into a single equation by (horizontal) concatenation: G =
(G1| . . . |GN ), c = (c1| . . . |cN ), e = (e1| . . . |eN ), and thus c = mG + e. The properties of
the code generated by G are defined by the following lemma:
Lemma 3.1.2 (Concatenated codes). Let G, c, and e be defined as above. The code C
generated by G has length nN , dimension k and minimum distance dN , the weight of e is
tN .
Proof. The length is increased to nN since every basis vector is a concatenation of N basis
vectors of length n.
The dimension cannot be greater than k since this is the number of vectors generating
the code C. Also, the dimension cannot be smaller than k as this would imply that
one row vector of G can be expressed as a linear combination of the remaining vectors.
This is possible only if the corresponding linear combination holds for each matrix Gi,
contradicting that these have a dimension of k.
Every code Ci generated by Gi contains a word mi of weight d. The concatenation of these
is a codeword of C of weight dN . If the minimum distance was smaller than dN then C
would contain a word of weight less than dN . This word would contain, for some i ∈ N,
a block [in, (i+ 1)n− 1] of weight smaller than d which is a codeword of Ci, contradicting
this code’s minimum distance of d.
While the concatenated code G is less secure than the original codes Gi, this can be
compensated by larger parameters, and it shows no structural weakness like in the Nieder-
reiter case. Figure 3.1 shows the work factor to run an ISD attack against the McEliece
cryptosystem using the concatenated code defined above.
We see that for an increasing number of recipients, the security of the concatenated
code decreases, but it remains above a positive level. We prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1.3. For an increasing number of recipients N , the code generated by
G = (G1| . . . |GN ) provides a security level which is lower bounded by C(n,R, t) = a(n)·eRt,
where a(n) ≥ 1 is a polynomial in n determined by the efficiency of the fastest ISD attack
and R is the information rate of the codes G1, . . . , GN .
Proof. As shown in [82], ISD-based algorithms have an approximate complexity of
C(n,R, t) = a(n) · 2−t·log2(1−R),
where a(n) is a polynomial in n. For N recipients, the security level is therefore
C(nN,R/N, tN).
Since C(nN,R/N, tN) = a(n)
(
1− knN
)−tN
, limN→∞
(
1− knN
)−tN
= eRt and
(
1− knN
)−tN
>
eRt for all N , the proposition follows.
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Figure 3.1.: Work factor to perform an ISD attack against the McEliece cryptosystem with
parameters (n, k, t) = (1024, 524, 50) using an increasing number of recipients.
3.1.3. Expected number of recipients required to break the
Niederreiter/HyMES scheme
Proposition 3.1.4. In a broadcast situation as described in Problem 3.1.1 and where the
recipients use linearly independent codes of length n and co-dimension r, our broadcast
attack can be run successfully if the number of recipients Nr is Nr =
n
r .
Proof. Since the codes are linearly independent, every recipient’s public key adds exactly
r new equations, so the system can be solved with n/r public keys. Note that in this case,
r divides n and N cannot be greater than n/r; otherwise the codes could not be linearly
independent.
Proposition 3.1.5. Let R be the set of all full-rank matrices over Fq of size r×n. In the
same scenario as in Proposition 3.1.4, but with public keys chosen uniformly at random
from R for each user, the expected number of recipients Nr required is
Nr :=
⌈
n+ 2
r
⌉
,
i.e. we expect to be able to run a successful broadcast attack if N ≥ Nr.
We start by estimating the probability that a random vector x ∈ Fnq is linearly indepen-
dent from all vectors in A, where A is a given set of r linearly independent vectors over
Fq.
A vector is linearly independent from a set of vectors if it cannot be expressed by a linear
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combination of these vectors. There are qr (different) linear combinations of vectors in A,
and the whole space has dimension qn. Thus, the probability that x is linearly independent
from A is
P = 1− qr−n = q
n − qr
qn
. (3.1)
Therefore, if we start from the system of linear equations
H1 · ϕ(m)T = cT1
and add the first row of H2 to H1, with probability P = 1− qr−n we add a new equation
to the system. Hence, if we assume the vectors in H2 to be independent from each other,
we expect to add P−1 rows to get one new equation. The fact that the vectors in H2
are not independent from each other does in fact slightly increases the chance to find a
new equation: subsequent vectors in H2 are guaranteed to be linearly independent to the
previous ones already considered, so a small subset of undesired vectors is excluded. Since
the effect is very small, we will continue with the probability P derived above.
Thus, in order to increase the number of linearly independent equations to n, which allows
us to solve the system, we need to add
T =
n−1∑
i=r
qn
qn − qi
rows on average.
For example, for the Niederreiter parameters [n, k] = [1024, 644], we need to add 646
rows, which corresponds to 3 recipients.
The expected number D of linearly dependent rows encountered when setting up the
system is nearly constant: We add T rows in order to be able to solve the system, out
of which (n − r) are not redundant (they complement the initial r rows to a linearly
independent set of n rows), and hence
D =
n−1∑
i=r
qn
qn − qi − (n− r)
=
n−1∑
i=r
(
qn
qn − qi − 1
)
=
n−1∑
i=r
qi
qn − qi
=
n−r∑
i=1
1
qi − 1 < 1.7.
The last sum converges quickly, and it decreases with increasing q:
n−r∑
i=1
1
qi − 1 ≤
∞∑
i=1
1
2i − 1 =
4∑
i=1
1
2i − 1 +
∞∑
i=5
1
2i − 1 ≤
4∑
i=1
1
2i − 1 +
∞∑
i=4
1
2i
< 1.7
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Therefore, we have
Nr ≤
⌈
n+ 2
r
⌉
.
In order to estimate the number of recipients Nr and thus encrypted messages we need
to recover the message encrypted by the above Niederreiter/HyMES schemes, we have
assumed that the parity check matrices Hi are actually random matrices of full rank
even though the codes used in the two cryptosystems are not random, but Goppa codes.
However, in practice Goppa codes have shown a behaviour identical to the one described
above. This similarity is to be expected, since it is widely believed that the problem
of distinguishing Goppa codes from random linear codes (i.e. codes defined by random
generator matrices) is computationally hard (except under special circumstances [32]).
Thus, the probability P and the subsequent arguments above remain valid.
3.1.4. Performing a broadcast attack when N < Nr
When an attacker receives less thanNr broadcast messages, the resulting systemHϕ(m)
T =
cT with H = 〈H1, . . . ,HN 〉 is under-determined. It can be used nonetheless to mount an
ISD attack. There are different ISD-like attacks, but the basic steps are as follows:
1. Choose a random n× n permutation matrix Q and compute H ′ = QH.
2. Perform Gaussian elimination on H ′ and c to get (IK |A) = c′, where IK is the
identity matrix of size K, and n−K is the number of rows of H.
3. Search for p ≤ t columns of A such that their sum S has Hamming distance t− p to
the syndrome c.
4. The non-zero entries of S − c locate the remaining t− p entries of ϕ(m).
In a broadcast scenario where the recipients use linearly independent public keys and
where N < Nr, the work factor of the above attack can be computed using the formulae
in Proposition 4.1.3. Figure 3.2 shows the corresponding attack complexity.
In practice, the recipients’ public keys might not be linearly independent. However,
we expect to get only a small number of redundant equations, so the attack complexity
decreases nearly identical to Figure 3.2 (compare Propositions 3.1.4 and 3.1.5).
This result is supported by [82], where Sendrier points out that ISD-based algorithms
have an approximate complexity of
C(n,R, t) = a(n) · 2−t·log2(1−R),
where R = k/n is the information rate and a(n) a polynomial in n. Increasing the number
of rows in the parity check matrix decreases R, so C(n,R, t) decreases exponentially.
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Figure 3.2.: Work factor for a broadcast attack against Niederreiter with parameters
(n, k, t) = (2048, 1498, 50) using ISD when N < Nr.
3.1.5. Related-message broadcast attack
In the previous sections, an identical message m has been sent to all recipients. In the
following, we show how a broadcast attack can be performed if the messages mi are not
identical, but related. More concretely, let M = {mi : 1 ≤ i ≤ N} and we define the
following property:
Definition 3.1.6. A set M of messages mi ∈ Fnq is called b-related if there are exactly
b ≤ n coordinates such that all messages are identical on these coordinates. We denote
this property by
ρ(M) = b.
Thus, there are u = n− b bits where not all messages mi are identical.
Proposition 3.1.7. In a broadcast situation where the recipients use codes of length n
and co-dimension r generated by linearly independent public key matrices, and where the
set of messages M is b-related with u = n − b, the number of recipients N ′r required to
solve the system of a related-message broadcast attack is
N ′r =
n
r − u.
Since the Niederreiter and HyMES cryptosystems do not encrypt mi ∈M directly, but
ϕ(mi) instead, the choice of the encoding function ϕ will influence ρ(ϕ(M)). For example,
regular encoding preserves the relatedness of messages in the sense that an identical bit
in mi and mj is equivalent to identical blocks in ϕ(mi) and ϕ(mj). This is not true for
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enumerative encoding since few different bits in mi and mj can lead to many different bits
in the encoded messages, depending on which bits differ. To keep our analysis independent
of the choice of ϕ, we will assume that
ρ(ϕ(M)) = b,
for some value of b, and that n − b is small. The attacker has to compute b = ρ(ϕ(M))
from his knowledge of ϕ and ρ(M).
Solving the linear equation system
For simpler notation, let the messages in M be identical on the leftmost b bits, and (po-
tentially) different on the rightmost u := n− b bits. This can be achieved by permutation
of the coordinates. Since the messages are not identical, the parity check matrices cannot
be used directly to form the final system of equations. Let
Hi = (H
1
i |H2i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
where H1i contains the leftmost b columns of Hi. We set up the following system of
equations 
H11 H
2
1 0 · · · 0
... 0
. . .
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
H1N 0 · · · 0 H2N


e0
e1
...
eN
 =
 c1...
cN
 .
A solution e = (e0|e1| . . . |eN ) (where e0 has length b and the other blocks have length
n− b) yields solutions mi to the original problem with mi = ϕ−1(e0|ei), for 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
In contrast to the identical-message broadcast attack above, every additional recipient
adds equations as well as unknowns to the system. The system will eventually be solvable
if and only if the number of new equations is greater than the number of new variables.
This is ensured if r > n− b = u, and every recipient adds at least r − u new equations to
the system.
Therefore, the number of recipients N ′r required to solve the system of a related-message
broadcast attack is
N ′r =
n
r − u.
Similarly to Propositions 3.1.4 and 3.1.5, we modify this result for the case where the
public keys are not necessarily linearly independent.
Proposition 3.1.8. Let R be the set of all full-rank matrices over Fq of size r × n.
In the same scenario as in Proposition 3.1.7, but with public keys chosen uniformly at
random from R for each user, the expected number of recipients N ′r required for a successful
broadcast attack is
N ′r =
⌈
n+ 2
r − u
⌉
.
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Table 3.2.: Runtime of our algorithm for different parameters sets for the Niederreiter
encryption scheme.
Parameters Security level Number of Runtime
(n, k, t) against ISD recipients in sec
(1024, 764, 26) 57 4 6
(1024, 524, 50) 58 3 6
(2048, 948, 100) 97 2 35
(2048, 1498, 50) 101 4 50
(4096, 3136, 80) 174 5 460
(4096, 2896, 100) 184 4 430
(4096, 2716, 115) 188 3 352
Since we expect a total of at most 2 linearly dependent rows for the system (see the
proof of Proposition 3.1.5), the expected number of recipients N ′r required to solve the
system of a related-message broadcast attack is N ′r =
⌈
n+2
r−u
⌉
.
3.1.6. Implementation
We have implemented the broadcast attack described above in Java. Target was the
Niederreiter cryptosystem in the FlexiProvider package [20]. Table 3.2 shows the runtime
for different parameters on an Intel i5-2500 CPU using one core. Our attack is not tweaked
for performance, so we expect that this time can be improved further.
Note that the runtimes increase cubic in n. This is to be expected since the main work
of the attack is to solve a system of linear equations, the complexity of which is in O(n3).
3.2. Countermeasures against critical attacks
Our broadcast attack exploits the fact that the received ciphertexts are related since they
correspond to the same message m. A similar fact is used in other types of attacks like
message-resend, related message, chosen ciphertext etc. Therefore, broadcast attacks can
be prevented by using one of the CCA2 conversions that have been proposed for these
other types of attacks.
3.2.1. Unsuitable conversions
Padding schemes like the well-known Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP)
by Bellare and Rogaway [9] are unsuitable for the McEliece, Niederreiter, and HyMES
cryptosystems since they do not prevent reaction attacks: By randomly flipping bits and
observing the reaction of the receiver, an attacker can recover the cleartext, and apply the
inverse of the conversion to reveal the message.
There are (at least) two generic conversion, proposed by Pointcheval [78] and by Fu-
jisaki and Okamoto [37] that work with the above cryptosystems. However, they have the
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disadvantage of adding a large amount of redundancy to the ciphertexts. In both cases,
the general idea is the following: Instead of encrypting the message with the (asymmetric)
cryptosystem, say McEliece, it is encrypted with a symmetric system, and the correspond-
ing key is encrypted with McEliece. Both outputs are appended to form the ciphertext.
This prevents reaction attacks because the receiver will only show a positive reaction if
the symmetric key can be decrypted and if it also allows to decrypt the message. Since
the output block size of McEliece, Niederreiter, and HyMES is large, a lot of redundancy
is thereby added which decreases the efficiency.
3.2.2. Kobara-Imai conversion
More suitable is the γ conversion by Kobara and Imai [48]. This conversion was proposed
for the McEliece cryptosystem, and for large messages it manages to reduce the redun-
dancy of the ciphertext even below that of the unconverted cryptosystem. This conversion
can also be applied to the Niederreiter cryptosystem. It can not be applied to the HyMES
cryptosystem, since it uses a similar technique to encode part of the message into the
error vector; hence, applying the Kobara-Imai-conversion γ to the McEliece cryptosys-
tem will achieve a similar efficiency improvement as the HyMES scheme. For the sake of
completeness, we will briefly describe this conversion here. A more detailed description
can be found in [13, Section 5.3]. The resulting cryptosystem is a CCA2-secure variant of
Niederreiter, which allows to implement secure and efficient cryptographic applications.
This conversion consists of two modifications. Firstly, it introduces randomness into the
message, thereby rendering the output indistinguishable from a random ciphertext. This
prevents attacks that rely on the relation of ciphertexts and/or cleartexts, e.g. message-
resend, related-message, or broadcast attacks. Secondly, both the message vector m as
well as the error vector e are computed from the message. This prevents reaction attacks,
since a modified error vector results in a different cleartext, which can be detected by the
honest recipient.
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Algorithm 7 Kobara-Imai’s γ conversion, modified for the Niederreiter cryptosystem.
Notation for Algorithm 7:
EncN : The Niederreiter encryption algorithm
DecN : The Niederreiter decryption algorithm
Additional system parameters: The length of the random seed lens, and a constant const.
Encryption Encγ
INPUT: Message m ∈ F∗q
OUTPUT: Ciphertext c ∈ Fwq , where w = r + len(m) + len(c) + len(s)− l
Generate a random seed s of length lens
y1 ← PRG(s) + (m|const)
y2 ← s+ h(y1)
(y4|y3)← (y2|y1), such that
len(y3) = l
len(y4) = len(m) + len(c) + len(s)− l
z ← ϕ(y3)
c← y4|EncN(z)
Return c
Decryption Decγ
INPUT: Ciphertext c ∈ Fwq , where w = r + len(m) + len(c) + len(s)− l
OUTPUT: Message m ∈ F∗q
y4 ← MSBlen(c)−n(c)
z ← DecN(LSBn(c))
y3 ← ϕ−1(z)
(y2|y1)← (y4|y3)
s← y2 + h(y1)
(m|const′)← y1 + PRG(s)
if const’=const then
Return m
else
Reject c
end if
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Non-critical attacks have a runtime that is exponential in the security parameter (in our
case, the code length, provided that the other code parameters are chosen appropriately).
Therefore, they can be rendered infeasible by enlarging this parameter. Often, they are
also called decoding attacks since many attacks in this category attempt to decode a given
ciphertext, not to recover the secret key.
Because of their exponential runtime, non-critical attacks usually do not completely break
the target cryptosystems. However, it is very important to understand their complexities
because these determine the choice of secure parameters. We will cover the selection of
parameters in more detail in Section 5. As an example, the McEliece cryptosystem itself
remains secure, while the original parameters (1024, 524, 50) had to be modified after
Bernstein et al. [15] published an improved ISD attack with a complexity of 260.4 binary
operations against these parameters.
Code-based cryptography has an important advantage in this respect: In contrast to some
other areas of post-quantum cryptography, e.g. some schemes based on lattices, it is often
possible to precisely compute the expected number of computations required to run an
attack against a certain cryptosystem. That means we do not have to rely on the O-
notation to measure the complexity, avoiding the hidden factors which can be very large
and thus significantly influence the security. In the following, we will generally refrain
from using the O-notation; we will use it if that increases the readability of the text.
Our contributions
In this section, we present four improvements regarding non-critical attacks: A general-
ization of ISD attacks from binary to larger fields Fq; an analysis of the effect of partial
knowledge; an improvement of GBA attacks against certain structured matrices; and a
statistical decoding algorithm generalized to Fq, including techniques to exploit partial
knowledge.
We end this section with an analysis of three “cross-area” attacks, i.e. lattice-based at-
tacks against code-based systems and code-based attacks against lattice-based systems.
Even though the attacks we analyzed were not faster than the best attacks from the re-
spective areas, we include it here because our findings may help other researchers and lead
to improvements or insights in the future.
In Section 4.1, we propose and prove lower bounds for the complexity of ISD algorithms
over a finite field Fq. We generalize the lower bounds proposed by Finiasz and Sendrier
in [36] to codes over Fq and fix a misapproximation in their proof (the approximation of the
parameter l is suboptimal). In [16], the authors pointed out that the lower bound cannot
be correct by showing how to decrease the algorithm complexity below the corresponding
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Table 4.1.: Examples comparing our improved ISD attack with Peters’ [75].
Code parameters Claimed log2(#bin ops) Lower bound
q n k t security level (from [75]) log2(#bin ops)
256 459 204 50 80 77.10 65.05
1024 450 225 56 80 76.88 62.01
256 640 128 64 102 181.62 171.89
2 2304 1024 64 80 83.39 80.60
lower bound. We therefore propose a more general attack framework to derive the lower
bound which takes the improvement in [16] into account. This improvement is based on
the fact that vectors with a single non-zero entry can be added using less operations than
the addition of vectors in general. While the authors of [16] also propose a new bound
for the complexity of (binary) ISD, this bound is not as tight as ours. For the parameter
set (12200, 9244, 488) referred to in [16], their bound yields approx. 890 bits of security,
compared with 991 bits for our lower bound.
In addition to that, we show how to use the structure of Fq to increase the algorithm
efficiency by a factor of
√
q − 1 compared to a straightforward generalization of [36]. The
details of our proofs are given in Appendix A.1. Table 4.1 illustrates our improved algo-
rithm.
Based on this generalization, in Section 4.2 we analyze two types of partial knowledge
an attacker can obtain in certain scenarios:
1. The error values (of the secret error vector e) are in a subset E ( Fq.
2. The entries of e ∈ Fnq are known, but their positions are not.
We show that additional knowledge can be used to improve the efficiency of an attack
by restricting the space that needs to be searched, and we prove new lower bounds for
these cases. As an example, we analyze the Cayrel-Ve´ron-El Yousfi (CVE) ID scheme [26]
to apply our methodology and assess their method to prevent the information leak.
In the subsequent Section 4.3 we shown how the time and memory efficiency of GBA
attacks against structured matrices can be improved. Our technique can be applied to a
wide range of possible structures including QC and QD matrices. Even if only part of the
matrix is structured, as for the truncated QC matrices in the FSB hash function, we can
apply the improvement, with a correspondingly smaller effect.
However, in contrast to the claims in the corresponding paper [66], the effect can only
be applied until the algorithm starts to eliminate vectors from the lists, so the effect is
much smaller than originally anticipated. We will describe the technique we developed,
and show why it cannot be applied once elimination takes place.
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In Section 4.4, we analyze statistical decoding over a finite field Fq. We generalize
Overbeck’s binary statistical decoding algorithm [72] to codes over Fq, analyze the success
probability of our algorithm, and provide experimental data for different field sizes. Our
algorithm is able to successfully decode most of our test instances, even with a small sam-
ple size of |H| = 100. The success probability shows to be independent of the field size q,
making it especially interesting for short codes over large fields Fq. In addition to that,
we describe two techniques to use knowledge about the structure of the code or about the
solution to speed up the decoding algorithm.
The final Section 4.5 covers our analysis of three “cross-area” attacks:
• The sieving algorithm by Micciancio and Voulgaris [59] against code-based cryp-
tosystems.
• Enumeration using extreme pruning by Gama et al. [41] against code-based cryp-
tosystems.
• ISD against lattice-based cryptosystems.
We show that the pruning technique does not work in the code-context because the notion
of an orthogonalized basis cannot be transferred to codes. However, the sieving and ISD
algorithms can be modified to work in the corresponding area. The resulting algorithms are
able to solve the hard problems of finding short codewords and short vectors, respectively,
and can therefore be used to attack cryptosystems that rely on the hardness of one of
these problems. As mentioned above, the attacks were not as fast as the best attack from
the respective other field.
Related work
ISD over Fq
Many improvements and generalizations of ISD-like attacks have already been proposed
in the literature; we outline these pivotal examples:
1962 Prange [79]: The first proposal to use information sets for decoding.
1988 Leon [51]: Prange’s proposal was made probabilistic, thereby improving its runtime.
1988 Lee-Brickell [49]: Introduced a systematic way to determine whether the recovered
message is correct, and proposed several other improvements. These include bit-wise
computation of vectors, which stops the computation earlier, and a speedup of the
Gaussian elimination which reuses part of the columns of the parity-check matrix.
1990 van Tilburg [95]: The efficiency of the algorithm was further improved, and the ISD
attack was made more efficient by a systematic method of checking and by using a
random bit swapping procedure.
1989 Stern [88]: Proposed an idea that allows to make use of the birthday paradox, thereby
increasing the speed of the search step.
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1998 Canteaut-Chabaud [22]: This paper improved the efficiency of previous algorithms
and used Markov chains to model the algorithm’s behavior.
2008 Bernstein et al. [15]: Several techniques were proposed to further speed up the attack
algorithm, e.g. re-using pivot values to speed up the matrix inversion step.
2010 Bernstein et al. [16]: Introduced ball-collision decoding, a technique allowing to
speed up the algorithm using the fact that standard basis vectors can be added very
efficiently. The result is a decreased complexity of ISD, for certain parameters even
below the lower bound in [36].
All above proposals are restricted to binary codes. Recently, two papers — by Finiasz
and Sendrier [36] and by Peters [74] — studied ISD algorithms. The former provided
lower bounds for the complexity of the ISD algorithm over F2, the latter described how to
generalize Stern’s and Lee-Brickell’s algorithms to Fq. Figure 4 illustrates the development
of ISD algorithms, focussing on the error vector structure it searches for.
Figure 4.1.: Weight profile of the codewords sought by the various algorithms (Update of a
figure from Overbeck and Sendrier: Code-based Cryptography in Post-quantum
Cryptography [13])
Bernstein (Ball) p1 p1 p2 p2 t− 2p1 − 2p2
Finiasz/Sendrier p p t− 2p
Stern p p 0 t− 2p
-ﬀ ` -ﬀ n− k − `
Leon p 0 t− p
Lee-Brickell p t− p
Plain ISD 0 t
k -ﬀ n− k -ﬀ
Following our work, two publications contributed improvements of ISD. In their 2011
paper “Decoding Random Linear Codes in O˜(20.054n)”, May et al. [54] presented an algo-
rithm based on Finiasz and Sendrier’s ISD algorithm. The authors built on the variant
with non-disjoint sets and achieved a complexity of O˜(20.05363), slightly below that of
ball-collision decoding by Bernstein et al. [16]. Since the authors state the algorithm’s
complexity in O() notation and do not determine the cut-off point with other variants
of ISD (e.g. ball-collision decoding or our algorithm), however, the actual efficiency for
concrete parameters is not yet known and cannot be compared with our algorithm.
The contribution of Becker et al. [2] in “Decoding Random Binary Linear Codes” is to
appear at Eurocrypt 2012 and not yet available publicly.
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The effect of partial knowledge
We are not aware of any previous work that specifically deals with the effects of partial
knowledge.
GBA against structured matrices
The birthday paradox refers to the fact that collisions between two (usually random) lists
can be found in O(2n/2), much faster than O(2n) for checking every possible combination.
Wagner generalized this algorithm in 2002 by allowing more than two lists. The resulting
GBA takes lists L1, . . . , Lt and an element s as input and attempts to find exactly one
element xi ∈ Li per list such that
∑
i xi = s. By starting with t instead of 2 lists,
the generalized algorithm achieves a complexity of O(22
√
n). However, it requires a larger
number of input elements and therefore more memory than the classic birthday algorithm.
Minder and Sinclair’s extended k-tree algorithm [60] can be seen as a further generalization
of Wagner’s work. It allows to balance the time and memory efficiency of the algorithm.
This enables an attacker to optimize the attack performance in the presence of memory
constraints. We will demonstrate our improvement based on Minder and Sinclair’s version
of the GBA.
In 2009, Bernstein et al. published a successful attack [14] against FSB48, a toy version of
FSB, that required just under 8 days. This attack used the two techniques mentioned in
Remark 2.5.1 (page 38), but did not exploit the structure of the matrix.
Statistical decoding over Fq
Statistical decoding was introduced in 2001 by Al Jabri [45] and improved by Overbeck
in 2006 [72]. We are not aware of any attempt to use statistical decoding for non-binary
codes, nor to exploit knowledge about the structure of the code or of the solution to
increase the algorithm’s efficiency.
“Cross-area” attacks
We are not aware of any related work.
Outlook and further work
It can be seen from Table 4.2 (page 69) that the efficiency of concrete algorithms over F2
is not far from the lower bound, while over larger fields the gap is wider. We propose to
further investigate improvements over Fq to decrease the size of this gap.
In addition to that, we suggest to analyze the impact of partial knowledge on other at-
tacks, for example on GBA. Also, other types of partial knowledge should be considered.
For example, in the FSB hash function [5] the “message” is transformed into a regular
word, which consists of blocks of size n/t and weight 1 or, more generally, of weight t0
for some positive integer t0. This has been studied recently for ISD and t0 = 2 by Bern-
stein et al. [17], and for GBA and weight k by Kirchner [46]. It should be further analyzed
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how this knowledge can increase the efficiency of attacks in order to better estimate the
security of cryptographic schemes.
Regarding structured codes as in Section 4.3 (page 79), we propose to analyze if and
how other attacks, for example ISD, can exploit such structures. Furthermore, it would
be interesting to transfer these results to other areas of cryptography, for example lattice-
based schemes.
Also, we propose to analyze if the structure of the matrix can be exploited in case of a
“Grover-improved GBA”. In 2010, Bernstein [12] presented an improvement of an ISD
attack for quantum computing. Protecting against this attack requires key sizes to be
increased only by a factor of four. If structures as analyzed in our paper can also be
exploited by a Grover-GBA, it would require an additional key size increase.
In the area of statistical decoding, we propose to analyze if other types of structure
can be exploited as well. Especially the code structure seems to be very promising, for
example if the underlying code is a Goppa code.
4.1. Information Set Decoding over Fq
In recent years, many new proposals use codes over larger fields Fq, mostly in an attempt
to reduce the size of the public and private keys. Two examples that received a lot of at-
tention are Berger et al.’s QC alternant [10], and Misoczki and Barreto’s QD Goppa [61]
codes. Cryptosystems using these codes are the QD-CFS signature scheme [8], the FSB
hash function [5], the CVE ID scheme [26], and others.
Cryptographic schemes based on codes over fields other than F2 present security issues
that are not relevant in the case of binary codes; the security of such constructions, there-
fore, requires separate assessment. For instance, several structural attacks against QC and
QD codes have been published, indicating how to break some of the proposed non-binary
parameter sets [94, 33]. These attacks use the QC/QD structure of the matrix in order to
decrease the number of variables in the linear equation system which is used to recover an
alternant decoder. Binary codes remain unaffected by these attacks.
ISD is one of the most important class of generic attacks against code-based cryptosys-
tems. Attacks based on ISD are the most efficient attacks against several encryption and
identification schemes, e.g. the McEliece and Niederreiter encryption schemes.
In the following, we present and prove lower bounds for ISD algorithms over a finite field
Fq. Since we focus on lower bounds in a generic attack framework instead of individual
attacks, our results anticipate future software and hardware improvements and allow to
compute conservative parameters for cryptographic applications.
4.1.1. Analysis of the ISD algorithm over Fq
The security analysis of cryptosystems considers the most efficient attack and estimates
its complexity. However, when a faster attack is developed, this security analysis might
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become obsolete. Over the years, there have been many improvements for ISD. Finiasz
and Sendrier [36] proposed to establish lower bounds for an ISD family of algorithms
to allow for conservative, longer lasting security estimates. Our algorithm is based on
the same framework, but includes several generalizations and improvements. This attack
framework represents an idealized ISD-like algorithm, meaning that we only consider a
cost for the most crucial steps and assume no cost for overhead, memory access etc.
The most significant steps in ISD are the calculation of syndromes (ISD 1 and ISD 2 in
Algorithm 8 on page 66), and checking the success condition (ISD 3). This approach
allows us to develop lower bounds for the complexity of those attack algorithms matching
our framework which is very general and includes, amongst others, the algorithms shown
in Figure 4.
We start by generalizing the ISD algorithm to work over Fq, taking the improvements
from [16] into account (“Algorithm A”), and then we show how to use the field structure
to increase its efficiency (“Algorithm B”). The latter algorithm is faster by a factor of√
q − 1 compared with the former (in number of operations, counted according to our
framework).
4.1.2. A generic ISD framework
The problem we attempt to solve using ISD attacks is the GD problem. This problem can
be reduced to the SD problem: Given a ciphertext c = mG+ e, we can multiply it with a
public parity-check matrix H
HcT = H(mG+ e) = HeT,
and solve the corresponding SD problem. A suitable matrix H can be found as described
in Section 3.1.2 (page 46).
The algorithm we describe here recovers a q-ary error vector e. In each step, we randomly
rearrange the columns of the parity check matrix H and apply Gaussian elimination to
transform it into the form
H =
(
In−k−l 0 H1
0 Il H2
)
, (4.1)
where In−k−l and Il are identity matrices of size (n−k− l) and size l, respectively. The
columns are usually chosen adaptively to guarantee the success of this step, i.e. to ensure
that n−k linearly independent columns are found. Although this approach could bias the
following steps, it has not shown any influence in practice. The variables l and p (see next
step) are algorithm parameters optimized with respect to the code parameters (n, k, t).
This structure of H differs from the one proposed in [36]. We modified it in order to
increase the efficiency of the syndrome generation step. This technique has been described
in [16], allowing the authors to achieve an ISD complexity below the lower bound in [36].
We correct the resulting lower bounds by extending our attack framework to include this
technique.
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The error vector we are looking for has p1 errors in the column set corresponding to
H1 and H2, p2 errors in the columns corresponding to Il, and the remaining (t− p1 − p2)
errors in the first (n−k− l) columns. The reason for this split into p1 and p2 errors is that
columns in the central block of H have exactly one non-zero entry, which makes it faster
to add them to another vector. We will go into more details at the end of this section.
To find an error vector with the structure described above, many possible error patterns
of p := p1 + p2 errors in the last k + l columns are checked whether the weighted sum sˆ
of those p columns is identical to the syndrome s in the last l entries. This is done by
searching for collisions between two sets L1 and L2 defined as
L1 = {H2eT : e ∈W1}, (4.2)
L2 = {s2 −H2eT : e ∈W2}, (4.3)
where W1 ⊆ Wk+l;bp/2c;q;p1 and W2 ⊆ Wk+l;dp/2e;q;p1 are given to the algorithm, and
Wk+l;p;q;p1 denotes the set of all q-ary words of length k + l and weight p such that
the first l entries contain exactly p1 non-zero entries. This approach corresponds to the
overlapping sets technique proposed in [36]. Alternatively, the sets can be defined such
that they overlap only partially or not at all, but this has shown only a small influence in
practice.
Writing e = [e′|(e1 + e2)] and s = [s1|s2] with s2 of length l, we thus search for vectors e1
and e2 of weight bp/2c and dp/2e respectively, such that
[Il|H2] · [e1 + e2]T = sT2 .
If such vectors e1 and e2 are found, we compute the difference sˆ− s; if it does not have
weight t − p, the algorithm restarts. Otherwise, the non-zero entries correspond to the
remaining t− p errors:
HeT =
(
In−k−l 0 H1
0 Il H2
)(
e′T
(e1 + e2)
T
)
=
(
In−k−l · e′T + [0|H1](e1 + e2)T
[Il|H2](e1 + e2)T
)
=
(
In−k−l · e′T
0
)
+ sˆT
=
(
sT1
sT2
)
.
Therefore, we have
In−k−l · e′T = sT1 − [0|H1](e1 + e2)T,
revealing the remaining columns of e.
Definition 4.1.1. For any (n, k, t) code C over Fq we denote by WFqISD(n, r, t, q) the
minimum work factor (in number of operations) of Algorithm 8 applied to C, i.e. after
optimizing l, p1, p2, W1, and W2 with respect to C.
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In the algorithm described in this section, all computations are done over Fq, so the
complexity also depends on the implementation of q-ary arithmetic. A na¨ıve implemen-
tation yields an additional factor of log2(q) for addition and log
2
2(q) for multiplication.
There are several techniques to improve this, e.g. by lifting to Z[x] (for large q) or by
precomputing exp and log tables (for small q). Especially for small q, this allows to make
q-ary arithmetic nearly as fast as binary, so in order to gain conservative estimates we
neglect this factor.
4.1.3. Efficiency improvement
We can use the field structure of Fq to increase the algorithm’s efficiency. While this
improvement is one of our own contributions (and has been described in [67]), it has been
found independently by Minder and Sinclair [60].
Proposition 4.1.2. The structure of Fq can be used to increase the efficiency of ISD (in
number of operations) by a factor of
√
q − 1 compared with a straightforward generalization
of ISD to Fq.
To see this, note that for every vector e such that HeT = sT, there are q − 1 pairwise
different vectors e′ such that He′T = asT for some a ∈ Fq\{0}, namely e′ = ae. Clearly, if
we find such an e′, we can calculate e and thus solve the SD problem. We can modify the
algorithm to allow it to find these vectors e′ as well, thereby increasing the fraction of error
vectors that are (implicitly) tested in each iteration by a factor of q−1 (see Appendix A.1
for a detailed description).
Since this fraction depends linearly on |W1| · |W2|, we can also keep the fraction constant
and decrease the size of both sets W1 and W2 by a factor of
√
q − 1 each. As the work
factor in each iteration of the algorithm is linear in |W1| + |W2|, this increases the algo-
rithm’s efficiency by a factor
√
q − 1.
A simple way to decrease the size of the sets is to restrict them to vectors with the
leading element equal to 1. We achieve this by redefining as follows.
W ′1 ⊆ {e ∈ Wk+l;bp/2c;q;p1 : le(e) = 1}, (4.4)
L′1 =
{
(H2e
T)(le(H2e
T))−1 : e ∈W ′1
}
, (4.5)
L′2 =
{
(s2 −H2eT)(le(s2 −H2eT))−1 : e ∈W2
}
. (4.6)
Note that in practice, the calculation of each vector is more costly due to the final divi-
sion by the leading coefficient. However, this is offset by the smaller number of vectors that
must be computed. Therefore, applying the above improvement to an implementation of
ISD (and thus counting its number of operations instead of according to our framework)
leads to an efficiency improvement smaller than a factor of
√
q − 1.
The algorithm thus works as shown in Algorithm 8. The description is the one from [36],
modified to include our improvements described above.
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Algorithm 8 Information Set Decoding over Fq (“Algorithm B”)
Notation for Algorithm 8:
hl(x) : A function returning the last l bits of the vector x ∈ Fnq
y Notational shortcut for le(H2e
T
1 )
z Notational shortcut for le(s−H2eT2 )
Parameters:
• Code parameters: integers n, r = n− k, and t, and a finite field Fq.
• Algorithm parameters: two integers p > 0 and l > 0, and two sets W1 ⊆ {e ∈
Wk+l;bp/2c;q;p1 : le(e) = 1} and W2 ⊆ Wk+l;dp/2e;q;p1 .
Input: Matrix H0 ∈ Fr×nq and a vector s0 ∈ Frq.
Output: A pair (P, e), consisting of permutation P and vector e, which allow to com-
pute the message m as described above.
Repeat (MAIN LOOP)
P ← random n× n permutation matrix
(H,U)← PGElim(H0P ) //Gaussian elimination as in (4.1)
s← s0UT
for all e1 ∈W1
i← hl(H2eT1 y−1) (ISD 1)
write(e1, i) //store e1 in some data structure at index i
for all e2 ∈W2
i← hl((sT2 −H2eT2 )z−1) (ISD 2)
S ← read(i) //extract the elements stored at index i
for all e1 ∈ S
if wt(sT2 −H2(e1 + e2)T) = t− p (ISD 3)
return (P, e1zy
−1 + e2). (SUCCESS)
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4.1.4. Lower bounds for the complexity
Proposition 4.1.3. Let C be an (n, k, t) Goppa code over Fq and c = (x+ e) a McEliece
ciphertext, where x is an arbitrary codeword and e ∈ Fnq an error vector chosen uniformly at
random from all vectors of weight t. If
(
n
t
)
(q−1)t < qr (single solution), or if (nt)(q−1)t ≥
qr (multiple solutions) and
(
r
t−p
)(
k
p
)
(q − 1)t  qr, a lower bound for the expected cost (in
number of operations) of using Algorithm 8 to find e is
WFqISD(n, r, t, q) = min
l;p1;p2
Np;q(l) ·
λ−1q
 2(q − 1)l
q
(
l
p′2
)
(q − 1)p′2 + p2
√( k
p1
)(
l
p2
)
(q − 1)p−1
+ Kq
(
k
p1
)(
l
p2
)
(q − 1)p−1
ql
)
,
where
Np;q(l) =
min
((
n
t
)
(q − 1)t, qr)(
r−l
t−p
)(
k
p1
)(
l
p2
)
(q − 1)t , p = p1 + p2, p
′
2 = bp2/2c,
and λ−1q = (1− exp(−1))−1 ≈ 1.58.
An exception is p = 0, which corresponds to the classical ISD algorithm proposed by
Prange [79]. In this case, we cannot gain a factor of
√
q − 1, and the work factor is
WFqISD(n, r, t, q) =
(
n
t
)(
r
t
) .
If
(
n
t
)
(q − 1)t ≥ qr and ( rt−p)(kp)(q − 1)t ≥ qr, the expected cost is
WFqISD(n, r, t, q) ≈ min
l;p
2lqr/2√(
r−l
t−p
)
(q − 1)t−p+1
.
Proof. We only sketch the proof here and give full details in Appendix A.1.
By computing the number of syndromes that are tested in each iteration of the algorithm
and the success probability of each error pattern we try, we can compute the expected
number of iterations, which corresponds to the number of executions of the steps ISD 1
and ISD 2. This number depends on the size of the sets W ′1 and W2 and we can analytically
find the optimal size for these sets. In addition to that, we compute the expected number
of collisions we have to test per iteration (step ISD 3 in the algorithm). Multiplied by
the number of iterations, this equals the number of executions of ISD 3. Finally, we use
the number of operations required to execute ISD 1-3 to compute the total cost of the
algorithm.
The variable Kq represents the number of operations required to check condition ISD 3.
A realistic value for Kq is Kq = 2t, which will be used for the parameters in Section 4.1.5.
This value is justified by counting the computation of each row of sT2 −H2(e1 + e2)T as
67
4. Non-Critical Attacks
one operation; since every row has the same probability of yielding 0 or 1, step ISD 3 ends
after 2t rows on average.
In [36], the cost to compute the vectors in steps (ISD1) and (ISD2) was estimated to
l operations. However, we can reduce the cost by optimizing the calculation: by storing
partial sums, we only have to add a single vector to compute the next syndrome. The
number of operations required equals the weight of this vector, which is l/2 on average. In
addition to that, we do a full instead of a partial Gaussian elimination, which corresponds
to the central block Il of H. These vectors contain only a single non-zero entry, which
makes it particularly fast to add them in order to compute the syndrome: for every partial
sum of p1 columns, we get
(
l
p2
)
syndromes at a very low cost.
The work factor per iteration is essentially the sum of a matrix multiplication (with
the permutation matrix), the Gaussian elimination, and the search for collisions between
L′1 and L′2. Compared with the binary case, the Gaussian elimination is slower in the
q-ary case because every row has to be divided by the pivot entry. However, since matrix
multiplication and Gaussian elimination are much faster than collision search, we allocate
no cost to them.
4.1.5. Results
In [74], the author shows how to extend Lee-Brickell’s and Stern’s algorithms to codes
over Fq. Since our goal is to find general lower bounds, instead of the complexity of
individual attacks, our assumptions are more optimistic (from an attackers point of view).
In the following, we show how much each of our assumptions contributes to the difference
between our results on those in [74].
The website [75] lists the work factor of the latter algorithm against several parameters.
In Tables 4.2 and 4.3, we use the same parameters and compare these results with our
lower bound.
As noted above, the complexity of the binary ISD algorithm is relatively close to our
lower bound, while the gap is wider in the q-ary case. This is due to our efficiency
improvement of a factor of
√
q − 1 and the fact that over Fq the cost of the individual
steps of current ISD algorithms is not as close to our assumptions (e.g. no cost for Gaussian
elimination).
4.1.6. Comparison with other results on the ISD complexity
For the algorithm from [74], as well as for our lower bound algorithm, the expected number
of operations is the product of the number of iterations by the number of operations in
each iteration. While the former factor is the same for both algorithms, or even a little
higher for our algorithm, the lower bound for the number of operations per iteration is
much smaller in our case, which results in the difference between these algorithms.
The following comparison is between our algorithm and the overlapping-sets variant in [74]
which is structurally closer to our algorithm than the one using even-split sets. The run-
68
4.1. Information Set Decoding over Fq
Table 4.2.: Parameters analyzed by Peters [75]. The claimed security is taken from [10]
and [61], the last two columns show Peters’ complexity and our lower bound.
Code parameters Claimed log2(#bin ops) Lower bound
q n r t security level (from [75]) log2(#bin ops)
256 459 204 50 80 77.10 65.05
256 510 204 50 90 84.87 72.94
256 612 204 50 100 98.29 86.50
256 765 255 50 120 97.52 85.14
1024 450 225 56 80 76.88 62.01
1024 558 279 63 90 84.00 69.17
1024 744 372 54 110 70.54 57.88
4 2560 1024 128 128 187.46 178.85
16 1408 512 128 128 210.76 204.65
256 640 128 64 102 181.62 171.89
256 768 256 128 136 253.01 243.02
256 1024 512 256 168 329.04 318.65
2 2304 1024 64 80 83.39 80.60
2 3584 2048 128 112 112.18 109.98
2 4096 2048 128 128 136.47 134.51
2 7168 4096 256 192 215.91 213.92
2 8192 4096 256 256 265.01 262.42
Table 4.3.: The two parameter sets from [16], which are below the lower bound proposed
in [36] (number of bit operations in log2)
Code parameters Lower bound #bin ops Our new
q n k t from [36] (from [16]) lower bound
2 6624 5129 117 255.18 254.15 251.95
2 12200 9244 488 999.45 996.22 991.94
69
4. Non-Critical Attacks
time difference between these two variants is comparatively low.
The number of operations per iteration for the first algorithm is the sum of three steps:
1. Reusing parts of information sets and performing precomputations,
2. Compute sums of p rows on l bits to calculate H2e
T,
3. For each collision (e1, e2), checking if wt(s
T
2 −H2(e1 + e2)T) = t− p.
To compare the cost of these steps with that used for our lower bound, we calculate all
values for the (450, 225, 56) parameter set over F1024. For this set, using p = 1, l = 3,
m = 1, c = 2, and r′ = 1 (the last variable is called r in [74], but it should not be confused
with the co-dimension), we calculate a total cost of the first algorithm of 272.47, which
consists of 251.46 iterations of 221.0 operations1.
1. Precomputations
The cost of the first step is given in [74] as
(n− 1)
(
(k − 1)
(
1− 1
qr′
)
+ (qr
′ − r′)
)
c
r′
,
where c and r′ are algorithm parameters. For these parameters, this amounts to 220.1
operations, and it is the most expensive step.
Our algorithm does not use precomputation, so we allocate no cost.
2. Computing sums of p rows to calculate H2eT
The cost of this step for the first algorithm is
((k − p+ 1) + (|W1|+ |W2|)(q − 1)p) l.
For the parameters given above, this step adds 219.9 operations.
Our algorithm allocates to this step a cost of
(q − 1)l|W ′1|
q
(
l
p′2
)
(q − 1)p′2 + |W
′
1|p′2 +
(q − 1)l|W2|
q
(
l
p′2
)
(q − 1)p′2 + |W2|p
′
2
=
 2(q − 1)l
q
(
l
p′2
)
(q − 1)p′2 + p2
√( k
p1
)(
l
p2
)
(q − 1)p−1.
We make this optimistic assumption2 for the cost of a matrix-vector multiplication to
anticipate further software and hardware improvements for this operation. The result is
25.6 operations in this case.
1Computed with the formulae in [74]. We are unable to determine why the authors website [75] claims a
different complexity.
2From the cryptanalyst’s point of view.
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Table 4.4.: Contribution of individual steps to the complexity difference.
Step Peters’ complexity Our lower bound
1. Precomputations 220.1 0
2. Computing sums 219.9 25.6
3. Checking collisions 212.4 24.6
Total 221.0 26.2
3. Checking collisions
The first algorithm allocates a cost of
q
q − 1(t− 2p)2p
(
1 +
q − 2
q − 1
) |W1| · |W2|(q − 1)2p
ql
to this step. For our set of parameters, this equals 212.4 operations.
In our algorithm, we expect the number of collisions to be
λq|W ′1| · |W2|
ql
=
(
k
p1
)(
l
p2
)
(q − 1)p−1
ql
.
The cost Kq of checking each collision is taken to be Kq = 2t. Thus, the expected cost
per iteration is 24.6.
Some of the assumptions above may seem fairly optimistic. However, we find it necessary
to make these assumptions since we want to establish conservative lower bounds.
4.1.7. Conclusion
For the three steps above, we have the following comparison:
In total, the work per iteration of our algorithm is smaller by a factor of 214.8. This
number reflects the assumptions we made to establish lower bounds for the complexity.
While our assumptions lead to a higher number of iterations — 255.8 compared with 251.5
— the total number of operations is smaller by a factor of 210.4 in our case.
4.2. ISD using partial knowledge
While most security proofs assume that an attacker does not have any additional informa-
tion about the secret key, we show that in certain scenarios an attacker can gain partial
knowledge of the secret. In this section, we present how this knowledge can be used to
improve the efficiency of an ISD attack. The modified attack algorithms are at least as
efficient as the unmodified version, but usually they are significantly better. For most
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types of partial knowledge discussed in the following sections we use the framework from
Section 4.1.1 to derive new bounds for the complexity of such an attack; in one case we
present arguments to show that the modified attack is more efficient and to allow the
approximation of the improvement factor.
We analyze two types of partial knowledge, present applications for our results, and give
an idea how to prevent the leakage of such knowledge to an attacker. These two types are:
1. Error values are in a subset E ( Fq, i.e. the error vector e ∈ En0 ( Fnq with
E0 = E ∪ {0}.
2. The entries of e ∈ Fnq are known, but their positions are not.
Note that these types of partial knowledge only apply over fields Fq larger than binary;
the first type is not possible in F2, and the second type is trivial (no additional informa-
tion).
There are various situations when adversaries have partial knowledge. For example,
any Stern-like identification scheme that works over Fq, provided the scheme does not use
measures to prevent it, leaks information of the second type we described above: For one
of the challenges sent by the verifier, the prover sends a random permutation of the secret
key in the answer phase. This reveals the value of all entries of the secret, but not their
positions.
There are other types of partial knowledge, e.g. knowledge about the structure of the un-
derlying code. Also, other attacks (e.g. GBA) should be able to exploit partial knowledge.
We leave these research questions for future work.
As an example, we show how to apply partial knowledge to attack the CVE ID scheme if
information leakage is not prevented. In this case, the complexity of the attack is decreased
significantly. Clearly, the potential leakage of partial knowledge has to be analyzed when
designing new cryptosystems.
4.2.1. Error values are in a set E ( Fq
If we know that the error values are in a proper subset E ( Fq, we can limit the size of
the sets Wi and Li by redefining:
W1 ⊆ Ek+l0 ∩ {e ∈ Wk+l;dp/2e;q;p1 : le(e) = 1}, (4.7)
W2 ⊆ Ek+l0 ∩ {e ∈ Wk+l;bp/2c;q;p1}, (4.8)
L1 =
{
(H2e
T)(le(H2e
T))−1 : e ∈W1
}
, (4.9)
L2 =
{
(s2 −H2eT)(le(s2 −H2eT))−1 : e ∈W2
}
, (4.10)
where E0 = E ∪{0}. When restricting the leading entry of e to 1, the above assumes that
1 ∈ E. If this is not the case, i.e. 1 6∈ E, any other element in E can be used to fix the
leading entry of all vectors in W1. This gives the following proposition:
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Proposition 4.2.1 (Error values in a set E). Let C be an (n, k, t) Goppa code over Fq and
c = x + e a McEliece ciphertext, where x is an arbitrary codeword and e ∈ En0 an error
vector chosen uniformly at random from all vectors of weight t. If
(
n
t
)|E|t < qr (single
solution), or if
(
n
t
)|E|t ≥ qr (multiple solutions) and ( rt−p)(kp)|E|t  qr, a lower bound
for the expected cost (in number of operations) of using Algorithm 8 and the improvement
technique above to find e is
WFqISD(n, r, t, q)
= min
l;p1;p2
Np;q(l) ·
λ−1q
 2|E|l
(|E|+ 1)( lp′2)(q − 1)p′2 + p2
√( k
p1
)(
l
p2
)
|E|p−1
+ Kq
(
k
p1
)(
l
p2
)|E|p−1
ql
)
,
where
Np;q(l) =
min
((
n
t
)|E|t, qr)(
r−l
t−p
)(
k
p1
)(
l
p2
)|E|t , p = p1 + p2, p′2 = bp2/2c,
and λ−1q = (1− exp(−1))−1 ≈ 1.58.
The case p = 0 is identical to the one in Proposition 4.1.3, hence
WFqISD(n, r, t, q) =
(
n
t
)(
r
t
) .
If
(
n
t
)|E|t ≥ qr and ( rt−p)(kp)|E|t ≥ qr, the expected cost is
WFqISD(n, r, t, q) ≈ min
l;p
2lqr/2√(
r−l
t−p
)|E|t−p+1 .
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The difference to the proof of Proposition 4.1.3 is that we can decrease the size of the sets
W ′1 and W2 by allowing only error patterns with values in E0. The expected number of
iterations is unchanged, but the number of operations per iteration decreases rapidly with
E.
4.2.2. Error values known (but not error positions)
Let the error values be v1, . . . , vt ∈ Fq. Depending on the size of the set V := {v1, . . . , vt},
several strategies can be used. We will describe three cases:
1. |V | = t, i.e. all error values are different.
2. |V | < t, but |V |  1
3. Most error values belong to a very small subset of V (or |V |  t).
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1. |V| = t
In this case, we can decrease the number of error vectors we have to try in each iteration
in the following way. For each distribution of p = p1 + p2 errors in k + l locations, we do
not assign all combinations of q-ary values to the error positions, but instead randomly
choose p out of the t known error values and assign them in all possible combinations.
Hence, instead of (
k
p1
)(
l
p2
)
(q − 1)p−1
combinations, we only have to test (
k
p1
)(
l
p2
)(
t
p
)
p!.
For most parameters, the second expression is much smaller than the first. For these
parameters, we redefine the sets Wi and Li as follows
W1 ⊆ {e ∈ W ′k+l;dp/2e;q;p1}, (4.11)
W2 ⊆ {e ∈ W ′k+l;bp/2c;q;p1}, (4.12)
L1 =
{
(H2e
T)(le(H2e
T))−1 : e ∈W1
}
, (4.13)
L2 =
{
(s2 −H2eT)(le(s2 −H2eT))−1 : e ∈W2
}
, (4.14)
where the p error values in each element of W ′k+l;dp/2e;q;p1 are taken from the known t
error values. This gives the following result:
Proposition 4.2.2 (Known error values). Let C be an (n, k, t) Goppa code over Fq and
c = x+e a McEliece ciphertext, where x is an arbitrary codeword and e ∈ Fnq an error vector
chosen uniformly at random from all vectors of weight t. Let |V | = t as described above. If(
n
t
)
t! < qr (single solution), or if
(
n
t
)
t! ≥ qr (multiple solutions) and ( rt−p)(kp)p!(t−p)! qr,
a lower bound for the expected cost (in number of operations) of using Algorithm 8 and
the improvement technique above to find e is
WFqISD(n, r, t, q) = min
l;p1;p2
Np;q(l) ·
λ−1q
 2(q − 1)l
q
(
l
p′2
)(
t
p′2
)
p′2!
+ p2
√( k
p1
)(
l
p2
)(
t
p
)
p!
+ Kq
(
k
p1
)(
l
p2
)(
t
p
)
p!
ql
)
,
where
Np;q(l) =
min(
(
n
t
)
t!, qr)(
r−l
t−p
)(
k
p1
)(
l
p2
)(
t
p
)
p!(t− p)! , p = p1 + p2, p
′
2 = bp2/2c, and
λ−1q = (1− exp(−1))−1 ≈ 1.58.
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An exception is p = 0 where the above method does not gain anything, hence
WFqISD(n, r, t, q) =
(
n
t
)(
r
t
) .
If
(
n
t
)
t! ≥ qr and ( rt−p)(kp)p!(t− p)! ≥ qr, the expected cost is
WFqISD(n, r, t, q) ≈ min
l;p
2lqr/2√(
r−l
t−p
)
(t− p)!
.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Again, this type of partial knowledge allows to decrease the size of the sets W ′1 and W2.
The method to construct these sets is different compared to the case above. Instead of
restricting the allowed error values, we redefine the sets W ′1 and W2 such that the entries
have the correct weight and weight distribution, and in addition that the entries are chosen
from v1 to vt. This last condition explains the additional binomial factors in the resulting
formula of the lower bound.
2. |V| < t, and many different error values
This case enables further improvement compared to the previous Section 4.2.2. Because
of the condition |V | < t, some error values occur more than once. This further decreases
the size of the set W ′k+l;p;q;p1 , and hence Wi and Li decrease in size.
For each of the
(
k+l
p
)
patterns to distribute the errors, p values are chosen from V to be
allocated to these error positions. If it happens that the same value is drawn more than
once, then some permutations of these p error values lead to the same result, and we only
need to consider one of these permutations.
The exact efficiency improvement depends not only on |V |, but on the detailed distri-
bution of errors (e.g., three times the same error value is not the same as two pairs of
the same value each). Let Di, i ∈ N, describe the distributions of error values that can
occur after applying the random permutation, i.e. every Di represents a certain number
of pairs, triplets etc. Let P (Di), i ∈ N, be the probability that such a distribution occurs,
and G(Di) be the efficiency gain in such a case (with 0 < G(Di) ≤ 1). Then∑
i∈N
P (Di) = 1,
and the total work factor is decreased by a factor of∑
i∈N
P (Di) ·G(Di).
As an example, consider a case where t = 20, p = 6, |V | = 10, and vi = di/2e; that is,
all error values come in pairs. We can describe each distribution by the number j of error
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Table 4.5.: Expected efficiency gain for t = 12 and various values of p and v. Shown is
the fraction of required operations between the improved and the standard
algorithm.
p = 2 p = 3 p = 4 p = 6
v = 4 0.91 0.74 0.53 0.19
v = 3 0.86 0.63 0.38 0.09
v = 2 0.72 0.44 0.12 0.02
value pairs amongst the p last error positions (where collisions are searched for). Each
pair decreases the number of operations by a factor of 2. The probability of the event is
P (j) =
(
t/2
j
)(
t/2−j
p−2j
)
2t/2−j(
t
p
) .
Hence, the number of operations performed by the algorithm is reduced to
∑3
j=0 P (j) ·
2−j , an improvement of ≈ 36%.
In this example, we do not have a huge efficiency improvement, but for smaller V (and
hence more pairs, triplets etc. of error values), the chance of a gain as well as the gain
itself increases.
In order to analyze the situation in more detail, we introduce some notation: Let v =
|V | denote the size of V ; each of these v values occurs at u1, . . . , uv positions, and a
configuration (c1, . . . , cv) with
∑v
i=1 ci = p denotes how many of these values are chosen for
the last p error positions. Then the probability of a certain configuration c = (c1, . . . , cv)
is
P (c) =
∏v
i=1
(
ui
ci
)(
t
p
) ,
while the gain is
G(c) =
v∏
j=1
(ci)!.
An interesting general case is u1 = . . . = uv = t/v. Since p is usually small for ISD
attacks, we do not expect a large efficiency gain if v is large as well. However, for small
values of v, the gain increases significantly. See Table 4.5 for details.
Note that higher values of p allow for greater efficiency improvements. This has to be
taken into account when selecting attack parameters for the ISD algorithm.
3. Most error values belonging to a very small subset of V (or |V|  t)
If most error values come from a smaller subset Vs ⊂ V , we can modify the algorithm to
take advantage of this fact. Instead of considering the full set V when defining sets L1
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and L2 and searching for collisions, we can simply assume that the random permutation
moved all errors with values not belonging to Vs to the left hand side of the matrix. The
sets L1 and L2 are then defined using the smaller set Vs, decreasing their size and thereby
increasing the algorithm’s efficiency. While this assumption decreases the probability of
finding a suitable permutation, it can be more than offset by the reduced number of
operations per iteration.
The case |V |  t is a special case with Vs = V .
4.2.3. Example: The CVE ID scheme
In [26], the authors propose a zero-knowledge identification scheme called CVE based on
the q-ary SD problem. They propose to use a special permutation of the secret value s in
this scheme in order to hide the non-zero values of s. In this section, we study the effect
of a leakage of the values of s on the ISD algorithm.
We first introduce the special permutation that is used in the protocol to hide the non-zero
values.
Definition 4.2.3. Let γ be a permutation of {1, . . . , n} and w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ Fnq such
that ∀i, wi 6= 0. We define the transformation Πw,γ as :
Πw,γ : Fnq −→ Fnq
v 7→ (wγ(1)vγ(1), . . . , wγ(n)vγ(n))
Notice that ∀α ∈ Fq, ∀v ∈ Fnq , it holds that Πw,γ(αv) = αΠw,γ(v), and wt(Πw,γ(v)) =
wt(v).
Attack scenario
In this section, we show how an ISD attacker against the security of the CVE can gain
partial knowledge of the secret. We analyze the CVE scheme and show that the prover
leaks information to a potential attacker when using a “classic” permutation instead of
the function Πw,γ .
We assume that the attacker Eve attempts to impersonate the honest prover Alice. She
can do this by recovering Alice’s secret e; when Eve later runs the ID scheme with the
honest verifier Bob, this allows her to successfully answer all queries.
First, Eve runs the ID scheme with Alice, where Eve sends the challenge b = 1. If the
CVE scheme does not use the function Πw,γ to prevent information leakage, but rather
sends the permuted secret, Eve will gain partial knowledge on the secret e.
Similarly to the original Stern scheme, Eve then attempts to find a codeword w, minimiz-
ing the weight of (v+w) where v ∈ H−1(s) and s is Alice’s public key. If she is successful,
Eve can use s′ := v+w to successfully answer all queries by the verifier Bob. An element
w with the above properties can be found using ISD-like algorithms.
Table 4.6 shows how much our modification of ISD attacks can decrease the security of
the CVE scheme (without the special permutation). We will give the ISD complexity for
three cases (as seen from an attackers point of view):
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Table 4.6.: Parameter sets for the CVE ID scheme (without the special permutation) over
Fq. (P, T ) refers to the number of pairs and triples we assume for this case.
The field size is q = 256 for all parameters.
Security Security level modified ISD and (P, T )
(n, k, t) level ISD Pessimistic Typical Optimistic
[128, 64, 49] 71.93 76.06 (0, 0) 72.06 (4, 0) 67.48 (6, 1)
[144, 72, 55] 80.76 85.03 (0, 0) 80.03 (5, 0) 75.45 (7, 1)
[208, 104, 78] 113.78 118.39 (0, 0) 106.81 (9, 1) 101.22 (12, 2)
[256, 128, 97] 142.61 147.12 (0, 0) 129.95 (12, 2) 124.37 (15, 3)
• Pessimistic case: All error values are different (i.e. the least improvement potential)
• Typical case: The expected number of pairs, triples etc.
• Optimistic case: More than the expected number of pairs, triples etc.
Note that in the pessimistic case (and in one of the typical cases), the complexity of the
modified algorithm is higher compared with the unmodified version. This is due to the
fact that the optimal value of p is very small, so the modification offers only a very small
advantage, which is more than offset by the disadvantage of not including the improvement
factor of
√
q − 1 described in Section 4.1.3. The other cases, however, allow for a significant
improvement compared with the unmodified version.
Preventing the information leakage
The special permutation Πw,γ is introduced in [26] and used instead of a normal permuta-
tion. The vector w hides the entries of s, thereby preventing the attack described above.
Since in some cases the prover has to send w to the verifier, so this modification increases
the communication cost; for the parameters in [26], this corresponds to an increase from 31
kbit to 33 kbit for a security level of 80. However, simply increasing the code parameters
(n, k, t) to offset the loss in security would be far more costly.
4.2.4. Implications of partial knowledge attacks on the parameters
If the information leakage can not be prevented, the choice of parameters has to be modified
in order to offset the reduction in security. This is done in three steps:
1. Determine the required security level using the methodology introduced in Sec-
tion 5.1.
2. Estimate the loss in security as described above and add it to the security level.
3. Find optimal parameters in the row of Table 5.2 corresponding to this new security
level.
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4.3. Improved GBA attacks against structured matrices
As pointed out in Section 2.3.3, there have been several proposals to use codes with ad-
ditional structure in order to reduce the public key size. Most recently, QC alternant [10]
and QD Goppa [61] codes, the QD-CFS signature scheme [8], and the FSB hash func-
tion [5]. In this section, we show how a broad class of such structures can be exploited
to increase the time and memory efficiency of a GBA attack, which is one of the best
generic attacks against code-based cryptosystems. The GBA attack has been proposed
by Wagner in 2002 [97] and was generalized by Minder and Sinclair in 2009 [60]. It is the
best attack against several cryptosystems.
However, our results in [66] were erroneous and the true effect is much smaller than as-
sumed. Our technique works, but it can only be applied until the algorithm starts to
eliminate vectors from the lists; after that, the time and space complexity is identical
to the unmodified GBA: The number of computations and memory access of our mod-
ified GBA algorithm is decreased by a factor of up to r compared with the unmodified
algorithm. For parameters suitable for cryptography, the improvement factor cannot be
much larger than 2, since these parameters are designed such that elimination of vectors
is necessary.
We will describe the technique we developed, and show why it cannot be applied once
elimination takes place.
4.3.1. Efficiency improvement
Preliminaries
Our analysis is applicable in all cases where the underlying code has a parity check matrix
of the following structure: Each row of the parity check matrix H is a permutation of the
first row. This is true, for example, for the cryptosystems based on QC and QD codes
in [10, 61, 8].
This means that we have permutations Θi, 1 ≤ i ≤ r, such that the i-th row Hi of H can
be computed by
Hi = Θi(H1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
We abuse notation and write, for integers a and b, Θi(a) = b, to denote that Θi permutes
the a-th entry to position b.
Definition 4.3.1. To efficiently address the list entries, we note that for every entry x in
the lists there are unique c1 < c2 < . . . < ck and h1, h2, . . . , hk, such that x was created
by the weighted sum of columns of H:
x =
k∑
i=1
ciH·,hk .
We define index(x) := (c1, . . . , ck;h1, . . . , hk) and write
Θi((c1, . . . , ck;h1, . . . , hk)) = (c1, . . . , ck; Θi(h1), . . . ,Θi(hk)). (4.15)
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Since an index uniquely defines an element, we can associate the two and write for short
y := index(x). For any vector x, let us denote its i-th entry by x[i]. Then
x[i] = Θ−1i (index(x))[1]. (4.16)
Improved algorithm
We will describe our improved algorithm as a modification of the one by Minder and
Sinclair [60]; Figure 4.2 illustrates the basic GBA.
Figure 4.2.: Illustration of the GBA for k = 4.
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We start with t = 2a lists L11, . . . , L
1
t . In our case, each lists contains n entries, the
columns of H. However, due to the structure of H, we only need to store the first bit of
each entry, corresponding to the first row of H. We let li denote the number of bits that
is forced to zero in the i-th merge step.
This setup assumes s = 0. If s 6= 0, we modify the list L1t in a similar way as described in
Section 2.5.2, by subtracting s from every entry of L1t . We will later go into more details.
In the first merge step, we calculate the first bit of the entries in L2i by adding pairs of
entries of L12i−1 and L
1
2i. If l1 = 0 we continue with the second merge step — again, only
calculating the first bit of L3i , and so on.
The elimination issue
As soon as one of the lj is greater than zero, we cannot use our technique anymore.
The reason is that in the next merge step (following the elimination), most list entries
Θ−1i (index(x)) cannot be found since they have been eliminated. Also, in general we
cannot conclude from this that Θ−1i (index(x))[1] 6= 0 because the list entry might have
been eliminated in any of the previous merge and elimination steps.
In order to eliminate all vectors from L2i whose first li bits contain non-zero values, we need
to compute the remaining bits of each list entry using equation (4.16). For the remaining
steps of the algorithm, these bits need to be stored to enable us to continue with the GBA.
Therefore, in each merge step j where we can apply our technique, we have to compute
and store only the first bit of each vector of the current lists Lji , increasing time and space
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efficiency by a factor of up to r. The remaining merge steps are identical to the unmodified
GBA algorithm, and the total space and time efficiency improvement is between a factor
of 1 and r, depending on the number of steps with and without elimination and the
corresponding list sizes.
The pseudo code of our algorithm is shown in Algorithm 10. The operand ⊕1 refers
to the operation of creating the new list from sums of all pairs of the two parent lists,
only computing and storing the first bit, as shown in Algorithm 9 (here, | refers to the
concatenation operation):
Algorithm 9 Pseudo code for C := A⊕q B
1: for all a ∈ A, b ∈ B do
2: C ← C|(a[1] + b[1] mod q)
3: end for
Let ⊕ denote the corresponding merge operation where all bits are computed.
The GBA algorithm described above assumes s = 0. If s 6= 0, we can modify it similarly
as Wagner proposed in [97]: The rightmost list L1t does not get columns (H·,i) of H, but
(H·,i−s). This allows us to search for list elements that sum to zero, and the corresponding
columns of H will sum to s.
For the merge step of each rightmost list, we have to modify equation (4.16), since different
rows use different bits of s as an offset:
x[i] = Θ−1i (index(x))[1] + s[1]− s[i]. (4.17)
In practice, our modified GBA can be implemented efficiently by using look-up tables
for the Θi, and by using a suitable data structure for the lists L
j
i .
Analysis of time and memory efficiency
Our modification to the GBA reduces the number of computations and memory operations.
The memory required before the first elimination is reduced by the same factor. However,
since the lists have to be expanded once elimination takes place, the total memory required
is unchanged in most applications. There can be an effect, though, if partial results — lists
where no vectors have been eliminated — are stored temporarily to continue computation
at a later point. This was done, for example, in the attack on the toy version of FSB [14].
As we described above, our modified GBA algorithm decreases the number of computations
and memory access by a factor of up to r. For parameters suitable for cryptography,
though, the effect is small. These parameters lead to very large list sizes, since this
ensures the necessary level of security, and thus elimination is required to prevent the list
from growing to a size that can not be handled. Since elimination starts when the list
sizes get large, and since our improvement cannot be applied in the elimination phase,
those steps with the highest cost are not improved. In order to estimate the maximum
improvement factor in this case, we approximate the complexity of a merge step of the
GBA by the size of the child list, as proposed in [60]. In the same paper, the authors prove
that the size of the lists computed by the GBA squares in every step without elimination
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Algorithm 10 Pseudo code of improved GBA algorithm
Input: A r× n parity check matrix H, integer t = 2a, integers l1, . . . , la with ∑i li ≤ r, vector s, a prime
power q.
Output: Index(es) index(x) such that the corresponding weighted sum equals s, or “No solution found”.
Setup: Add the first entry of all n columns of H to each list L11, . . . , L
1
t . Subtract s from all elements of
L1t . Let z = 0.
1: for step← 1 to a do
2: z ← z + lstep
3: for j ← 1 to 2a−step do
4: if z = 0 then
5: Lstep+1j = L
step
2j−1 ⊕1 Lstep2j
6: else
. If necessary, compute all bits from the list entries using equation (4.17); then continue with the regular
GBA.
7: Lstep+1j = L
step
2j−1 ⊕ Lstep2j
8: end if
9: end for
10: end for
11: if |La1 | = 0 then
12: Return “No solution found”
13: end if
14: return index(La1)
and remains constant during the elimination phase (except for the final list, the size of
which is usually 1): Let |L1i | = b, and let j0 be the first step in which elimination takes
place, then the estimated list size in step j is
|Lji | =
{
22
j−1b j < j0
2u else
,
where 22
j0−2b ≤ 2u < 22j0−1b. Since we have a − j0 + 1 merge steps with elimination, we
can estimate the total complexity of the unmodified GBA as
j0−1∑
i=1
22
i−1b + (a− j0 + 1)2u.
The fraction of operations the modified GBA requires compared with the unmodified
version is thus
F =
∑j0−1
i=1 2
2i−1b
r + (a− j0 + 1)2u∑j0−1
i=1 2
2i−1b + (a− j0 + 1)2u
. (4.18)
The best improvement, i.e. the smallest value of this fraction, is achieved for only one
round of elimination, and for 2u = 22
j0−2b:
F =
∑j0−1
i=1 2
2i−1b + r22
j0−2b
r(
∑j0−1
i=1 2
2i−1b + 22
j0−2b)
.
Since 2u is very large, often in the order of 230 to 240, we get a very good approximation
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for F by neglecting all smaller list sizes:
F ≈ (r + 1)2
2j0−2b
2r22
j0−2b
=
r + 1
2r
.
As r is in the order of 100 to more than 1000, F ≈ 1/2. Therefore, in these cases the effect
is an improvement factor of up to 2.
4.3.2. Examples
In this section, we will present several cryptosystems which can be attacked by GBA
and where the attack benefits from our improvement. We start each section with a brief
description of the cryptosystem and then compute the maximum improvement that can
be gained using our technique for various parameters.
QD-CFS signature scheme
In 2009, Misoczki and Barreto [61] proposed QD binary Goppa codes to be used for the
McEliece PKC, and in 2010 Barreto et al. presented the QD-CFS signature scheme [8].
Since every row of a dyadic matrix is generated from the first row by a permutation, we
can apply the improved GBA. We illustrate this for the QD-CFS signature scheme. It is
possible to attack a QD-McEliece cryptosystem as well using our improved GBA. However,
since GBA would be very inefficient compared to other attacks (QD-McEliece has only a
single solution), for instance ISD, we do not consider it here.
Let h = (h0, . . . , hn−1) be the first row of a dyadic matrix. Then the i-th row can be
computed by
θi(h) = (hi⊕j)j=0..n.
From this we can compute
Θ1−QDi (h) := (θi ◦ θ−1i−1)(h),
where the superscript 1-QD denotes that this is a QD matrix consisting of one dyadic
block.
If H consists of several blocks of dyadic matrices, we can “glue” the corresponding permu-
tations Θ together as we have done in the previous subsection. For example, in the 2-QD
case, where the two blocks have h and g as their first rows, we have
θi(h|g) = (hi⊕j)j=0..n/2|(gi⊕j)j=0..n/2
and Θ2−QDi similar to Θ
1−QD
i above.
Table 4.7 presents the maximum improvement factor for several parameter sets. All pa-
rameters refer to binary codes since codes over larger fields have a significantly smaller
density (ratio of decodable words) and are therefore not suitable for CFS signatures. For
these parameters, we achieve an improvement of up to 40%.
Note that the improvement factor is higher, the closer the maximum list sizes before
and during elimination are (compare with equation (4.18) in the previous section).
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Table 4.7.: Improvement of time and space complexity (written in log2) for QD-CFS.
Largest list size (in log2)
Security Before During Improvement
n r t level elimination elimination factor
30924 180 12 80 59.66 61 1.393
989724 240 12 100 79.66 81 1.394
31671168 300 12 120 99.66 101 1.395
Table 4.8.: Time and space complexity (written in log2) for the FSB hash function, as-
suming quasi-cyclic matrix and collision attack. FSB48 is a toy version.
Largest list size (in log2)
Security Before During Improvement
n 2t r′ level elimination elimination factor
FSB48 3 · 217 2 · 24 192 35.8 31.0 31 1.00
FSB160 5 · 218 2 · 80 640 119.2 81.3 96 1.00
FSB224 7 · 218 2 · 112 896 166.9 83.2 146 1.00
FSB256 2
21 2 · 128 1024 190.7 168.0 172 1.02
FSB384 23 · 216 2 · 184 1472 281.0 164.2 229 1.00
FSB512 31 · 216 2 · 248 1984 378.7 167.6 330 1.00
FSB hash function
The FSB authors suggest to use a truncated quasi-cyclic matrix in order to reduce the
memory requirements and to increase the speed of the function. A truncated QC matrix is
a block matrix consisting of blocks of size r×r, where the upper left hand r′×r′ submatrix
of each block is cyclic. While the effect of our improvement is reduced because only part
of the matrix is structured, it can still be applied to this type of structure.
Table 4.8 shows this effect, assuming a truncated quasi-cyclic matrix and a collision attack.
Our numbers for the unmodified GBA will be a little lower that the original computation
since we use the resulting list size as the complexity of the merge operation (as proposed
in [60]) and don’t include logarithmic factors.
For these parameters, the small improvement factor is due to two facts:
• The list size during elimination is much larger than before, so our technique applies
to relative small lists and thus has a small impact.
• Elimination is applied to several merge steps instead of just one. Therefore, there
are several high-cost steps onto which our technique can not be applied.
Single-solution applications
The applications above share the property that there are many possible solutions, and an
attack needs to find any one of them. This fact makes the GBA very efficient since it
allows to greatly decrease the size of the lists that need to be stored and computed, and
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still expect to find at least one solution.
Other applications only have a single solution. Examples for these applications include:
• QD-McEliece: In [61], QD codes were proposed to be used for the McEliece encryp-
tion scheme. In contrast to the QD-CFS scheme mentioned above, the parameters
were chosen such that there exists only one solution for each instance.
• QC-McEliece: In [10], the authors propose to use QC alternant codes for the
McEliece PKC in order to reduce the size of the public key. A QC code can be
defined by a QC matrix, i.e. a block matrix where each block is cyclic.
• QC Stern-ID: Gaborit and Girault showed in [38] how to use random QC codes
for the identification scheme Stern presented in 1993 [89].
• SYND: The SYND stream cipher [39] was proposed in 2007 by Gaborit, Lauradoux
and Sendrier. It is based on the SD problem and uses QC codes.
Against these, GBA is much less efficient since any reduction in the list size can eliminate
the solution. Depending on the elimination strategy, GBA will perform between the two
extremes:
• No elimination, i.e. testing all combinations and finding the solution with certainty
(meaning large list sizes)
• Maximum elimination, which essentially means randomly trying combinations (small
list size, but large number of iterations)
Depending on the parameters, the work factor for GBA can be larger than 2300 opera-
tions, compared to 285 for other attacks (in this case, ISD against the QC Stern-ID). Our
improvement could be applied in these cases as well, but due to the reasons above, it does
not make sense to use GBA.
4.4. Statistical decoding of codes over Fq
Statistical decoding was introduced in 2001 by Al Jabri [45] and improved by Overbeck in
2006 [72]. While Al Jabri claimed that statistical decoding can be used effectively against
the McEliece cryptosystem, Overbeck showed that far more precomputation is required
than expected by Al Jabri, and that therefore the time as well as the memory requirements
are much higher compared with other attacks. However, statistical decoding is quite ef-
ficient in decoding short codes (i.e. codes with a small length n) and can even be faster
than attacks based on ISD or the GBA (see the recent resources [16, 67] and [60] for more
information on these attacks).
The basic principle of statistical decoding is as follows: After receiving a codeword with
error c = mG+ e, where m and e are unknown, a precomputed set Hw ⊆ C⊥ is used as a
mask to obtain information about e. Since GHTw = 0, we have
Hwc
T = Hwe
T.
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Al Jabri showed that if hcT = 1 for some h ∈ Hw then the non-zero bits of h give some
information about the non-zero bits of e. Overbeck has improved this algorithm by also
using the vectors h where hcT = 0 to gain information about e.
We will briefly describe Overbeck’s algorithm and then generalize it to codes over non-
binary fields Fq. Our algorithm for statistical decoding over Fq is shown in Algorithm 13
(page 89). In Section 4.4.3 we describe two techniques that allow a further improvement
of our algorithm by making use of additional structure (quasi-cyclic matrices and regular
words). In the subsequent sections we conclude by providing experimental results and
compare our statistical decoding algorithm with ISD.
4.4.1. Binary statistical decoding
Let C be an (n, k, t) code over Fq, w < n/2 be an integer, and Hw ⊆ C⊥ a sufficiently large
subset of the dual space of C, where ∀h ∈ Hw : wt(h) = w. Given a word c = x+ e, where
x = mG ∈ C and wt(e) is small, the algorithm attempts to find e.
For every h ∈ Hw, we have an odd error detection at bit i if hcT = 1 and hi = 1, and
an even error detection at bit i if hcT = 0 and hi = 1. In each case we can compute the
probabilities that e contains an error at bit i. In the case of an odd error detection, the
probabilities p+w and q
+
w that ei = 1 and ei = 0, respectively, are
p+w =
∑≤t
j odd
(
n−t
w−j
)(
t−1
j−1
)∑≤t
j odd
(
n−t
w−j
)(
t
j
) , q+w =
∑≤t
j odd
(
n−t−1
w−j−1
)(
t
j
)∑≤t
j odd
(
n−t
w−j
)(
t
j
) .
Let v+y,w = |{h ∈ Hw : hcT 6= 0}|. For every bit i, the random variable
1
v+y,w
∑
h∈Hw
(hcT mod 2)hi
is the relative frequency estimate for p+w or q
+
w , depending on whether i is an error position
of e. The variance of this random variable is (σ+w )
2 = p+w(1−p+w)/v+y,w. Thus, for Hw large
enough, Algorithm 11 allows to recover m.
Algorithm 11 Al Jabri’s algorithm for binary statistical decoding.
INPUT: Generator matrix G for an (n, k, t) code, Hw ⊆ C⊥ and c ∈ {0, 1}n
OUTPUT: m ∈ {0, 1}k such that wt(c−mG) ≤ t
v ←∑h∈Hw (hcT mod 2)h ∈ Zn
Choose I = {positions of the k smallest entries of v} s.t. G·I is invertible
Return m← cIG−1·I
Overbeck improved this algorithm in two ways. First, even error detections are used as
well, allowing to extract significantly more information from a given set Hw. Second, the
algorithm is no longer restricted to a fixed value of w. Instead, it allows a range for w,
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and the information extracted from the different sets Hw is combined in the end.
In case of an even error detection, the corresponding probabilities p−w and q−w are given by
p−w =
∑≤t
2≤j even
(
n−t
w−j
)(
t−1
j−1
)∑≤t
j even
(
n−t
w−j
)(
t
j
) , q−w =
∑≤t
j even
(
n−t−1
w−j−1
)(
t
j
)∑≤t
j even
(
n−t
w−j
)(
t
j
) .
Consequently, v−y,w = |{h ∈ Hw : hcT = 0}|, and the relative frequency estimates are
given by
1
v−y,w
∑
h∈Hw
(1− hcT mod 2)hi.
Algorithm 12 summarizes the improved algorithm. Note that v is defined as v =∑B
w−b awvw +
∑B
w=b aw+Bvw+B, where each ai ∈ {0, 1}, i.e. not all partial results need to
be combined in the end.
Algorithm 12 Overbecks’s improved algorithm for binary statistical decoding.
INPUT: Generator matrix G for an (n, k, t) code C, H = ⋃Bw=bHw ⊆ C⊥ and c ∈ {0, 1}n
OUTPUT: m ∈ {0, 1}k such that wt(c−mG) ≤ t
Let 1 = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ {0, 1}n
for w = b→ B do
(σ+w)
2 = p+w(1− p+w)v+y,w
(σ−w )
2 = p−w(1− p−w)v−y,w
vw ←∑h∈Hw (hcT mod 2)(h− p+w1)/σ+w ∈ Rn
vw+B ← −∑h∈Hw (1− hcT mod 2)(h− p−w1)/σ−w ∈ Rn
end for
for all binary combinations v of the different vi do
Choose I = {positions of the k smallest entries of v} s.t. G·I is invertible
m← cIG−1·I
if wt(c−mG) ≤ t then
Return m
end if
end for
4.4.2. Statistical decoding over Fq (for q > 2)
The first thing to note when considering codes over non-binary fields Fq is that the error
positions of the secret vector e now take values in Fq\{0}. However, we are only interested
to find k error-free positions such that the corresponding generator matrix G·I is invertible,
so we do not have to find those error values.
Secondly, we note that the definition of odd error detection needs to be changed, since
hcT ∈ Fq\{0} as well: We define odd error detection at bit i as the case when hcT 6= 0
and hi 6= 0. The reason is that since
∀x ∈ Fq\{0} : h(xc)T = x(hcT) and hcT 6= 0⇔ x(hcT) 6= 0, (4.19)
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all values of hcT have the same probability, and they are independent of the value of hi.
Finally, the original algorithm adds up the vectors h in order to compute the relative
frequencies of p+w and q
+
w . Doing the same over Fq would disturb these frequencies
because entries of h greater than 1 bias the computation. Instead, we add Θ(h) =
(θ(h1), . . . , θ(hn−k)), where
θ : Fq → F2, x 7→
{
0 x = 0
1 else
.
In order to proceed, we introduce some notation. Consider the case where e and a vector
h are simultaneously non-zero in exactly i bits. In contrast to the binary case, we don’t
have the equivalence i even ⇔ hcT = 0. Since every non-zero value of hcT has the same
probability (and occurs the same number of times when Hw = C⊥), the quantities
C(q, i) =
⌈
(q − 1)i
q
⌋
(4.20)
C′(q, i) = (q − 1)i −
⌈
(q − 1)i
q
⌋
· (q − 1) (4.21)
reflect the relative frequencies of non-zero and zero values of hcT, respectively, where dc
denotes rounding to the nearest integer. They are well-defined since (q−1)i/q ∈ N+{0.5}
can only occur for q = 2.
Using equation (4.19), we can calculate the respective probabilities.
p++w =
∑t
j=1 C(q, j)
(
t−1
j−1
)(
n−t
w−j
)
(q − 1)w−j∑t
j=1 C(q, j)
(
t
j
)(
n−t
w−j
)
(q − 1)w−j (4.22)
q++w =
∑t
j=1 C(q, j)
(
t−1
j
)(
n−t
w−j
)
(q − 1)w−j∑t
j=1 C(q, j)
(
t
j
)(
n−t
w−j
)
(q − 1)w−j (4.23)
p−−w =
∑t
j=0 C
′(q, j)
(
t−1
j−1
)(
n−t
w−j
)
(q − 1)w−j∑t
j=0 C(q, j)
(
t
j
)(
n−t
w−j
)
(q − 1)w−j (4.24)
q−−w =
∑t
j=0 C
′(q, j)
(
t−1
j
)(
n−t
w−j
)
(q − 1)w−j∑t
j=0 C(q, j)
(
t
j
)(
n−t
w−j
)
(q − 1)w−j (4.25)
Consequently, we redefine
v++y,w = |{h ∈ Hw : hcT 6= 0}| (4.26)
v−−y,w = |{h ∈ Hw : hcT = 0}| (4.27)
Since we sum up Θ(h) (instead of h), the variance of v remains unchanged, i.e.
σ++w = p
++
w (1− p++w )v++y,w .
Algorithm 13 is the generalized version for statistical decoding over Fq.
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Algorithm 13 Generalized algorithm for statistical decoding over a non-binary field Fq.
INPUT: Generator matrix G for an (n, k, t) code C, H = ⋃Bw=bHw ⊆ C⊥ and c ∈ Fnq
OUTPUT: m ∈ Fkq such that wt(c−mG) ≤ t
Let 1 = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ {0, 1}n
for w = b→ B do
(σ++w )
2 = p++w (1− p++w )v+y,w
(σ−−w )
2 = p−−w (1− p−−w )v−y,w
Let H+w = {h ∈ Hw : hcT 6= 0} and H−w = Hw\H+w
v+w ←
∑
h∈H+w (Θ(h)− p
++
w 1)/σ
++
w ∈ Rn
v+w+B ← −
∑
h∈H−w (Θ(h)− p
−−
w 1)/σ
−−
w ∈ Rn
end for
for all binary combinations v+ of the different v+i do
Choose I = {positions of the k smallest entries of v} s.t. G·I is invertible
m← cIG−1·I
if wt(c−mG) ≤ t then
Return m
end if
end for
4.4.3. Exploiting additional structure
Many types of additional structure have been proposed in code-based cryptography in
order to reduce the public key size or to increase efficiency. Algorithm 13 allows to exploit
various types of such structures. We will give two examples and briefly describe the
corresponding techniques:
(Quasi-)cyclic matrices
We will describe the technique using cyclic matrices, but it applies to QC matrices as well,
and also to other types of structured matrices like QD matrices.
Let γ(v) denote the cyclic shift of vector v. A cyclic code C allows to choose a cyclic
parity check matrix H. Therefore, for every h ∈ C⊥, γ(h) ∈ C⊥. This means that we can
restrict the precomputed matrix Hw to vectors that are not cyclic shifts of one another,
and in the course of running Algorithm 13, test h ∈ Hw as well as all cyclic shifts of h
against the vector c. As a result, while the run time of the actual algorithm is unchanged,
the size of the precomputed set Hw can be decreased by a factor of up to n.
Regular words
If it is known that the solution is a regular word, the decoding algorithm can be modified as
follows. When choosing the set I, we add the additional condition that I must not contain
those indices corresponding to a whole block; in other words, for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ t,{
(i− 1)n
t
+ 1, . . . ,
in
t
}
( I.
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If the values in v are such that a this would happen, the largest value of v in this block
is ignored and the index of the next smallest value of v is added to I instead. This
modification slightly increases the chance of decoding successfully, or to achieve the same
success probability with a slightly smaller size of Hw.
4.4.4. Experimental results
In this section, we derive a relation between the success probability of our algorithm and
the size of the set Hw. We restrict our analysis to the case b = B and the use of odd
error detection only, since we were not able to prove the results for the general case. Our
results therefore establish lower bounds for the success probability of our algorithm. We
conclude our analysis with experimental results of statistical decoding over Fq.
The success probability of Algorithm 13 depends on w and the size of the set Hw, and
it increases with |Hw|. However, the size of Hw is bounded from above:
Lemma 4.4.1 (Upper bound for the size of Hw). Let C be an [n, k] code over Fq. An
upper bound for the size of Hw is
|Hw| ≤
(
n
w
)
(q − 1)wq−k.
Proof. The set Hw is a subset of the dual code C⊥, which is a [n, n − k] linear code.
In [27], the authors generalize the weight distribution results from [53] to random codes
over Fq: In the [n, n−k] code C⊥, the ratio of codewords of weight w to words of weight w
approaches the constant Q = q−k as w becomes large. Since there are
(
n
w
)
(q − 1)w words
of weight w, the lemma follows.
We will derive the success probability of our algorithm under two assumptions, and then
provide arguments for the correctness of these assumptions:
1. v++y,w =
q−1
q |Hw|
2. Half the values of vj , for j the non-error positions, are below their mean of p
++
w v
++
y,w ,
where vj denotes the j-th bit of v
+
w .
Proposition 4.4.2. Under the above assumptions, Algorithm 13 for statistical decoding
in an (n, k, t) code over a non-binary field Fq has a success probability of 0.95t when a
precomputed set of size
|Hw| = 2.72 q
q − 1 ·
p++w (1− p++w )
(p++w − q++w )2
is used.
In order to compute the success probability P, there needs to be a value δ such that
the following conditions hold (these conditions were introduced in [72]):
1. For every error position i:
vi > (p
++
w − δ)v++y,w .
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2. There are at least k non-error positions j such that:
vj < (p
++
w − δ)v++y,w .
Using assumption (1) from above, the probability P that a certain δ satisfies the first
condition is
P = Φ(δ/σ++w )t = Φ
(
δ
√
(q − 1)|Hw|
qp++w (1− p++w )
)t
,
where Φ refers to the standard normal distribution. Therefore, we get the following con-
dition on |Hw|:
(Φ−1(P1/t))2δ−2 q
q − 1p
++
w (1− p++w ) ≤ |Hw| ≤
(
n
w
)
(q − 1)wq−k. (4.28)
Following from assumption (2) is that a δ satisfying both conditions above is expected
to be smaller than |p++w − q++w |. Thus, we expect a success probability of 0.95t when a set
of size
|Hw| = 2.72 q
q − 1 ·
p++w (1− p++w )
(p++w − q++w )2
is used (since Φ−1(0.95)2 ≈ 2.72). Note that this size differs by a factor of q2(q−1) from the
binary case.
Validation of the assumptions
Since non-zero multiples of vectors in C⊥ are also in C⊥ and ∀a ∈ Fq, a 6= 0 : hcT 6=
0 ⇒ ahcT 6= 0, the expected frequency of every non-zero value in the computations hcT ,
h ∈ Hw, is identical. The expected frequency of zeros in these computations is nearly
the same (see equations (4.20) and (4.21)). Therefore, the number of non-zero results is
expected to be |Hw|(q − 1)/q.
For parameters used in cryptography, p++w is close to 0.5 (otherwise a small set Hw would
be sufficient and decoding was easy). Also, due to the large size of Hw, v
++
y,w is large.
Therefore, we expect the values of vj to be close to their mean value and to be above and
below it approximately the same number of times (due to the law of large numbers).
In Table 4.9 we present experimental results obtained using our implementation in
Maple.
The results show that in many cases our algorithm decodes successfully, even though
the number of sample vectors |H| was not very large. Also, the success probability can be
increased by using a larger weight spectrum B − b. However, this increases the complex-
ity of testing all binary combinations v+. Note that the success probability seems to be
independent of the field size q; this is to be expected, since we are only searching for the
(non-)error positions, not their values. This is an advantage compared with other algo-
rithms like information set decoding, where the algorithm complexity grows significantly
with q (more than the impact of q-ary arithmetic, which applies in our case as well).
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Table 4.9.: Experimental results of using Algorithm 13 to decode t errors in an (n, k) code
over Fq. We ran several thousand decoding attempts, each using a sample of
size |H| = |⋃Bw=bHw| = 100.
(n, k, t) q b B Successful decodings
(64, 40, 4)
3 44 46 30.6%
5 51 53 29.8%
7 56 58 36.1%
11 58 60 35.8%
13 59 61 42.7%
53 61 63 29.4%
(128, 72, 8)
3 84 88 18.1%
5 100 104 22.9%
7 108 112 23.0%
11 115 119 32.1%
13 117 121 27.8%
53 123 127 37.8%
Also, note that larger field sizes require larger values w when computing the sets Hw. This
is due to the fact that the weight distribution of codes over different fields is not identical.
For the above fields Fq with q ∈ {3, 5, 7, 11, 53}, the weight distributions are shown in
Figure 4.3. Those distributions are derived from Cheung’s result that in an (n, k) code
over Fq, the ratio of codewords of weight u to words of weight u is very close to
q−(n−k). (4.29)
The optimal choice of b and B is difficult to compute: since vectors h of smaller weight
can provide more information about the error positions of e, a smaller set Hw is sufficient
to achieve a given success probability, but it is more difficult to precompute this set if
there exist fewer vectors of this weight in the code. A good value (or range of values) can
be estimated using Equations (4.28) and (4.29).
4.4.5. Comparison with ISD
Information set decoding (ISD) is based on a decoding algorithm by Prange [79]. Im-
proved versions of this attack, e.g. [74] achieve complexities close to theoretical lower
bounds [67, 68].
For those parameters typically used today in code-based cryptography, ISD is much
faster than statistical decoding. However, the complexity of ISD increases significantly
with the field size q. To estimate the value of q for which statistical decoding becomes
faster than ISD, we will compare our algorithm with the one in [74].
In the case of statistical decoding, the largest part of the complexity is due to the generation
of the sample sets Hw, so we will restrict our analysis to this. Our algorithm is not fully
optimized; for example, the sets Hw are sampled essentially randomly, instead of using
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Figure 4.3.: Weight distribution of [64, 40] codes over Fq for q ∈ {3, 5, 7, 11, 53}. Larger
fields correspond to higher weights.
a generalized version of ISD to sample the vectors. We will therefore estimate the total
work factor of statistical decoding by
WFSD ≈ 2n(n− k)|H|
F · P ,
where H = ∪wHw, F is the fraction of codewords c with b ≤ wt(c) ≤ B, and P is the
success probability of decoding. The factor of 2n(n−k) reflects the fact that our sampling
algorithm requires n(n− k) multiplications and additions.
Note that both algorithms estimate the number of q-ary operations (instead of binary
operations), so the results are comparable.
For the (64, 40) code over F3, ISD requires 213.9 operations, compared with 220.2 for our
algorithm. Increasing q, we find that ISD is slower than statistical decoding for q ≥ 1201.
In the case of the (128, 72) code and q = 3, the number of operations is 218.3 for ISD and
222.0 for statistical decoding. Here, q ≥ 233 is sufficient to make our algorithm the more
efficient one.
4.5. “Cross-area” attacks
In this section, we describe and analyze three “cross-area” decoding attacks, i.e. lattice-
algorithms against code-based cryptosystems and code-based algorithms against lattice
cryptosystems:
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• Sieving algorithm against code-based cryptosystems
• Enumeration algorithm against code-based cryptosystems
• ISD against lattice-based cryptosystems
We turns out that the sieving and ISD attacks do work, i.e. they can be used to solve the
hard problem required to run a decoding attack. However, in both cases the “cross-area”
attack is slower than the best known decoding attack from the within the other area. We
are not able to modify the enumeration attack to work against code-based schemes. In
the following, we will describe each approach and our findings in detail.
4.5.1. Sieving algorithm against code-based cryptosystems
In [59], Micciancio and Voulgaris presented a new sieving-based attack against lattice-
based cryptosystems. Since our attack is a modification of their Gauss sieve attack (List
sieve has a proven upper complexity bound, but is much slower in practice), we will briefly
describe the idea of this type of attack. The original attack solves the following problem:
Problem 4.5.1 (Shortest Vector Problem (SVP)). Given an n-dimensional lattice L, i.e.
a linear subspace of Zn, and a metric || · ||; find a vector x ∈ L of minimal length
||x|| = min
y∈L\{0}
||y||.
The Sieving algorithm starts with an empty list L. In each iteration, a random vector
vnew ∈ L is sampled. This vector is used to try to reduce the length of the vectors in the
list L by substituting v ∈ L with v− vnew if the latter is smaller. In the same way, vnew is
reduced against the vectors in the list. If the resulting vector v′new is non-zero, it is added
to the list L. These steps are repeated until a vector of sufficiently small length is found.
In order to allow this algorithm to find a small codeword, we have to modify two parts:
Firstly, the computations are performed over a finite field Fq instead of over Z. Secondly,
the Hamming weight has to be used instead of the (usually Euclidean) metric in the lattice
case. Algorithms 14 and 15 summarize the steps of the modified algorithm.
The original lattice algorithm has a time complexity of 20.52n, and space complexity of
20.2n. Without being able to prove this, we expect a similar behaviour of the modified
version.
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Algorithm 14 GaussSieve(G, q, 〈t1, t2〉)
L← {0}, S ← {}, K ← 0
while K < c do
if S is not empty then
vnew ← S.pop()
else
vnew ← Sample(G, q, 〈t1, t2〉)
end if
vnew ← GaussReduce(vnew, L, S, q)
if vnew = 0 then
K ← K + 1
else
L← L ∪ {vnew}
end if
end while
Algorithm 15 GaussReduce(p, L, S, q)
while ∃v ∈ L : (wtv ≤ wtp) ∧ (wt(p− v) mod q ≤ wtp) do
p← (p− v) mod q . Reduce p
end while
while ∃vi ∈ L : wtvi > wtp ∧ wt(vi − p) mod q ≤ wtvi do
L← L \ {vi} . Remove vi from list L
S.push((vi − p) mod q) . Push reduced vi on the stack
end while
return p
Experimental results
In the following, we test our implementation using different parameter sets, and compare
the results with the corresponding complexity of running an ISD-based attack. To keep
the comparison fair and as independent from implementation details as possible, we count
in both cases only the number of operations for the most important steps. For ISD, the
details are described in Section 4.1. For sieving, we count the following operations:
• Sampling a new vector
• Comparing wt(p− v mod q) ≤ wt(p) and comparing wt(v − p mod q) ≤ wt(v)
This means, do not count
• Push on or pop from stack
• Other memory operations like fetching an entry from the list
• Adding an entry to or removing from the list
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Table 4.10.: Comparison of our sieving implementation with ISD using binary parameters.
The number of operations is in log2.
Operations
n t sieving ISD Ratio sieving/ISD
56 8 22.6 16.0 1.41
70 9 25.3 17.4 1.46
80 9 27.1 17.7 1.53
100 11 30.4 20.1 1.51
120 13 35.8 22.4 1.60
The results are shown in Table 4.10.
To test the effect of larger fields, we also use different values of q. However, for growing
q, sieving seems to become worse compared with ISD. This behaviour is no surprise: Even
though we have no formal argument for this, we believe that the runtime of the sieving
algorithm generalizes from 20.34n in the binary case to q0.34n in the q-ary case. Thus, the
increase is (q/2)0.34n.
For ISD, however, the birthday step gets slower by a factor of only (q/2)p < (q/2)0.34n,
and the probability to find the right permutation remains constant.
Asymptotic complexity of sieving compared with ISD
In cryptography, we are interested in larger parameters than those that can be tested
experimentally. It is therefore important to consider the asymptotic complexity of both
algorithms when we increase the size of the parameters.
As mentioned above, we assume a time complexity of 20.52n and a space complexity of
20.2n for the modified sieving algorithm. As mentioned earlier, ISD-like algorithms have
an approximate complexity of
C(n,R) = a(n)2−t(n,R) log2(1−R),
where a(n) is some polynomial in n and R = k/n the code rate. For Goppa codes with a
code rate of R = 1− exp(−1) = 0.63, we have a complexity of
C(n,R) = a(n)20.53n/dlogne,
since in this case k = n − t ∗ dlog2(n)e. These complexities are supported by Table 4.10
(page 96): Choosing a(n) such that the ratio of sieving over ISD is correct for n = 56, we
find for the other ratios 1.49, 1.53, 1.61, and 1.68.
This shows that the asymptotic complexity of the modified sieving algorithm is higher
than the complexity of ISD. In addition to that, the space complexity of sieving is expo-
nential, whereas that of ISD is quadratic.
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4.5.2. Enumeration algorithm against code-based cryptosystems
This section covers the second attack, enumeration using extreme pruning [41]. In contrast
to the sieving-based attack above, we are not able to modify this algorithm to an attack
against code-based cryptosystems. We will briefly describe the idea of the algorithm, and
then show why the modified version fails.
Lattice enumeration using (extreme) pruning
Enumeration algorithms attempt to solve the SVP, i.e. find the shortest vector in a given
lattice L ∈ Zn. Let B = (b1, . . . , bn) be a basis of L, then every lattice vector v can be
represented as a linear combination of basis vectors: v =
∑
i xibi, where xi ∈ Z. The most
basic form of an enumeration algorithm performs an exhaustive search through all those
linear combinations of basis vector and thus finds the shortest vector in exponential time.
This is possible because the (originally infinite) search space Zn can be restricted by using
upper bounds on the norm of the shortest vector. See [41] for details.
The idea of (extreme) pruning is to make this algorithm probabilistic and only enumerate
those branches of the search tree that have the greatest probability of containing the
solution. This leads to an exponential speed-up of the total expected runtime. Let v ∈ L
be the shortest vector, then v can be written as a linear combination of basis vectors
v =
∑
i vibi, where the vi are the unknown coefficients. Let B∗ = (b∗1, . . . , b∗n) be a Gram-
Schmidt reduced basis of B, then v can also be written as
v =
n∑
i=1
vibi =
n∑
i=1
vi
b∗i + i−1∑
j=1
µi,jb
∗
j
 = n∑
j=1
vj + n∑
i=j+1
µi,jvi
 b∗j , (4.30)
where the µi,j ∈ Q form the lower-triangular matrix computed by the Gram-Schmidt
orthogonalization. Let pii be the orthogonal projection onto (b1, . . . , bi−1)⊥. This allows
to compute the norms of the projections of v as
||pin+1−k(v)||2 =
n∑
j=n+1−k
vj + n∑
i=j+1
µi,jvi
2 ||b∗j ||2, 1 ≤ k ≤ n. (4.31)
Since the norm of the projection pii(v) only depends on those unknown vectors vj with
j ≥ i, the algorithm can apply bounds on the vi one at a time. If R is the upper bound
on v (which is either known or can be estimated, e.g. using the Gaussian heuristic), then
the algorithm first applies the bound
0 ≤ vn ≤ R||b∗n||
.
The possible values of vn form the first level of the search tree. For every value of vn, the
second level is formed by using equation (4.31) to apply a bound on vn−1 and so on. The
resulting tree is the search tree for the (extreme) pruning algorithm.
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Using (extreme) pruning against code-based cryptosystems
Equation (4.31) is crucial for the (extreme) pruning enumeration algorithm since it allows
to estimate the norm of a vector v =
∑
i vibi using only a small number of vi. As in the
previous section, if we want to apply the algorithm on a code C generated by G, we need
to estimate the Hamming weight of v instead of the norm. In order for equation (4.31) to
work when we substitute the norm with the Hamming weight, we require an analogue to
the Gram-Schmidt basis b∗i , namely a generator matrix G
∗ for C such that wt(x + y) =
wt(x)+wt(y) (in the lattice case, this works because the b∗i are orthogonal). Unfortunately,
in general it is not possible to construct such a basis, as the following binary example shows
G =
(
1 1 0
0 1 1
)
.
We have implemented an algorithm to test the behaviour, but the estimates of the
weight of v seem completely random, so pruning can not be used to improve the efficiency
of enumeration.
4.5.3. ISD against lattice-based cryptosystems
In this section we analyze the third attack, ISD against lattice-based cryptosystems. In or-
der to use ISD in this context, three issues have to be addressed: Defining the search space,
modifying the target function from small Hamming weight to small Euclidean length, and
estimating the number of non-zero entries which the ISD algorithm attempts to find. We
will describe our approach to solve these issues and the associated issues. For the re-
mainder of this section, let L denote the lattice for which we want to solve the SVP. Let
the norm || · || be a norm commonly used in lattice-based cryptography, i.e. the 1-norm,
Euclidean norm, or maximum-norm.
Defining the search space
In the collision-search step of (the unmodified) ISD, for every non-zero position the algo-
rithm has to tests all values in Fq. Lattices, however, are a subset of Zn and therefore do
not have a finite number of such values to test. If a bound on the shortest lattice vector
is known, we can use the following proposition:
Proposition 4.5.2. If the p-norm of the smallest lattice vector v = (v1, . . . , vn) is upper
bounded by an integer b, then every entry vi of v is upper bounded by b.
Proof. Using the triangle inequality, we have ∀i : b ≥ ||v||p =
(∑n
j=1 |vj |p
)1/p ≥ |vi|.
However, this bound is not very tight. In some cases, we can do much better.
Definition 4.5.3 (Ajtai lattice). Let u = (u1, . . . , un) be a sequence of vectors, where
ui ∈ Znq and Zq = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}. The Ajtai-lattice Λ(u, q) is defined as
Λ(u, q) = {x ∈ Zn : uixT = 0 mod q for all i}.
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Proposition 4.5.4. If L is an Ajtai-lattice Λ(u, q), then every entry vi of the shortest
vector v is upper bounded by q.
Proof. Even though Ajtai-lattices are also infinite, the entries of the smallest vector v are
in Zq since ∀x ∈ L : x mod q ∈ L and ||x mod q|| ≤ ||x||.
Modifying the target function
This is a more difficult issue. Due to the way ISD works, it is restricted to finding vectors
of a given (usually small) Hamming weight, and we are not able to modify it to find vectors
having a small norm. However, while there is no implication between a small Hamming
weight and a small norm, they are correlated. So we can use ISD to search for vectors of
increasing Hamming weight and hope that the output also has a small norm.
This approach can be combined with other techniques to improve the probability that the
output has small norm, e.g. to test error patterns with smaller values more often in the
collision search step.
Estimating the number of non-zero entries
In code-based cryptography, the number t of non-zero values of the secret is much smaller
than the length of the code. This implies that there is a relatively small number of solutions
(often only one). The number of vectors over Fq of weight t (which usually corresponds
to the size of the search space) is
(
n
t
)
(q − 1)t.
In lattice-based cryptography, however, the number t of non-zero values is usually un-
known. In addition to that, the weight distribution can be approximated by equation (4.29)
on page 92, showing that the expected weight of the solution is much larger than in the
code-context. This increases the search space significantly, and also we expect a large
number of vectors of a given weight, of which only few might be of small norm.
Conclusion
While ISD can be used to search for vectors in a lattice which have a small Hamming
weight, this does not allow to attack lattice-based cryptosystems. The main difficulty is the
different notion of small : the Hamming metric for codes and a norm (1-, 2-, or maximum-
norm) for lattices. Due to the nature of ISD, we do not expect that this algorithm can be
modified to efficiently attack lattice-based cryptosystems.
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Our contributions
In this section, we solve the problem of selecting optimal parameters for the McEliece
cryptosystem based on binary Goppa codes as well as for the QD-CFS signature scheme
that provide security until a given year. This allows users to optimize the parameter
choice, thereby improving the applicability of code-based cryptography. For our analysis
we consider several constraints that have to be satisfied when selecting parameters:
• Security against structural attacks
• Security against decoding attacks
• Efficiency of the QD-CFS scheme (number of signing attempts and using the QD
structure)
The optimal parameter set is selected from those satisfying the above constraints. The
main focus is to minimize the public key size. In addition to that, we also show how to
trade off signature speed with public key size for the QD-CFS scheme.
Related work
Lenstra and Verheul [50] proposed a model on how to select appropriate keys that provide
security until a given year. Their work covers cryptosystems based on the factoring and
the discrete logarithm, but not code-based or other post-quantum cryptosystems. As far
as we know, our work is the first to apply their methodology in the context of code-based
cryptography.
In an independent work Kobara [47] proposed another construction for QD code suitable
for the CFS signature scheme (called flexible quasi-dyadic, or FQD) for the same problem.
However, we use the construction in [8] since it has several advantages. We briefly list
these below, see [8, Section 1] for details.
• The FQD construction does not produce smaller public key sizes than QD-CFS
• QD-CFS is computationally simpler
• In contrast to FQD, [8] provides a security assessment of binary QD codes against
recent structural attacks [33, 94] (in particular, arguing that binary QD codes remain
unscathed and are hence suitable for cryptographic applications)
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Outlook and further work
As a next step, we suggest a comprehensive analysis of concrete application scenarios. In
these scenarios, constraints as well as the tradeoffs between the code properties strongly
depend on the details of the application, e.g. available bandwidth, acceptable response
times, or typical message size. This analysis provides further insights into the current
strengths and limitations of code-based cryptography, thereby also suggesting new research
foci for the future.
The resulting QD-CFS scheme can be adapted to schemes derived from CFS signatures
like [24], [98], or [30]. Binary QD codes can also be applied to other code-based primitives
like FSB, the Stern ID scheme, or SYND. For these schemes and other applications of QD
codes, optimal parameters need to be found. We leave this for further research.
5.1. Selecting Optimal Parameters
In this section, we approach the problem of selecting secure parameters for the McEliece
cryptosystem based on binary Goppa codes. Our security model uses the methodology of
Lenstra and Verheul (LV); in Section 5.1.3 we discuss why we chose this approach. We
estimate the security of any given parameter using the lower bound complexity estimates
from Section 4.1. As far as we know, this is the first work focused on this subject. Our
main goal for the selection of parameters is to satisfy a minimum security level. Given
that the first goal is satisfied, we want to minimize the public key size. The results of our
optimization can be found in Table 5.2 on page 110.
There are, of course, other properties that can be optimized, e.g. encryption or decryption
speed, or the code rate. The reason why we focus on the key sizes is the following: While
the McEliece cryptosystem is already very fast and does not require special hardware (like
a cryptographic coprocessor), it suffers from the drawback of having large public keys.
For example, in a smart card implementation we analyzed [91], the computation time for
encryption and decryption accounted for only 5% of the total time, while the data transfer
of the public key (which is directly proportional to the key size) required 95% of the total
time. Therefore, reducing the public key size is an important target.
5.1.1. Methodology
In this section, we present our approach to determine parameters for the McEliece cryp-
tosystem which are secure until a given year. The analysis consists of three steps:
1. Use Lenstra and Verheul’s approach to estimate the algorithmic complexity that
ensures security until a given year, meaning that running a corresponding algorithm
is infeasible with the available resources. This step uses a set of assumptions, e.g.
about the speed of hardware development (Moore’s Law)
2. Use our lower bound results (Section 4.1) for ISD, Minder and Sinclair’s results [60]
for GBA, and several structural attacks to estimate the security of a large number
of parameters
3. Perform exhaustive search in the parameter space to select optimal parameters
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Lenstra and Verheul’s approach
In 1999, Lenstra and Verheul [50] described a mathematical model providing key length
recommendations for public-key cryptosystems based on integer factorization and discrete
logarithm. To our knowledge, this is the first important publication that uses a mathemat-
ical approach to determine secure parameters based on a set of general assumptions. After
the introduction of this model, several papers made use of it to find appropriate key lengths
for cryptographic primitives (see, for example, [57], [71] and [93]). Furthermore, several
companies have used this model to estimate the accepted key length for their cryptographic
applications. For instance, in 2004, the computer security company McAfee applied the
LV-model to find the minimal key size for SSL connections [4]. Another interesting organi-
zation is the BlueKrypt company which hosts the website www.keylength.com. This site
has an implementation of the LV-model and summarizes reports from well-known organi-
zations, allowing the evaluation of the minimum security requirements for some symmetric
and asymmetric systems in the future. In the following, we present the LV-model in more
detail.
The LV-model is based on a set of assumptions that combine the impact of cryptanalytic
progress and the effect of changes in computing environment. The key points of this model
on which the choice of parameters depends are the following:
1. Security margin: It is the year s which is used to “anchor” the extrapolation.
In [50] the default value of s is 1982 which represents the last year for which it is
assumed that a 56-bit key DES cryptosystem provides adequate security for commer-
cial use. The computational effort for breaking the 56-bit DES system was estimated
to be 5 · 105 MIPS-years1.
In order to estimate the security level required until a given year, Lenstra and Ver-
heul propose a function IMY(y), short for “Infeasible number of MIPS-years for
year y”, and it refers to the minimum computational effort that is expected to be
infeasible to do in year y.
In general, we define IMY(y) in such a way that a successful attack using tens of
thousands of year-y CPUs requires more than 100 years to finish. The number of
CPUs is a rough estimate for the effort a security agency might put into an attack;
the number of years is derived from the fact that US law used to require some na-
tional secrets to be protected for 75 years2, and the additional 25 years serve as a
conservative buffer.
2. Computing environment: This estimates the changes in computational power
available to attackers. The estimation is based on a slight variation of Moore’s law
by introducing three variables a, b, and c, which specify the changes in hardware
speed, IT budget, and price over time. The definitions of these variables and their
default values are as follows:
1MIPS = million instructions per second
2For example, the report on the Kennedy assassination; see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_F.
_Kennedy_assassination
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• a is the average number of months in which processor speed and memory size
are expected to increase by a factor of two. The default value is a = 18, which
is the value specified by Moore’s law and which is to date in line with current
hardware developments. We are going to use the same value due to the fact
that over the last years, hardware development has resulted in a doubling of
transistors (for a fixed price) every 12–24 months3. Thus, a default of 18 is
a compromise of this historic data. Also, opinions differ in whether hardware
development will slow down due to quantum mechanical effects, or whether new
technologies will further accelerate it.
• c ∈ {0, 1} indicates how to interpret the variable a. For c = 0, the amount of
computing power and memory available to an attacker doubles every a months,
while for c = 1, the computing power and memory for a given price double every
a months. We will use c = 1 since the historical trend mentioned above refers
to a fixed price.
• b is defined as the average number of months it takes for IT budgets to double.
It is assumed that the budget available to an attacker (be it a single person
or a security agency) develops similarly to the overall economy. According to
historic data4, the US Gross National Product has doubled approx. every 10.5
years over the last 30 years. Since the exact growth varies every year, we will
use an average value to extrapolate over a larger period of time. Our default
setting for b is 120.
3. Cryptanalysis: This refers to the future cryptanalytic progress. It is measured
by the number of months r it is expected for cryptanalytic attacks to become twice
as efficient, i.e. to require half the number of operations for a comparable task.
We estimate this number extrapolating the efficiency of attacks against code-based
cryptosystems only, since the cryptanalytic development can be very different for
other cryptosystems. Lenstra and Verheul’s default value is r = 18. In code-based
cryptography, we find it reasonable to assume that the pace of future cryptanalytic
developments and their impact will be relatively close to historic developments from
1988 until 2009. By applying a linear regression on data points listed in Table 2.2,
we see a twofold attack efficiency improvement every 2, 44 years. We use r = 30,
which corresponds to 2.5 years.
At the end of this section, we will provide a sensitivity analysis for the variables in our
model.
Based on these parameters, Lenstra and Verheul present a formula which can be used
to derive lower bounds for the algorithmic complexity that offers a specified security level
at least until year y in the future (independent of the concrete asymmetric cryptosystem).
3See http://wi-fizzle.com/compsci/
4See http://www.bea.gov
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Corollary 5.1.1. Under the assumptions described above regarding the complexity of
breaking DES and the hardware and budget developments in the future, the number of
MIPS-years that are expected to remain infeasible at least until year y is
IMY(y) = 5 · 105 · 212(y−s)/a · 212c(y−s)/b MIPS-years. (5.1)
With our default settings, it follows that in year y, a computational complexity of
IMY(y) = 5 · 105 · 2 2330 (y−1982) MIPS-years (5.2)
provides an acceptable level of security. The next step is to convert this lower bound
expressed in MIPS-years to a lower bound for the number of binary operations.
Corollary 5.1.2. Using as a data point the result [15] that in 2008, approximately 260.4
binary operations were needed to decode a message which was encoded using the original
McEliece parameters (1024, 524, 50), and expecting cryptanalytic developments by a factor
212(y−2008)/r (with r = 30); a sufficient condition for the security level of a McEliece
instance with parameter set (n, k, t), denoted S(n, k, t), providing an adequate security
until a given year y is the following:
S(n, k, t) ≥ IMY(y) · 2
12(y−2008)/30 · 260.4
1.7 · 105 . (5.3)
As in [50, Page 9], the value of S(n, k, t) is defined as the expected runtime of the fastest
algorithm published in 2008 for attacking the McEliece cryptosystem with the parameter
set (n, k, t). In our case, this corresponds to the lower bounds presented in [67, 68]. The
value 1.7 · 105 is expressed in MIPS-years and obtained from the fact that the attack by
Bernstein et al. [15] required 1400 CPU days on Q6600 quad processors. Assuming that a
Q6600 processor executes approximately 44, 000 MIPS (SiSoft Sandra benchmark and [1]),
this corresponds to 1.7 · 105 MIPS-years.
Therefore, the inequality (5.3) becomes:
S(n, k, t) ≥ 2.9412 · 2 2330 (y−1982)+ 1230 (y−2008)+60.4 (5.4)
5.1.2. Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we analyze the choice of the values we described in the previous Sec-
tion 5.1.1. More specifically, we estimate the impact that a different value of each variable
has on the resulting security level. This analysis quantifies the robustness of our model,
and it allows users to apply our results even if they have different assumptions about the
correct values.
1982 and DES-56 bit
The function IMY(y) was “anchored” by using 1982 as the last year in which breaking
the DES scheme with 56-bit key was considered infeasible. The choice to use DES with
56-bit for this definition is arbitrary; the function, therefore, is defined using the number
of operations required to break the DES scheme, and it is thus independent of which
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cryptosystem was used for the definition. Any other year and/or cryptosystem can be
used for the definition, e.g. AES or RSA. Using the data from the recent attack by
Bernstein et al. [15] that a 44,000 MIPS CPU breaks the original McEliece parameters in
1400 CPU-days, the attack complexity estimated as 260 operations corresponds to 217.3
MIPS years. An attack complexity of 280 operations, which is considered the “smallest
general-purpose level” of security5, corresponds to 237.3 MIPS-years, very close to our
estimate of IMY(2008) = 238.8.
Moore’s Law (parameters a and c)
The original Moore’s Law refers to the number of transistors on an integrated circuit [62].
Moore estimated this number to double every two years6. The number of MIPS of a CPU
depends on the number of transistors, but also on the clock speed. These two factors taken
together increase the chip performance by a factor of two every 18 months (estimated by
David House, an Intel executive). For our sensitivity analysis, we will consider a 10%
error in this estimate, i.e. a range between 16 and 20 months for a twofold performance
increase. The value c = 1 is in line with past developments, but we will show the impact
of c = 0 below.
Budget (parameter b)
Our choice for the value of b is based on the budget development of the US, since they
constitute the largest economic power worldwide. However, countries like China have a
much higher economic growth; some analysts expect China to overtake the US in the near
future, doubling the US economic power in 20307. This growth corresponds to a twicefold
increase in economic power in 6 years. Even though the GDP of China is smaller than that
of the US (about 40% in 2010) and the faster growth is therefore on a smaller baseline,
we will assume a range of 72–120 for the value of b.
Cryptanalytic progress (parameter r)
For more than two decades, cryptanalytic progress has improved the efficiency of the
fastest attack algorithm by a factor of two every 30 months. While every individual
attack algorithm has a lower bound for its complexity (see, for example, [15, 36, 67]),
many new attacks have been developed which improved the previous bounds. As in the
case of Moore’s Law, it is unclear whether generic attack algorithms have a lower bound for
their complexity that cannot be improved, thereby slowing down cryptanalytic progress,
or whether new cryptanalytic tools will increase the progress. We will therefore consider
a larger range for r, from 20 to 40 months.
5www.keylength.com, ECRYPT II recommendations
6See http://www.intel.com/technology/mooreslaw/ or http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moore’s_law
7J. Lin, World Bank’s chief economist, on March 23rd, 2011
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Table 5.1.: Impact of different input values to our model. Impact is the absolute and
relative change in the required security level for the year 2050.
Our Expected Impact
Parameter value range Absolute Relative
a 18 16–20 5.7 4.3%
b 120 72–120 4.5 3.5%
c 1 0/1 6.8 5.2%
r 30 20–40 8.4 6.4%
Conclusion
It can be seen from Table 5.1 that even very pessimistic assumptions (from a user’s point
of view) do not lead to dramatic changes in the required security level. For example,
assuming the most pessimistic value for all four parameters above raises the required se-
curity for 2050 from 131 to 149 bit, an increase of 18.6 bit or 14.2%.
Therefore, if a user has different assumptions than we used to compute Table 5.2, appro-
priate parameters can be found as follows: Determine the necessary security level using
our table and the year y until which protection is required; increase this security level
using the values in Table 5.1 (or correspondingly smaller values if y < 2050); locate the
row in Table 5.2 that corresponds to this higher security level and find optimal parameters
in it. Table 5.3 (page 112) applies the optimistic and pessimistic assumptions described
above and shows optimal parameters for selected years.
5.1.3. Discussion on the choice of the LV methodology
While we gave several examples above where the LV methodology was used, we acknowl-
edge that it is not widely applied in the academic world nor outside of it. There are other
methods of choosing parameters, e.g. one set of parameters for each output length of the
employed hash function. These alternatives are acceptable in the academic context where
the focus of the work is not on the parameters, but on the efficiency improvement of the
algorithm, for instance. However, we argue that the LV methodology is superior, especially
outside the academic world, where the parameter choice is important for cryptographic
applications.
The basic question when choosing parameters is: “which security level is required to
withstand attacks until a given year in the future?”. This level is then translated into
parameters in a way depending on the application. Many alternative methods like the one
mentioned above do not answer this question, and instead of choosing parameters, a user
faces the equally difficult question of choosing a hash function length.
In order to answer this question, one has to model the development of “available attack
power” which the given application will face. This can be done in very different ways,
and in different units of measurement, where MIPS-years and binary operations are two
prominent examples.
The LV methodology is a very natural framework to model this development. It is based
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on a clear logic tree of drivers: available attack power increases through algorithmic and
hardware improvements, hardware development breaks down into computing power per
dollar and budget increases etc. This logic not only reflects the way we naturally think
about this problem, it has several advantages:
• Its structure and level of detail make the results credible and convincing
• It makes assumptions transparent and allows to identify the biggest drivers
• It allows sensitivity analyses to test and validate the assumptions and, depending
on the results, potentially adjust them
For these reasons, we chose the LV framework to select optimal parameters.
5.1.4. Structural attacks against the Goppa code structure
As pointed out in [28], the only structural attack against general Goppa codes is the sup-
port splitting algorithm (SSA) [81]. A brief description of the algorithm can be found in
Section 2.5.2. We will provide a rough estimate of its complexity; in the next section, we
will check all parameters against this attack to ensure that they are not vulnerable against
it (meaning that the SSA has a higher complexity than ISD or GBA.
Given a public key corresponding to the McEliece cryptosystem, the SSA does not
directly recover the secret key. Instead, the attacker has to iterate through all possible
secret keys and check whether the corresponding Goppa code is permutation equivalent
to the public key. The complexity of a SSA-based attack against an (n, k, t) Goppa code
is approximately
tmnt−2
binary operations, where m = dlog2 ne.
Sendrier showed that the complexity of one run of the SSA against a code C is in
O(2dim(C∩C⊥)). The set C ∩ C⊥ is called the hull of the code C. Since the hull of a code
is often of small dimension, the complexity of the algorithm is not very high. However,
it cannot be smaller than n(tm)2, where m = dlog2 ne, which corresponds to a Gaussian
elimination. The number of codes that need to be tested can be computed using [80]. As
an approximation, there are 2tm/t binary (n = 2m, k, t) Goppa codes, and one out of mn3
need to be tested, so we have an approximate complexity of this attack of tmnt−2 binary
operations (see [28]).
5.1.5. Optimal parameters
The problem of estimating secure parameters for the McEliece cryptosystem for a given
year consists in obtaining, for the security level S calculated in equation (5.3), a set of
parameters that achieves this security level and provides the smallest key size among all
other such sets. To solve this problem, we first show how an instance attaining maximum
security for a given key size can be used to solve the problem of finding the optimal key
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size for a given security level. We then present an algorithm that we use to find optimal
instances.
From [69] we know that there exists an optimal information rate R∗ = k/n with R∗ ≈ 0.8
such that, for a given key size, the highest security is achieved at this rate. Although this
has been shown using a generic estimate for the security of given parameter sets and we
use more advanced lower bounds from [36, 67], we can expect that for a given key size
K the maximum security will be achieved at some R∗, which is similar for all K. This
is mainly due to the fact that the improvements of the ISD algorithm do not seem to
improve much on the exponential part but on the polynomial factor. Moreover, because
of the same reason we expect this R∗ not to differ significantly from the value 0.8 predicted
by [69, Lemma 1].
Building on this, we construct an algorithm that finds, with arbitrary precision, an instance
with the smallest key size possible achieving the given security level S. This algorithm is
depicted below (see Algorithm 16). In this algorithm, the value of S is calculated via the
inequality (5.4), and the interval [Rstart, Rend] is chosen large enough and contains 0.8:
we take an information rate which ranges from Rstart = 0.6 to Rend = 0.85. All other
parameters are selected such that it is feasible to complete the algorithm in a reasonable
time. For the key size, we set Kup = 200 kB as an upper bound and use the step size
Kstep = 1 kB. Moreover, we use the lower bound formula from [67] as a function C.
Our results are presented in Table 5.2 which shows the following information:
• Year: the year until which data security is required. Historic data is given mainly
to allow comparison with other sources.
• Symmetric key size: the symmetric key size required to ensure data security, calcu-
lated in accordance with Lenstra and Verheul’s approach.
• Lower bound for log2(S(n, k, t)): the log2 of the minimum number of binary opera-
tions (required to break a McEliece cryptosystem) that are infeasible in the respective
year.
• The last two columns are a translation of the required symmetric key size into param-
eters relevant in practice, i.e. the number of MIPS years that render a cryptosystem
infeasible to break, and the corresponding number of years on a modern quad core
CPU.
5.2. Quasi-dyadic CFS signatures
In this section, we contribute results to three questions regarding the QD-CFS signature
scheme. We will provide a security analysis regarding structural as well as decoding
attacks, and propose parameters based on the methodology presented in the previous
Section 5.1. In addition to that, we show how the parameters can be used to trade off
signature generation time versus public key size.
109
5. Parameter Selection
Table 5.2.: Proposed parameters for the McEliece cryptosystem — optimized for public
key size
Sym- Lower McEliece para- Infeasible Corresponding
metric bound for meters (n, k, t) and number of number of
Year Key Size log2 S(n, k, t) public key size (kB) MIPS-years years
a
2009 77 83 (1641, 1213, 40) 63 8.52 · 1011 1.94 · 107
2010 78 84 (1661, 1222, 41) 66 1.45 · 1012 3.30 · 107
2011 79 85 (1680, 1230, 42) 68 2.47 · 1012 5.61 · 107
2012 80 87 (1722, 1270, 42) 70 4.19 · 1012 9.52 · 107
2013 80 88 (1740, 1277, 43) 72 7.14 · 1012 1.62 · 108
2014 81 89 (1765, 1290, 44) 75 1.21 · 1013 2.75 · 108
2015 82 90 (1801, 1325, 44) 77 2.07 · 1013 4.70 · 108
2016 83 91 (1859, 1392, 43) 79 3.51 · 1013 7.98 · 108
2017 83 92 (1861, 1372, 45) 82 5.98 · 1013 1.36 · 109
2018 84 93 (1922, 1442, 44) 85 1.02 · 1014 2.32 · 109
2019 85 95 (1923, 1421, 46) 87 1.73 · 1014 3.93 · 109
2020 86 96 (1983, 1490, 45) 90 2.94 · 1014 6.68 · 109
2021 86 97 (1983, 1468, 47) 92 5.01 · 1014 1.14 · 1010
2022 87 98 (2044, 1538, 46) 95 8.52 · 1014 1.94 · 1010
2023 88 99 (2045, 1517, 48) 98 1.45 · 1015 3.30 · 1010
2024 89 101 (2072, 1532, 49) 101 2.47 · 1015 5.61 · 1010
2025 89 102 (2135, 1604, 48) 104 4.20 · 1015 9.55 · 1010
2026 90 103 (2157, 1614, 49) 107 7.14 · 1015 1.62 · 1011
2027 91 104 (2159, 1594, 51) 110 1.21 · 1016 2.75 · 1011
2028 92 105 (2187, 1621, 51) 112 2.07 · 1016 4.70 · 1011
2029 93 106 (2241, 1673, 51) 116 3.52 · 1016 8.00 · 1011
2030 93 108 (2248, 1669, 52) 118 5.98 · 1016 1.36 · 1012
2032 95 110 (2340, 1758, 52) 125 1.73 · 1017 3.93 · 1012
2034 96 112 (2396, 1801, 53) 131 5.01 · 1017 1.14 · 1013
2036 98 115 (2443, 1824, 55) 138 1.45 · 1018 3.30 · 1013
2038 99 117 (2531, 1909, 55) 145 4.20 · 1018 9.55 · 1013
2040 101 119 (2573, 1927, 57) 152 1.22 · 1019 2.77 · 1014
2042 103 122 (2614, 1944, 59) 159 3.52 · 1019 8.00 · 1014
2044 104 124 (2653, 1959, 61) 166 1.02 · 1020 2.32 · 1015
2046 106 126 (2774, 2099, 59) 173 2.95 · 1020 6.70 · 1015
2048 107 129 (2798, 2088, 62) 181 8.53 · 1020 1.94 · 1016
2050 109 131 (2804, 2048, 66) 189 2.47 · 1021 5.61 · 1016
aon a 2.4 GHz Intel Core 2 Quad Q6600
110
5.2. Quasi-dyadic CFS signatures
Algorithm 16 Search(S,C,Kstep,Kup, Rstep, Rstart, Rend)
Require:
- Security level S
- Complexity function C(n,R)
- Step for the key size search Kstep
- Search upper bound for the key size Kup
- Step for the rate search Rstep
- Rate search interval bounds Rstart, Rend
Ensure: nout and Rout such that
- C(nout, Rout) ≥ S
- The key size is the smallest possible up to steps
Kstep and Rstep
Begin
for K = Kstep to Kup do
for R = Rstart to Rend do
n←
√
K
R(1−R)
if C(n,R) ≥ S then
return n and R
end if
R← R+Rstep
end for
K ← K +Kstep
end for
return “NO solution found”
End
5.2.1. Structural attacks against the QD structure
In addition to structural attacks against the Goppa structure (which we have covered
in Section 5.1.4), we also have to consider structural attacks against the QD structure
when using QD-CFS. In 2010, Fauge`re et al. [33] published a structural attack against the
McEliece cryptosystem when used with QC or QD codes. Since a dual of McEliece is the
Niederreiter cryptosystem, on which the CFS signature scheme is based, this attack has
to be taken into account in our context.
Proposition 5.2.1. A necessary condition to protect against the structural attack by
Fauge`re et al. is that non-binary QD Goppa codes have to be avoided and that the complex-
ity of guessing half the errors needs to be large enough to be infeasible. The latter constraint
is met if
(
n
t/2
)
is greater than the complexity which is considered infeasible (computed as
in Section 5.1.1).
In order to show why Proposition 5.2.1 is true, we will briefly describe their attack here
and then discuss how to protect against it.
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Table 5.3.: Comparison of parameters using optimistic versus pessimistic assumptions
(from a users point of view) for selected years.
Optimistic scenario Pessimistic scenario
Lower McEliece para- Lower McEliece para-
bound for meters (n, k, t) and bound for meters (n, k, t) and
Year log2 S(n, k, t) public key size (kB) log2 S(n, k, t) public key size (kB)
2020 95 (1902, 1390, 47) 87 98 (2047, 1541, 46) 95
2030 105 (2220, 1664, 50) 113 112 (2396, 1801, 53) 131
2040 142 (2453, 1811, 57) 116 126 (2730, 2045, 60) 171
2050 127 (2732, 2024, 62) 175 139 (3108, 2342, 66) 219
The first step is to recognize that Goppa codes are a subclass of alternant codes, so any
QD Goppa code is also an alternant code. Alternant codes can be defined using parity
check matrices of a certain structure. We define the alternant code Ar(x, y) over Fq as
Ar(x, y) = {v ∈ Fnq : Vr(x, y)vT = 0},
where x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) ∈ Fnqm is a vector of pairwise different elements, y = (y0, . . . , yn−1) ∈
Fnqm a vector of non-zero elements, m = dlog2(n)e, and
Vr(x, y) =

y0 · · · yn−1
y0x0 · · · yn−1xn−1
...
...
y0x
r−1
0 · · · yn−1xr−1n−1
 .
Secondly, there exist polynomial time algorithms for decoding alternant codes; such an
algorithm can be used once a parity check matrix in the form H = Vr(x, y) for the code is
found. Let C be the code on which a QD-CFS scheme is based, G the corresponding public
generator matrix (which can be derived from the public parity check matrix, if necessary).
For any parity check matrix H of C, we have GHT = 0.
Since the secret matrix H defines a Goppa code, the linear equation system corresponding
to 5.2.1 has the following form:
{g1,1Y1Xj1 + · · ·+ g1,nYnXjn = 0 : 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 0 ≤ j ≤ r − 1},
where gi,j are the (known) entries of G and X and Y the unknowns. Usually, this system
is too complex to be solved. However, using the QD structure allows to greatly reduce the
number of unknowns and therefore solve the system. The solutions yields an alternant
decoder, i.e. an algorithm for decoding alternant codes; for codes over non-binary fields
Fq, this decoder allows an attacker to forge signatures.
Binary Goppa codes, however, have approximately twice the minimum distance than
corresponding binary alternant codes: For a code of length n and dimension k, alternant
codes have a minimum distance
≥ n− kdlog2(n)e
+ 1,
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whereas Goppa codes have a minimum distance of
≥ 2 n− kdlog2(n)e
+ 1.
Therefore, a binary alternant decoder allows to decode only half the errors that can be
added to a codeword of a binary Goppa code — the other half an attacker needs to guess.
Proposition 5.2.1 ensures that this type of attack remains infeasible.
Remark 5.2.2. As pointed out in Proposition 5.2.1, the conditions above are necessary,
not sufficient to protect against the attack by Fauge`re et al. While no efficient algorithm is
known to extend the t/2-error correcting alternant decoder into a t-error correcting Goppa
decoder, we cannot yet exclude the possibility that such an algorithm exists. In this case,
a parameter adjustment would be necessary for QD Goppa codes to remain secure.
5.2.2. Decoding attacks against the QD structure
As described in Section 2.5.2, (QD-)CFS signatures constitute a “decoding one out-of-
many” (DOOM) scenario since an attacker can be satisfied with decoding any of the
syndromes generated by hashing the document with different counters. However, we do
not suggest to apply Finiasz’ “Parallel-CFS” [35] construction mentioned in [83]: it requires
complete decoding which is very inefficient, and it is unclear whether this construction is
really immune to the above attack.
Thus, we propose parameters which remain secure even facing a decoding one out-of-many
attack by increasing the required security level by 50% (since a DOOM attack reduces the
runtime exponent to approximately 2/3).
5.2.3. Optimal QD-CFS parameters
When selecting parameters for the QD-CFS signature scheme, there are several constraints
that need or should be taken into account:
• Security:
– The complexity of ISD and GBA attacks need to be large enough, in order to
protect against these generic attacks
– To protect against the structural attack discussed in Section 5.2.1, avoid using
non-binary QD Goppa codes, and choose parameters such that guessing half
the errors is infeasible
– The number of non-equivalent Goppa codes of corresponding parameters needs
to be large enough to render SSA-based attacks infeasible
• Efficiency:
– To utilize the QD structure, t should be a multiple of a large power of 2
– Use codes of high density to keep the number of signing attempts small
– The parameters can be used to trade off speed versus key size, depending on
the application
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Table 5.4.: Proposed parameters for the QD-CFS signature scheme — optimized for public
key size and number of signing attempts.
Sym- Lower bound McEliece para-
metric for log2 S(n, k, t) meters (n, k, t) and
Year Key Size (incl. DOOM) public key size (MB)
2014 81 122 (1979448, 1979196, 12) 14.8
2020 86 129 (3958896, 3958632, 12) 31.1
2030 93 140 (15835583, 15835295, 12) 135.9
2040 101 152 (31671167, 31670867, 12) 283.2
2050 109 164 (126684666, 126684342, 12) 1223.3
Table 5.5.: Minimum value of m to yield a time complexity of at least 280 (incl. DOOM
attacks); corresponding expected number of signing attempts and key sizes.
(t,m) (8, 29) (10, 24) (12, 21) (14, 19)
Security level 281.6 281.8 281.3 283.9
Avg no. of sign attempts 216.3 222.8 229.8 237.3
Key size (MB) 822 224 15 8
The protection against the attack by Fauge`re et al. and against the SSA has been
discussed in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.1.4. In the following, we propose parameters that are
secure against ISD and GBA attacks and satisfy the necessary conditions to be secure
against those two structural attacks. In order to do this, we make use of the method-
ology introduced in Section 5.1. Among those parameters sets that satisfy the security
constraints, we will select the one minimizing the key size (taking into account the effect
of the QD structure). The results can be found in Table 5.4, followed by a discussion on
the tradeoff between speed and key size.
As we described in Section 2.4.3, the CFS signature scheme requires a much smaller
value of t in order to reduce the number of signing attempts, which is in O(t!). However,
this requires large values of n ≤ 2m and k, which increases the public key size pk, where
pk = k(n − k)dlog2 qe bits. Hence, the (QD-)CFS signature scheme allows to trade off
signing speed (in number of signing attempts) against public key size. An example is given
in Table 5.5.
For the security range we considered in Table 5.4, a value of t = 12 has shown to be
optimal. Smaller values lead to larger key sizes since 12 is dividable by a relatively large
power of 2 and therefore allows to use the QD structure efficiently. The choice of t > 12
is suboptimal in our view, since the relatively small key size reduction is not outweighed
by the exponential increase in the number of signing attempts.
In addition to that, we propose to use the greatest possible code length n = b2m−1/te.
While smaller values of n slightly reduce the public key size, they significantly increase the
number of signing attempts: If the code length is a fraction 1/2c of the maximal length
2m, the number of signing attempts is increased by a factor of 2ct (see [8] for more details).
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In this thesis, we presented contributions to the theoretical security as well as the practical
application of code-based cryptography.
We started with a study of attacks in a broadcast scenario. To our knowledge, this type of
attack has not been analyzed in the context of code-based cryptography. In this section, we
found that the Niederreiter and the HyMES cryptosystems are vulnerable to a broadcast
attack, in contrast to the McEliece encryption scheme. In addition to that, we generalized
the broadcast attack to the situation of similar (instead of identical) messages, and we
proved bounds for the expected number of recipients that are required to run our attack
in both cases. If an attacker intercepts a smaller number of messages, it is possible to use
the gathered knowledge to improve an ISD attack, and we computed the respective attack
complexity. A discussion on the use of semantic conversions to protect against broadcast
attacks concluded our analysis, and we implemented our attack in Java to demonstrate
its efficiency.
The subsequent section of this thesis covers our improvements of non-critical attacks.
Like many other attacks, ISD had largely been studied in the context of binary codes.
We generalized this attack to codes of larger fields Fq, developed an additional efficiency
improvement, and proved lower bounds for the complexity. The next result is a study of
the effect of partial knowledge on the efficiency of ISD attacks. After defining two types of
partial knowledge and describing situations where an attacker might be able to obtain this
knowledge, we presented techniques to exploit this knowledge and proved lower bounds
for the complexity of ISD attacks modified respectively. Recognizing the number of pub-
lications which make use of highly structured matrices, we developed a modified GBA
attack that makes use of this structure to improve its efficiency. This results demonstrates
that additional code structure — aimed to achieve a smaller public key size or other im-
provements — potentially decreases the security of a given cryptosystem. The subsequent
contribution is the generalization of statistical decoding from binary to larger finite field
Fq. We provided a theoretical analysis of the success probability of our algorithm, and
gathered experimental data for different field sizes. Many instances were successfully de-
coded, independent of the field size. In addition to that, we described techniques that can
be used to exploit partial knowledge in order to increase the algorithm’s efficiency. Our
final result in this section is a study of two lattice attacks against code-based cryptosys-
tems, and of ISD against lattice-based schemes.
Our final results concern the selection of appropriate parameters. We applied the Lenstra-
Verheul framework to the McEliece encryption scheme and the QD-CFS signature scheme
to select secure and efficient parameters. In order to do this, we discussed in detail our as-
sumptions regarding future hardware and software developments on which this framework
is built, and added a sensitivity analysis to show the robustness of our results.
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Lists of symbols and abbreviations
General
Ik Set {1, 2, . . . , k}
In Identity matrix of size n
[n, k] code Linear code of length n and dimension k
[n, k, d] code An [n, k] code with a minimum distance of d
(n, k, t) code An [n, k] code with an error-correcting capability of t
r = n− k Co-dimension of an [n, k] code
R = k/n Information rate of an [n, k] code
DC , DG, DH Decoding algorithm for a code C, or a code generated by G or H, respectively
le(v) The leading element of a non-zero vector v ∈ Fnq , i.e. the first non-zero element
Wn,t,q Set of words over Fq of length n and weight t
wt(v) The (Hamming) weight of vector v
d(x, y) The (Hamming) distance between two vectors x and y
CFS Courtois-Finiasz-Sendrier
CVE Cayrel-Ve´ron-El Yousfi
CWE Constant weight encoding
FSB Fast Syndrome-Based
GBA Generalized Birthday Algorithm
GRS Generalized Reed-Solomon
GV Gilbert-Varshamov
ID Identification
ISD Information-Set Decoding
LV Lenstra-Verheul
pk, sk Public key, secret key
PKC Public-Key Cryptosystem
QC, QD Quasi-cyclic, quasi-dyadic
SSA Support Splitting Algorithm
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Algorithms
PRG(x) Cryptographically secure pseudo random number generator from fixed length
random seed
lq blogq
(
n
t
)c
ϕ() Bijective function mapping an integer in Zql = Z/qlZ to a word of length n
and weight t. We apply ϕ to vectors in Fkq by enumerating these vectors first,
and then apply ϕ
MSBx(v) The left x bits of v
LSBx(v) The right x bits of v
len(v) Length of vector v
h() Cryptographic secure hash function to a word of length l
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A. Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
A.1. Proof of Proposition 4.1.3
In this section, we prove Proposition 4.1.3 (page 67). We begin with a detailed description
of the efficiency improvement we presented in Section 4.1.3.
Efficiency improvement using the field structure of Fq
For the sake of better readability in this section, we introduce a simplified notation for
equation 4.1 (page 63):
H =
(
In−k−l 0 H1
0 Il H2
)
=
(
In−k−l K1
0 K2
)
.
The step of Algorithm 8 that can be made more efficient using the field structure of Fq
is the search for a pair (e1, e2) such that e1 ∈ Wk+l;bp/2c;q;p1 , e2 ∈ Wk+l;dp/2e;q;p1 and
K2e
T
1 = s
T
2 −K2eT2 ,
where Wk+l;p;q;p1 is the set of all q-ary words of length k+ l, weight p, and weight p1 on
the first l bits.
Let W ′1, W2, L′1, and L′2 be defined as in (4.4)-(4.6). First note that for any pair (e1, e2)
and all non-zero values y ∈ Fq, we have
K2e
T
1 = s
T
2 −K2eT2 ⇔ (K2eT1 )y−1 = (sT2 −K2eT2 )y−1.
Instead of storing K2e
T
1 and s
T
2 − K2eT2 , we can store (K2eT1 )(le(K2eT1 ))−1 in L′1 and
(sT2 − K2eT2 )(le(sT2 − K2eT2 ))−1 in L′2, respectively. The list L′1, however, would contain
every entry exactly (q − 1) times, since for every y ∈ Fq\{0}, e1 and ye1 yield the same
entry. Therefore, we can generate the first list by using only vectors e1 whose first non-zero
entry is 1.
To see that there is exactly one collision between L′1 and L′2 for every solution of the
problem, let (e1, e2) be a pair found by our algorithm. Let y = le(K2e
T
1 ) and z = le(s
T −
K2e
T
2 ). Then we have
(K2e
T
1 )y
−1 = (sT −K2eT2 )z−1,
and therefore (e1zy
−1, e2) is a solution to the problem.
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Conversely, let (e1, e2) be a solution to the problem, i.e. K2e
T
1 +K2e
T
2 = s
T
2 . We want
to show that there exists a collision between L′1 and L′2 which corresponds to this solution.
Let y = le(K2e
T
1 ) and z = le(s
T
2 −K2eT2 ). Since K2eT1 = sT2 −K2eT2 , we have
(K2e
T
1 )y
−1 = (sT2 −K2eT2 )z−1. (A.1)
As we did not limit the set W2, the right hand side of equation (A.1) is an element of
L′2.
Let x = le(e1). The first non-zero entry of e
′
1 = e1x
−1 is 1, so it was used to calculate a
member of L′1. As le(K2e′T1 ) = le(K2(e1x−1)T ) = yx−1, we have
(K2e
′T
1 )(le(K2e
′T
1 ))
−1 = (K2(e1x−1)T )(yx−1)−1 = (K2eT1 )y
−1.
Therefore, the left hand side of equation (A.1) belongs to L′1.
Since z = y, this collision between L′1 and L′2 corresponds to the solution (e1, e2).
Obviously, this improvement can only be applied if p > 0, i.e. if there actually is a search
for collisions. If p = 0, which corresponds to the basic ISD algorithm by Prange, we are
simply trying to find a permutation which shifts all error positions into the first r positions
of s, so the runtime is the inverse of the probability P0 of this event with P0 =
(
r
t
)
/
(
n
t
)
.
For the rest of the appendix we assume p > 0.
Cost of the algorithm
In most cases, the value of t will be smaller than the GV bound, and we expect the
algorithm to require many iterations. In that case, in one iteration of our main loop, we
expect to test a fraction
λq(zq) = 1−
(
1− 1(
k
p1
)(
l
p2
)
(q − 1)p−1
)|W ′1|·|W2|
≈ 1− exp
(
− |W
′
1| · |W2|(
k
p1
)(
l
p2
)
(q − 1)p−1
)
= 1− exp(−zq)
of vectors in Wk+l;p;q, where
zq =
|W ′1| · |W2|(
k
p1
)(
l
p2
)
(q − 1)p−1 . (A.2)
The approximation via the exponential function is possible since Proposition 4.1.3 requires
that zq is small and hence exp(−zq) ≈ 1−zq. This slightly overestimates the success prob-
ability, but the difference is less than 2−12 for relevant parameters.
The success probability of each pair (e1, e2) is the number of error combinations match-
ing the syndrome in the last l rows, divided by the total number of possible values HeT
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with e ∈ Wk+l;p;q. Depending on the code parameters, the latter is either given by the
number of error patterns or by the number of syndromes:
Pq =
λq(zq)
(
r−l
t−p
)
(q − 1)t−p+1
min
((
n
t
)
(q − 1)t, qr) .
The success probability in one iteration of main loop is thus:
Pp;q(l) = 1− (1− Pq)|W ′1|·|W2|
≈ 1− exp(−Pq · |W ′1| · |W2|)
= 1− exp
(
− λq(zq)
Np;q(l)
)
,
where
Np;q(l) =
min
((
n
t
)
(q − 1)t, qr)(
r−l
t−p
)|W ′1| · |W2|(q − 1)t−p+1 .
As described above, the set W ′1 (and, similarly, W2) is computed by storing partial sums,
reducing the cost of each calculation to l q−1q operations. This is done for the rightmost
p′1 = dp1/2e error positions. Then the p′2 = dp2/2e remaining positions are added, again
storing partial sums, but at a cost of only one operation each, since the corresponding
vectors have only one non-zero entry. If the sets are chosen to maximize this effect, every
combination of p′1 error locations allows to compute (
(
l
p′2
)
(q − 1)p′2) vectors at the cost of
only one operation. This leads to a total cost of
|W ′1|(
l
p′2
)
(q − 1)p′2
(
(q − 1)l
q
+
(
l
p′2
)
(q − 1)p′2p′2
)
=
(q − 1)l|W ′1|
q
(
l
p′2
)
(q − 1)p′2 + |W
′
1|p′2
to compute the syndromes corresponding to the vectors in W ′1, and similarly for W2.
For small parameters, the optimal p2 might be odd, and the sets W
′
1 and W2 will have
different size. However, the difference between the optimal runtimes of an odd p2 and
p2 + 1 is very small, thus we will assume an even p2.
For small Pp;q(l), the cost of the algorithm can be approximated to
Np;q(l)
λq(zq)
·
 (q − 1)l|W ′1|
q
(
l
p′2
)
(q − 1)p′2 + |W
′
1|p′2 +
(q − 1)l|W2|
q
(
l
p′2
)
(q − 1)p′2 + |W2|p
′
2 +Kq
λq(zq)|W ′1| · |W2|
ql
 ,
which is the approximate number of iterations times the number of operations per itera-
tion. Kq is the expected cost to perform the check that wt(s
T −H(e1 + e2)T ) = t− p.
129
A. Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
It is easy to see that choosing |W ′1| = |W2| minimizes this expression.
Np;q(l) ·
 |W ′1|
λq(zq)
 2(q − 1)l
q
(
l
p′2
)
(q − 1)p′2 + p2
+Kq |W ′1|2
ql

=
min
((
n
t
)
(q − 1)t, qr)(
r−l
t−p
)|W ′1|2(q − 1)t−p ·
 |W ′1|
λq(zq)
 2(q − 1)l
q
(
l
p′2
)
(q − 1)p′2 + p2
+Kq |W ′1|2
ql
 .
This expression decreases as the size of W ′1 increases, so we maximize this size, choose
zq = 1 and set λq = λq(1) = 1− e−1. Using (A.2), we get
Np;q(l) ·
λ−1q
 2(q − 1)l
q
(
l
p′2
)
(q − 1)p′2 + p2
√( k
p1
)(
l
p2
)
(q − 1)p−1 +Kq
(
k
p1
)(
l
p2
)
(q − 1)p−1
ql
 ,
where Np;q is now
Np;q(l) =
min
((
n
t
)
(q − 1)t, qr)(
r−l
t−p
)(
k
p1
)(
l
p2
)
(q − 1)t .
Minimizing over p1, p2 and l gives the result.
Now consider the case where
(
r
t−p
)(
k
p
)
(q − 1)t ≥ qr. Then the main loop is likely to
succeed after a single iteration. This corresponds to the birthday algorithm described
in [36]:
WFBA ≈ 2√
P
·
(
l +
K0
2
√
P2l
)
.
We can apply this result here, since it does not depend on the field size, but only on the
success probability. In the q-ary case, this expression becomes
WFqBA ≈ 2√
P
·
(
l +
K0
2
√
Pql
)
.
Easy analysis shows that the optimal value for l is
l = logq
(
ln(q)K0
2
√
P
)
.
Applying this in our case with Kq instead of K0 (since K0 is the cost of the third step in
the algorithm of [36], which corresponds to Kq when applied in the case of ISD), using
P = Pq ≈
(
r−l
t−p
)
(q − 1)t−p+1
qr
,
and minimizing over p and l yields the lower bound result:
WFqISD(n, r, t, q) ≈ 2lq
r/2√(
r−l
t−p
)
(q − 1)t−p+1
.
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A.2. Proof of Proposition 4.2.1
The proof follows the same approach as above, and we focus on the differences compared
to that case.
Since the domain of the error values has been restricted fromWn;p;q ∈ Fnq toWn;p;q∩En,
every iteration of the algorithm tests a larger ratio of possible error vectors. We continue
to denote this ratio by λq(zq) = 1− exp(zq), where zq changes and is now defined as
zq =
|W ′1| · |W2|(
k
p1
)(
l
p2
)|E|p−1 . (A.3)
This also changes the success probability Pq of each pair (e1, e2) to
Pq =
λq(zq)
(
r−l
t−p
)|E|t−p+1
min
((
n
t
)|E|t, qr) .
Therefore, we get a success probability of each iteration of the main loop of
Pp;q(l) = 1− (1− Pq)(
k
p1
)( lp2)|E|
p
≈ 1− exp
(
−Pq ·
(
k
p1
)(
l
p2
)
|E|p
)
= 1− exp
(
− λq(zq)
Np;q(l)
)
,
with
Np;q(l) =
min
((
n
t
)|E|t, qr)(
r−l
t−p
)|W ′1| · |W2| · |E|t .
Hence, for small Pp;q(l), the cost of the algorithm is
min
((
n
t
)
(q − 1)t, qr)(
r−l
t−p
)|W ′1|2(q − 1)t−p ·
 |W ′1|
λq(zq)
 2|E|l
(|E|+ 1)( lp′2)(q − 1)p′2 + p2
+Kq |W ′1|2
ql
 .
Using (A.2) and setting zq = 1, we get
Np;q(l) ·
λ−1q
 2|E|l
(|E|+ 1)( lp′2)(q − 1)p′2 + p2
√( k
p1
)(
l
p2
)
|E|p−1 +Kq
(
k
p1
)(
l
p2
)|E|p−1
ql
 ,
where Np;q is now
Np;q(l) =
min
((
n
t
)|E|t, qr)(
r−l
t−p
)(
k
p1
)(
l
p2
)|E|t .
Minimizing over p1, p2 and l gives the result.
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Similarly, in the case where
(
r
t−p
)(
k
p
)|E|t ≥ qr, we use the formula
WFqBA ≈ 2√
P
·
(
l +
K0
2
√
Pql
)
with
P = Pq ≈
(
r−l
t−p
)|E|t−p+1
qr
.
Minimizing over p and l yields the lower bound result:
WFqISD(n, r, t, q) ≈ 2lq
r/2√(
r−l
t−p
)|E|t−p+1 .
A.3. Proof of Proposition 4.2.2
We mention only the changes compared with the proof in Appendix A.2.
Since the size of the sets Wi changes, the values of zq, Pq and Np;q(l) become
zq =
|W1| · |W2|(
k
p1
)(
l
p2
)(
t
p
)
p!
, (A.4)
Pq =
λq
(
r−l
t−p
)
(t− p)!
min(
(
n
t
)
t!, qr)
,
Np;q(l) =
min(
(
n
t
)
t!, qr)(
r−l
t−p
)(
k
p1
)(
l
p2
)(
t
p
)
p!(t− p)! .
We can use the same strategy to efficiently compute the syndromes. In this case, the
total cost is
|W ′1|(
l
p′2
)(
t
p′2
)
p′2!
(
(q − 1)l
q
+
(
l
p′2
)(
t
p′2
)
p′2! · p′2
)
=
(q − 1)l|W ′1|
q
(
l
p′2
)(
t
p′2
)
p′2!
+ |W ′1|p′2
to compute the syndromes corresponding to the vectors in W ′1, and similarly for W2.
Using (A.4) and following the same steps as above, we get
Np;q(l) ·
λ−1q
 2(q − 1)l
q
(
l
p′2
)(
t
p′2
)
p′2!
+ p2
√( k
p1
)(
l
p2
)(
t
p
)
p! +Kq
(
k
p1
)(
l
p2
)(
t
p
)
p!
ql
 ,
Minimizing over l, p1 and p2 gives the result.
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In the second case, we can use the same formula as above with the probability changed,
i.e.
WFqBA ≈ 2√
P
·
(
l +
K0
2
√
Pql
)
.
With
l = logq
(
ln(q)K0
2
√
P
)
,
P = Pq ≈
(
r−l
t−p
)
(t− p)!
qr
.
and minimizing over p and l yields the lower bound result:
WFqBA(n, r, t, q) ≈ 2lq
r/2√(
r−l
t−p
)
(t− p)!
.
Minimizing over p yields the result as above.
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Broadcast attack
Listing B.1: Broadcast attack
1 import java . i o . ∗ ;
2 import java . s e c u r i t y . KeyPair ;
3 import java . s e c u r i t y . KeyPairGenerator ;
4 import java . s e c u r i t y . PrivateKey ;
5 import java . s e c u r i t y . PublicKey ;
6 import java . s e c u r i t y . SecureRandom ;
7 import java . s e c u r i t y . Se cu r i ty ;
8 import java . u t i l . Calendar ;
9
10 import javax . crypto . Cipher ;
11 import javax . crypto . CipherInputStream ;
12 import javax . crypto . CipherOutputStream ;
13
14 import de . f l e x i p r o v i d e r . core . F lex iCoreProv ider ;
15 import de . f l e x i p r o v i d e r . pqc . ∗ ;
16 import de . f l e x i p r o v i d e r . pqc . ecc . ∗ ;
17 import de . f l e x i p r o v i d e r . pqc . ecc . n i e d e r r e i t e r . ∗ ;
18 import de . f l e x i p r o v i d e r . common . math . l i n e a r a l g e b r a . ∗ ;
19
20 import Jama . ∗ ;
21
22 public class Broadcast {
23
24 // Constants
25 f ina l stat ic int r e c i p i e n t s =2;
26
27 // V a r i a b l e s
28 stat ic KeyPairGenerator kpg ;
29 stat ic ECCKeyGenParameterSpec eccParams ;
30 stat ic KeyPair [ ] keyPair ;
31 stat ic PublicKey [ ] pubKey ;
32 stat ic PrivateKey [ ] privKey ;
33 stat ic St r ing message ;
34 stat ic byte [ ] messageBytes ;
35 stat ic byte [ ] [ ] c i phe r t ex tByte s ;
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36 stat ic Jama . Matrix [ ] jm ;
37 stat ic Jama . Matrix [ ] syn ;
38 stat ic Jama . Matrix mes ;
39
40
41 public stat ic void main ( St r ing [ ] a rgs ) throws Exception {
42
43 i n i t i a l i z e ( ) ;
44
45 // Generate KeyPairs
46 genKeyPairs ( ) ;
47
48 // Set up a message
49 c iphe r t ex tByte s=encrypt ( ” t e s t ” , pubKey , privKey ) ;
50 byte [ ] pad = padMessage ( messageBytes ) ;
51
52 //Encode message us ing each p u b l i c key
53 GF2Vector m = Convers ions . encode (
54 ( ( N iede r r e i t e rPub l i cKey )pubKey [ 0 ] ) . getN ( ) ,
55 ( ( N iede r r e i t e rPub l i cKey )pubKey [ 0 ] ) . getT ( ) , pad ) ;
56 Vector hm = ( ( Niede r r e i t e rPub l i cKey )pubKey [ 0 ] ) . getH
( ) . rightMultiplyRightCompactForm (m) ;
57
58 // Set up v e c t o r s and matr ices f o r the l i n e a r
equat ion system
59 int numRows=(( Niede r r e i t e rPub l i cKey )pubKey [ 0 ] ) . getK
( ) ;
60 int numCols=(( Niede r r e i t e rPub l i cKey )pubKey [ 0 ] ) . getN
( ) ;
61
62 GF2Matrix [ ] gfM = new GF2Matrix [ r e c i p i e n t s ] ;
63 jm = new Jama . Matrix [ r e c i p i e n t s ] ;
64 syn = new Jama . Matrix [ r e c i p i e n t s ] ;
65 mes = new Jama . Matrix ( numCols , 1) ;
66 for ( int i =0; i<numCols ; i++)mes . s e t ( i , 0 , m. ge tB i t ( i ) )
;
67
68 // Assign p u b l i c keys to corresponding matr ices
69 //and c i p h e r t e x t s to syndrome v e c t o r s
70 for ( int i =0; i<r e c i p i e n t s ; i++){
71 gfM [ i ] = ( ( Niede r r e i t e rPub l i cKey )pubKey [ i ] ) . getH
( ) . extendRightCompactForm ( ) ;
72 jm [ i ] = M2JM(gfM [ i ] ) ;
73 syn [ i ] = jm [ i ] . t imes (mes ) ;
74 }
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75
76 // Concatenate matr ices and v e c t o r s
77 Jama . Matrix jjm=v e r t i c a l J o i n ( jm) ;
78 Jama . Matrix j syn=v e r t i c a l J o i n ( syn ) ;
79 normal ize ( jsyn , 2) ;
80
81 // So lve equat ion system
82 long tim=Calendar . g e t In s tance ( ) . ge tT imeInMi l l i s ( ) ;
83 Jama . Matrix s o l u t i o n=modSolve ( jjm , j syn ) ;
84 System . out . p r i n t l n ( ( Calendar . g e t In s tance ( ) .
ge tT imeInMi l l i s ( )−tim ) /1000+” Seconds ” ) ;
85 normal ize ( s o lu t i on , 2) ;
86
87 // Print s o l u t i o n
88 GF2Vector lsgVec=vec2GFvec ( s o l u t i o n ) ;
89 byte [ ] l sgByte=Convers ions . decode (
90 ( ( N iede r r e i t e rPub l i cKey )pubKey [ 0 ] ) . getN ( ) ,
91 ( ( N iede r r e i t e rPub l i cKey )pubKey [ 0 ] ) . getT ( ) , l sgVec ) ;
92 System . out . p r i n t l n ( ”Padded message” ) ;
93 for ( int i =0; i<pad . l ength ; i++)System . out . p r i n t ( pad [ i ]+” ”
) ;
94 System . out . p r i n t l n ( ”Padded s o l u t i o n ” ) ;
95 for ( int i =0; i<l sgByte . l ength ; i++)
96 System . out . p r i n t ( l sgByte [ i ]+” ” ) ;
97 St r ing s=new St r ing ( unPadMessage ( l sgByte ) ) ;
98 System . out . p r i n t l n ( ” C l ea r t ex t again ” ) ;
99 System . out . p r i n t l n ( s ) ;
100
101 //Check s o l u t i o n
102 i f ( s o l u t i o n==null )
103 System . out . p r i n t l n ( ” So lu t i on i s n u l l ” ) ;
104 i f ( s o l u t i o n !=null&&JMeq(mes , s o l u t i o n ) )
105 System . out . p r i n t l n ( ”” ) ;
106 else {
107 // I f wrong s o l u t i o n , output debug i n f o
108 System . out . p r i n t l n ( ” : ( ” ) ;
109 for ( int i =0; i<mes . getRowDimension ( ) ; i++)
110 System . out . p r i n t (mes . get ( i , 0 )+” ” ) ;
111 System . out . p r i n t l n ( ) ;
112 for ( int i =0; i<s o l u t i o n . getRowDimension ( ) ; i++)
113 System . out . p r i n t ( s o l u t i o n . get ( i , 0 )+” ” ) ;
114 System . out . p r i n t l n ( ) ;
115 Jama . Matrix check = jjm . t imes ( s o l u t i o n ) ;
116 normal ize ( check , 2) ;
117 i f (JMeq( check , j syn ) )
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118 System . out . p r i n t l n ( ”Check c o r r e c t ” ) ;
119 for ( int i =0; i<j syn . getRowDimension ( ) ; i++)
120 System . out . p r i n t ( j syn . get ( i , 0 )+” ” ) ;
121 System . out . p r i n t l n ( ) ;
122 for ( int i =0; i<check . getRowDimension ( ) ; i++)
123 System . out . p r i n t ( check . get ( i , 0 )+” ” ) ;
124 }
125 }
126
127 stat ic GF2Vector vec2GFvec (Jama . Matrix v ) {
128 //Assuming v i s a column v e c t o r
129 GF2Vector r e t=new GF2Vector ( v . getRowDimension ( ) ) ;
130 for ( int i =0; i<r e t . getLength ( ) ; i++)
131 i f ( v . get ( i , 0)==1) r e t . s e t B i t ( i ) ;
132
133 return r e t ;
134 }
135
136 stat ic Jama . Matrix modSolve (Jama . Matrix M, Jama . Matrix v ) {
137 // Require m>=n
138 int numCol=M. getColumnDimension ( ) ;
139 int numRow=M. getRowDimension ( ) ;
140 System . out . p r i n t l n ( ”ModSolve ac t i va t ed . Parameters ”+
numCol+” columns and ”+numRow+” rows . ” ) ;
141 i f (numRow<numCol ) {
142 System . out . p r i n t l n ( ”Number o f rows too smal l ” ) ;
143 return null ;
144 }
145
146 Jama . Matrix A=M. copy ( ) ;
147 Jama . Matrix b=v . copy ( ) ;
148 i f (numRow!=b . getRowDimension ( ) ) return null ;
149
150 Jama . Matrix r e t=new Jama . Matrix (numCol , 1 ) ;
151
152 // I n i t i a l i z e permutat ion t r a c k e r
153 int [ ] perm = new int [ numCol ] ;
154 for ( int i =0; i<perm . l ength ; i++)perm [ i ]= i ;
155
156 for ( int c o l =0; co l<numCol ; c o l++){
157 i f (A. get ( co l , c o l )==0){
158 //Need to swap columns
159 int pos=c o l ;
160 while (A. get ( co l , pos )==0&&pos<numCol−1)pos++;
161 i f ( pos>=numCol | |A. get ( co l , pos )==0){
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162 //No b e t t e r columns found . Trying rows
163 pos=c o l ;
164 while (A. get ( pos , c o l )==0&&pos<numRow−1)
165 pos++;
166
167 i f ( pos>=numRow | |A. get ( pos , c o l )==0){
168 //No row found
169 System . out . p r i n t l n ( ”Matrix i s rank
d e f i c i e n t ” ) ;
170 A. pr i n t (2 , 0 ) ;
171 b . p r i n t (2 , 0 ) ;
172 return null ;
173 } else {
174 //Row Pos found . Swapping
175 swapRows(A, pos , c o l ) ;
176 swapRows(b , pos , c o l ) ;
177 }
178 } else {
179 // Col Pos found , swapping
180 swapCols (A, co l , pos ) ;
181 int temp=perm [ c o l ] ; perm [ c o l ]=perm [ pos ] ;
perm [ pos ]=temp ;
182 }
183 }
184
185 // Pivot i s 1 now
186 for ( int row=0;row<numRow; row++)
187 i f ( row!= c o l&&A. get ( row , c o l )==1){
188 addRows(A, row , c o l ) ;
189 addRows(b , row , c o l ) ;
190 }
191 }
192
193 //Done d i a g o n a l i z i n g
194 for ( int i =0; i<r e t . getRowDimension ( ) ; i++)
195 r e t . s e t ( perm [ i ] , 0 , b . get ( i , 0) ) ;
196 return r e t ;
197 }
198
199 stat ic Jama . Matrix applyPerm (Jama . Matrix v , int [ ] p ) {
200 i f ( v . getRowDimension ( ) !=p . l ength ) {
201 System . out . p r i n t l n ( ” Permutation dimensions don ’ t
match” ) ;
202 return null ;
203 }
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204 Jama . Matrix r e t=new Jama . Matrix ( v . getRowDimension ( ) ,1 ) ;
205 for ( int i =0; i<p . l ength ; i++)
206 r e t . s e t (p [ i ] , 0 , v . get ( i , 0) ) ;
207 return r e t ;
208 }
209
210 stat ic void addRows(Jama . Matrix A, int a , int b) {
211 //Adds a+b and s t o r e s i t as row a
212 Jama . Matrix temp =
213 A. getMatrix ( a , a , 0 ,A. getColumnDimension ( )−1) . p lus (
214 A. getMatrix (b , b , 0 ,A. getColumnDimension ( )−1) ) ;
215 normal ize ( temp , 2) ;
216 A. setMatr ix ( a , a , 0 , A. getColumnDimension ( )−1, temp ) ;
217 }
218
219 stat ic void swapRows(Jama . Matrix A, int a , int b) {
220 Jama . Matrix temp =
221 A. getMatrix ( a , a , 0 , A. getColumnDimension ( )−1) ;
222 A. setMatr ix ( a , a , 0 , A. getColumnDimension ( )−1, A.
getMatrix (b , b , 0 , A. getColumnDimension ( )−1) ) ;
223 A. setMatr ix (b , b , 0 , A. getColumnDimension ( )−1, temp ) ;
224 }
225
226 stat ic void swapCols (Jama . Matrix A, int a , int b) {
227 Jama . Matrix temp =
228 A. getMatrix (0 , A. getRowDimension ( )−1, a , a ) ;
229 A. setMatr ix (0 , A. getRowDimension ( )−1, a , a , A. getMatrix
(0 , A. getRowDimension ( )−1, b , b) ) ;
230 A. setMatr ix (0 , A. getRowDimension ( )−1, b , b , temp ) ;
231 }
232
233 stat ic void normal ize (Jama . Matrix A, int q ) {
234 int temp ;
235 for ( int i =0; i<A. getRowDimension ( ) ; i++)
236 for ( int j =0; j<A. getColumnDimension ( ) ; j++){
237 temp=( int ) (A. get ( i , j )%q ) ;
238 i f ( temp<0)temp∗=−1;
239 A. s e t ( i , j , temp ) ;
240 }
241 }
242
243 stat ic boolean JMeq(Jama . Matrix A, Jama . Matrix B) {
244 i f (A. getColumnDimension ( ) !=B. getColumnDimension ( ) )
245 return fa l se ;
246 i f (A. getRowDimension ( ) !=B. getRowDimension ( ) )
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247 return fa l se ;
248 for ( int i =0; i<A. getRowDimension ( ) ; i++)
249 for ( int j =0; j<A. getColumnDimension ( ) ; j++)
250 i f (A. get ( i , j ) !=B. get ( i , j ) ) return fa l se ;
251 return true ;
252 }
253
254 stat ic Jama . Matrix M2JM( GF2Matrix gm) {
255 int [ ] [ ] gma = gm. getIntArray ( ) ;
256 int numColumns = gm. getNumColumns ( ) ;
257 int numRows = gm. getNumRows ( ) ;
258 Jama . Matrix r e t = new Jama . Matrix (numRows , numColumns) ;
259 St r ing bin ;
260 int o f f s e t ;
261 // Set matrix
262 for ( int i =0; i<r e t . getRowDimension ( ) ; i++){
263 for ( int j =0; j<gma [ 0 ] . l ength ; j++){
264 int va l=gma [ i ] [ j ] ;
265 bin=I n t e g e r . toBinaryStr ing ( va l ) ;
266 o f f s e t =32−bin . l ength ( ) ;
267 for ( int b i t s=o f f s e t ; b i t s <32; b i t s++){
268 r e t . s e t ( i , j ∗32+31−b i t s , I n t e g e r . pa r s e In t (
bin . s ub s t r i n g ( b i t s−o f f s e t , b i t s+1−o f f s e t )
) ) ;
269 }
270 }
271 }
272 return r e t ;
273 }
274
275 stat ic byte [ ] unPadMessage (byte [ ] input ) {
276 byte [ ] r e s u l t = new byte [ input . l ength − 1 ] ;
277 System . arraycopy ( input , 1 , r e s u l t , 0 , input . length −1) ;
278 return r e s u l t ;
279 }
280
281
282 stat ic byte [ ] padMessage (byte [ ] input ) {
283 byte [ ] r e s u l t = new byte [ input . l ength + 1 ] ;
284 r e s u l t [ 0 ] = 0x01 ;
285 System . arraycopy ( input , 0 , r e s u l t , 1 , input . l ength ) ;
286 return r e s u l t ;
287 }
288
289 stat ic Jama . Matrix randomModularMatrix ( int m, int n , int q ) {
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290 Jama . Matrix r e t=new Jama . Matrix (m, n) ;
291 for ( int i =0; i<m; i++)
292 for ( int j =0; j<n ; j++)
293 r e t . s e t ( i , j , ( int ) (Math . random ( ) ∗q ) ) ;
294 return r e t ;
295 }
296
297 stat ic Jama . Matrix h o r i z o n t a l J o i n (Jama . Matrix A, Jama . Matrix
B) {
298 i f (A. getRowDimension ( ) !=B. getRowDimension ( ) )
299 return null ;
300 Jama . Matrix r e t=new Jama . Matrix (A. getRowDimension ( ) ,
301 A. getColumnDimension ( )+B. getColumnDimension ( ) ) ;
302 r e t . setMatr ix (0 , 0 ,A. getRowDimension ( )−1,
303 A. getColumnDimension ( )−1,A) ;
304 r e t . setMatr ix (0 ,B. getRowDimension ( )−1,
305 A. getColumnDimension ( ) ,
306 r e t . getColumnDimension ( )−1,B) ;
307 return r e t ;
308 }
309
310 stat ic Jama . Matrix v e r t i c a l J o i n (Jama . Matrix [ ] matr izen ) {
311 int s i z e =0;
312 int width=matrizen [ 0 ] . getColumnDimension ( ) ;
313 for ( int i =0; i<matrizen . l ength ; i++){
314 s i z e+=matrizen [ i ] . getRowDimension ( ) ;
315 i f ( matr izen [ i ] . getColumnDimension ( ) !=width )
316 return null ;
317 }
318 Jama . Matrix r e t=new Jama . Matrix ( s i z e , width ) ;
319 int l o c =0;
320 for ( int i =0; i<matrizen . l ength ; i++){
321 r e t . setMatr ix ( loc , l o c+matrizen [ i ] . getRowDimension ( )
−1, 0 , width−1, matr izen [ i ] ) ;
322 l o c+=matrizen [ i ] . getRowDimension ( ) ;
323 }
324 return r e t ;
325 }
326
327 stat ic Jama . Matrix v e r t i c a l J o i n (Jama . Matrix A, Jama . Matrix B
) {
328 i f (A. getColumnDimension ( ) !=B. getColumnDimension ( ) )
return null ;
329 Jama . Matrix r e t=new Jama . Matrix (A. getRowDimension ( )+
330 B. getRowDimension ( ) , A. getColumnDimension ( ) ) ;
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331 r e t . setMatr ix (0 ,A. getRowDimension ( ) −1 ,0 ,
332 A. getColumnDimension ( )−1,A) ;
333 r e t . setMatr ix (A. getRowDimension ( ) ,
334 r e t . getRowDimension ( ) −1 ,0 ,
335 B. getColumnDimension ( )−1,B) ;
336 return r e t ;
337 }
338
339 stat ic void i n i t i a l i z e ( ) {
340 Secur i ty . addProvider (new Flex iCoreProv ider ( ) ) ;
341 Secur i ty . addProvider (new FlexiPQCProvider ( ) ) ;
342
343 try{
344 kpg = KeyPairGenerator . g e t In s tance ( ” N i e d e r r e i t e r ” , ”
FlexiPQC” ) ;
345 eccParams =
346 new ECCKeyGenParameterSpec (11 ,50) ;
347
348 kpg . i n i t i a l i z e ( eccParams , new SecureRandom ( ) ) ;
349 }catch ( Exception e ) {System . out . p r i n t l n ( e ) ;}
350 }
351
352 stat ic void genKeyPairs ( ) {
353 keyPair = new KeyPair [ r e c i p i e n t s ] ;
354 pubKey = new PublicKey [ r e c i p i e n t s ] ;
355 privKey = new PrivateKey [ r e c i p i e n t s ] ;
356 for ( int i =0; i<r e c i p i e n t s ; i++){
357 keyPair [ i ] = kpg . generateKeyPair ( ) ;
358 pubKey [ i ] = keyPair [ i ] . g e tPub l i c ( ) ;
359 privKey [ i ] = keyPair [ i ] . g e tPr iva t e ( ) ;
360 }
361 }
362
363 stat ic void te s tMatr ixFunct ions ( ) {
364 /∗ Jama . Matrix [ ] jm = new Jama . Matrix [ r e c i p i e n t s ] ;
365 Jama . Matrix [ ] syn = new Jama . Matrix [ r e c i p i e n t s ] ;
366 Jama . Matrix mes = randomModularMatrix (8 ,1 ,2) ;
367
368 f o r ( i n t i =0; i<r e c i p i e n t s ; i++){
369 jm [ i ] = randomModularMatrix (4 ,8 ,2) ;
370 syn [ i ] = jm [ i ] . t imes (mes) ;
371 }
372
373 Jama . Matrix jjm = v e r t i c a l J o i n ( jm) ;
374 Jama . Matrix j syn = v e r t i c a l J o i n ( syn ) ;
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375 normal ize ( jsyn , 2) ;
376
377 Jama . Matrix s o l u t i o n = jjm . s o l v e ( j s yn ) ;
378 Jama . Matrix check=jjm . t imes ( s o l u t i o n ) ;
379 mes . p r i n t (2 ,0) ;
380 jjm . p r i n t (2 ,0) ;
381 j s yn . p r i n t (2 ,1) ;
382 s o l u t i o n . p r i n t (2 , 0) ;
383 check . p r i n t (2 , 1) ;
384 ∗/
385 /∗ Jama . Matrix jm = randomModularMatrix (8 ,4 ,2) ;
386 Jama . Matrix mes = randomModularMatrix (4 ,1 ,2) ;
387 Jama . Matrix syn = jm . t imes (mes) ;
388 normal ize ( syn , 2) ;
389 jm . p r i n t (2 ,0) ;
390 mes . p r i n t (2 ,0) ;
391 syn . p r i n t (2 ,0) ;
392 Jama . Matrix s o l=modSolve ( jm , syn ) ;
393 s o l . p r i n t (2 , 0) ;
394 ∗/
395 }
396
397 stat ic byte [ ] [ ] encrypt ( S t r ing s , PublicKey [ ] pk , PrivateKey
[ ] sk ) {
398 message = s ;
399 messageBytes = message . getBytes ( ) ;
400 c iphe r t ex tByte s=new byte [ pk . l ength ] [ 1 0 0 ] ;
401 try{
402 Cipher c iphe r = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( ” N i e d e r r e i t e r ” , ”
FlexiPQC” ) ;
403
404 for ( int i =0; i<pk . l ength ; i++){
405 c iphe r . i n i t ( Cipher .ENCRYPT MODE, pk [ i ] ,
406 new SecureRandom ( ) ) ;
407 c iphe r t ex tByte s [ i ] =
408 c iphe r . doFinal ( messageBytes ) ;
409 }
410 return c iphe r t ex tByte s ;
411 }catch ( Exception e ) {System . out . p r i n t l n ( e+” in method
encrypt ” ) ;}
412
413 return null ;
414 }
415 }
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